[1] The starting point for the "six-month" period under Article 174 of the Civil Code in a case where the debtor, who was notified of the performance, sought a grace period for the performance to the creditor on the ground that it is necessary to investigate the existence of the performance obligation

[2] In a case where an insurance company which received multiple claims from the insured before the expiration of the extinctive prescription period for insurance claims expresses its intent to pay insurance proceeds in accordance with the result after additional confirmation of the degree of disability and causal relationship between the insured and the insured, the case holding that the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles in finding that the extinctive prescription for insurance claims was expired by recognizing the progress of the period, even though the highest effect until the response to whether to pay insurance proceeds is made, and the period of “6 months” under Article 1

[1] Article 174 of the Civil Code / [2] Article 174 of the Civil Code

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2004Da16976 Decided April 28, 2006 (Gong2006Sang, 908) Supreme Court Decision 2005Da25632 Decided June 16, 2006 (Gong2006Ha, 1327) Supreme Court Decision 2010Da9467 Decided May 27, 2010

Plaintiff (Attorney Kim Sung-sung, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea Life Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Duo, Attorneys Kim Jung-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Daegu High Court Decision 2009Na2928 decided June 18, 2010

The part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff, excluding the part of the claim for insurance money related to Ansan and Lee Jae-chul, is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court. The remaining appeal is dismissed

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. As to the completion of extinctive prescription of the instant insurance claim

In a peremptory notice as a reason for interrupting prescription under Article 174 of the Civil Act, where an obligor who received a peremptory notice to perform an obligation requests a creditor to postpone the performance of obligation on the ground that it is necessary to examine the existence of such obligation, the peremptory notice shall be deemed to continue until the obligee receives a reply. Therefore, the period of six months under the same Article shall be interpreted to be calculated from the time when the obligee receives a reply from the obligor (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2004Da16976, Apr. 28, 2006; 2005Da25632, Jun. 16, 2006; 2010Da9467, May 27, 2010).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the records, the non-party 1 entered into the medical record agreement with the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 as the non-party 1 and the non-party 3 insured on July 24, 1995 for the purpose of verifying the causation between the plaintiff's husband's medical record and the non-party 2 as the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 as the non-party 1 and the non-party 4 insured on the condition that the non-party 2 knew that the non-party 1 and the non-party 4 was not entitled to the non-party 2 as the non-party 2's request for the issuance of the medical record for the above non-party 2 as the non-party 1 and the non-party 2's non-party 2 as the non-party 1 and the defendant's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 1 and the defendant's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 3.

The lower court determined that the instant lawsuit was filed on May 7, 2007, after the two-year extinctive prescription period from the date of the instant accident, based on the foregoing factual basis, and further rejected the Plaintiff’s claim for insurance money by rejecting all of the Plaintiff’s claim on the grounds that “the Plaintiff’s claim for insurance money payment was filed to the Defendant six times in total from April 4, 2006 to January 17, 2007, before the two-year period after the instant accident occurred, and the Defendant’s person in charge was consulted with the Plaintiff on several occasions regarding the payment of insurance money, and even around April 3, 207, after verifying whether the Plaintiff’s disability was related to the instant accident, whether the disability falls under the disability grade table in the insurance terms and conditions, and thus, this constitutes waiver of the obligation approval or the benefit of extinctive prescription, and violation of the good faith principle.”

However, examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the Plaintiff’s request for the payment of insurance money to the Defendant several times before the expiration of the extinctive prescription period constitutes the highest cause for suspending the extinctive prescription period. Accordingly, it is clear that the Defendant Company’s person in charge of the Defendant Company requested the submission of necessary documents, sought confirmation of causation and degree of disability by finding out the Plaintiff’s principal initiative, or sought suspension of its performance until the Plaintiff notifies the Plaintiff of the existence and amount of the Plaintiff’s insurance claim, and thus, in such a case, the Supreme Court’s demand for the payment of insurance money remains effective until the date of reply as to the payment of insurance money, and the six-month period stipulated in Article 174 of the Civil Act is not in progress ( even if the Defendant’s notice on November 15, 2006 can be seen as the result of the refusal of the payment of insurance money, it is apparent that the instant lawsuit was brought on May 7, 2007, which is six months after the lapse of the six months thereafter).

Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the validity of peremptory notice, which is the cause of interruption of extinctive prescription, and the starting point of starting “six months” under Article 174 of the Civil Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

2. As to the claim for insurance money with internal, external, and non-human and partial insurance

The court below determined that the plaintiff's inner part and the disability of the plaintiff did not constitute "when the plaintiff completely loses the eyesight of two snow permanently" under subparagraph 1 of class 1 of the Disability Classification Table 1 because the plaintiff had no direct external wound due to the accident in this case, and the physical diagnosis result shows normal opinion, and the plaintiff's physical diagnosis result does not constitute "when the plaintiff completely loses the eyesight of two snow", and it cannot be viewed that there is a proximate causal relation with the accident in light of the plaintiff's age, etc., and it cannot be viewed that there was a proximate causal relation with the accident in this case, and that the plaintiff's hearing ability is merely a 40 cm level 40 cm level , and it cannot be restored to "where it is impossible to recover after being 60 cc or more", the degree of loss of hearing ability under subparagraph 11 of class 5 of the Disability Classification Table 5.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above recognition and judgment of the court below are just, and there is no error of law such as incomplete deliberation, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal. However, although the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the effect of peremptory notice, which is the ground for interruption of extinctive prescription, as seen earlier, the court below's rejection of this part of the claim, as long as it is just, it did not affect the conclusion of the judgment. The argument in the grounds of appeal related to this is

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment below against the plaintiff except for the part on the claim of insurance money related to Ansan and Lee Jae-chul and Lee Jae-chul is reversed without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal. This part of the case is remanded to the court below. The remaining grounds of appeal are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent

Justices Lee Sang-hoon (Presiding Justice)