The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. misunderstanding of facts or misunderstanding of legal principles is only in the same business relationship with the defendant, and cannot be seen as a worker, and even if the F can be seen as a worker.

In light of the fact that the defendant is not obliged to pay the ordinary wage for at least 30 days as it constitutes an exception to the pre-determination of dismissal, and that there is no fact that the defendant actually notified F of dismissal, the court below which found the defendant guilty of the facts charged in this case has erred by misunderstanding of the facts or misunderstanding

B. The punishment sentenced by the lower court (the penalty amount of KRW 500,000) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged by the lower court’s judgment as to the assertion of misunderstanding of facts or misapprehension of the legal doctrine, it is reasonable to see that F is an employee under the Labor Standards Act, and the Defendant’s assertion on this part is without merit.

① At the time of investigation by the Seoul Southern Branch Office of the Seoul Regional Labor Office, Defendant stated that he/she was employed by him/her, and Defendant was employed by his/her Do and the head of the management office.

G also states F as an employee of the Defendant, which is distinguished from the statement that I (one person K) was a new rental business operator.

② The Defendant guaranteed F’s basic pay of KRW 1,50,000,000 was fixed each month at the 10th day of the month. ③ The Defendant asked F and other employees in the management room of the victim, including F, to observe the same degree of time as that of other employees in the management room of the victim including F, pursuant to the provisions of other employees in the care room operated by the Defendant. Nevertheless, the Defendant instructed F to report to the Defendant at the time of his/her retirement due to its failure to comply therewith.

(4) Even according to the statement of the Defendant himself, the Defendant was unable to operate the management office of the skin in charge of the crypt after childbirth (hereinafter referred to as the “management office of the skin in this case”) operated by himself.