1. The instant lawsuit shall be dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff

The main point of the argument is that the defendant is an incorporated association within the religious order of the B religious organization, and the plaintiff was the head of the defendant's political department from April 2010 to 2013 as the member of the N church, the branch church to which the defendant belongs.

Since the judgment of the general assembly of religious organizations B was written in September 16, 2014, the defendant is obligated to implement the above judgment.

On October 8, 2012, the Defendant amended the rules and election regulations at the Trade Association No. 127 times on October 8, 2012. However, for the resolution of the Trade Association, the Defendant’s resolution requires the consent of 2/3 of the number of the petition documents signed by at least five pastors and the total number of the members 197, and 2/3 of the members present at the Trade Association. The above resolution was held as a petition document signed by only two persons, and its procedure is unlawful and invalid.

The election of the chief executive officer of J shall be made by the E subject of punishment for the two-year suspension of the public service, and by the E subject of punishment for the one-year suspension of the public service, in violation of the rules of the Union and the election regulations, but the election has been made in the order of delegation, and shall be made invalid on the basis of false regulations.

The plaintiff pointed out the above problems and requested correction several times, but the defendant did not comply with the request, so there is no binding force on the punishment of religious organizations, so it is necessary to make judgment and indirect compulsory enforcement in accordance with the social law.

The legal doctrine pertaining to the determination of the legitimacy of the instant lawsuit (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Da78990, Dec. 11, 2014) is that religious activities are guaranteed by the State’s interference with the freedom of religion and the principle of separation of religion and religion under the Constitution. As such, the court, which is a State agency, should, in principle, guarantee the autonomy of the pertinent religious organization by failing to conduct substantive deliberation and determination, unless it regulates the rights and obligations or legal relations of a general citizen with respect to matters concerning the internal relation

Religious orders shall exist.