(영문) 대법원 2015.9.15.선고 2015다218655 판결

1. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court determined that, on the same day, the Defendants received the instant vehicle from the Defendant B to sell the instant vehicle on the Internet, and the Plaintiff’s employees, H, and I (hereinafter “I et al.”) obtained the instant vehicle from the seller to purchase the instant vehicle, and prepared a sales contract as to the instant vehicle on September 25, 2012, and subsequently, Defendant B would pay any balance after completing the procedure for inspecting the performance of the instant vehicle and the ownership transfer registration, and then received the Plaintiff’s certificate of automobile registration, the delegation letter of the transfer of the Plaintiff’s seal affixed with the Defendants’ seal imprint, the certificate of the Plaintiff’s respective certificates of seal impression and the local tax payment, the certificate of the automobile register, and the history of the second vehicle accident, etc. (hereinafter “the instant documents, etc.”) and received the instant vehicle from the seller to purchase the instant vehicle from the seller of the instant vehicle, and then received the Plaintiff’s right of representation from the seller of the instant vehicle from the seller to the Plaintiff’s mobile phone, and received a copy of the instant vehicle from the Plaintiff C0 to the Plaintiff’s account.

2. However, the lower court’s determination is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

A. In order to claim the effect of an expression agent beyond the authority under Article 126 of the Civil Act, the other party is required to believe that his/her agent has the right of representation and to believe that he/she performs an act other than his/her authority with the intention of representation, in cases where he/she expresses or explicitly expresses his/her intention on behalf of the person in question, or performs an act other than his/her authority with the intention of representation. The existence of justifiable grounds here should be objectively observed and determined in all circumstances existing when the act of representation by the person in question is conducted (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Da3031, Feb.

B. The following circumstances revealed by the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, namely, ① the first contact with CI of the instant vehicle transaction site via CI of the instant vehicle transaction, and the fact that CI of the instant vehicle had been acquired by means of the instant vehicle transaction, is only located at the home display lot designated by C of the Cheongju, not the intermediate store, and ② at the time, C of the indication of the vehicle, the delegating and the delegating column were both public and the Defendants’ agent form were issued to I of the instant vehicle sale consignment form with the Defendants’ seal impression affixed. The instant form stated that the Plaintiff’s authority to purchase and sell the vehicle can not be used by a person other than the one who obtained permission for the used vehicle sale business pursuant to Article 49 of the Automobile Management Act without any specific reason for the issuance of a certificate of seal impression to CI of the instant vehicle transaction without any justifiable reason for the issuance of the said certificate to CI of the instant vehicle to CI of the instant vehicle. However, the Plaintiff’s vehicle dealer’s name and the Plaintiff’s agent’s registration in accordance with Article 53 of the instant Motor Vehicle Management Act.

Nevertheless, the court below determined that C has the authority to act on behalf of the Defendants. The court below determined that there is a reasonable ground to believe that the Defendants are the Defendants. In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on justifiable grounds in the expression representation, which affected the conclusion of the judgment

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.