beta
Text
The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.
Reasons
1. Summary of grounds for appeal;
A. Although the defendant could not be deemed to have been in a state of mental disability at the time of the crime of this case, the court below recognized mental disability of the defendant. In this case, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on mental disability.
B. The lower court’s sentencing is too unjustifiable and unreasonable.
2. Determination
A. As to the unjust assertion of mental disorder, Article 10 of the relevant legal doctrine is a biological element, and it is necessary to distinguish things from mental disorder, such as mental disorder, mental weakness, or abnormal mental condition, as well as the psychological disorder, and the mental disorder caused by such mental disorder is lacking or reduced in the ability to control the act accordingly. Thus, even if a person with mental disorder is a person with a normal mental disorder at the time of committing the crime, he/she cannot be deemed a mental disorder if he/she had the ability to distinguish things from normal things at the time of committing the crime. However, Article 23(4)3 of the former Pharmaceutical Affairs Act (amended by Act No. 11251, Feb. 1, 2012) (amended by Act No. 11251, Feb. 1, 2012) of the same Act (amended by Act No. 23(4)3 of the amended Pharmaceutical Affairs Act thereafter)
A) In the case of such fixed mental illness as above, even in a case where the offender’s consciousness in the process of committing the crime seems to be identical to the normal person, it is often related to the mental illness that could not suppress the impulse of the crime. In such a case, there is room to deem that it is a mental disorder as a result of the mental illness’s decline in the ability to control the act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 92Do1425, Aug. 18, 1992). The following facts are acknowledged according to the records.
A) The Defendant’s diagnosis and treatment process (1) (from January 2, 2014 to November 27, 2017, the Defendant’s “uneasy disorder in the standing,” and “abstinence in the standing, and mental disorder in the sexual intercourse,” and “abstinence in the standing,” respectively.