[1] Where a public official engaged in the affairs of state property acquires state property in the name of a third party, the validity of such acquisition (negative)

[2] In a case where a public official engaged in the affairs concerning state property claims the invalidation of state property after the lapse of 20 years from the acquisition of state property in the name of a third party, whether it is contrary to the principle of gold speech or the principle of trust and good faith (negative)

[1] The act of acquiring land in the name of a third party by a public official engaged in the affairs related to state property under the name of the third party shall be null and void not only in relation to the pertinent public official who actually acquired it, but also in relation to the person who acquired it, as an evasion of the law to escape Article 7 of the former State Property Act (amended by Act No. 2950 of Dec. 31, 1976) which

[2] Since a public official, who is engaged in the affairs of state property, borrows his/her relative and relative name and purchased state property is null and void in violation of the former State Property Act, which is a mandatory law, it does not require a special act or procedure to invalidate it. Thus, it is null and void as a matter of course without a special act or procedure to invalidate it, and its invalidation is recovered or converted to its validity after the lapse of 20 years from the date of sale. Thus, even if the State claims its invalidation after the lapse of 20 years from the date of sale, it does not

[1] Article 7 of the former State Property Act (amended by Act No. 2950 of Dec. 31, 1976) and / [2] Article 2 of the Civil Act

[1]

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Jeon-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Republic of Korea (Attorney Kim Dong-in, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Defendant (Attorney Kim Yong-soo, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

1. It shall be confirmed that each real estate listed in the separate sheet is owned by the plaintiff;

2. The defendant shall implement the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer for each of the above real estate to the plaintiff on the ground of the restoration of the authentic title of registration.

3. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

The same shall apply to the order.

1. Grounds for request;

In the case of the application for the transfer registration of the ownership of each real estate listed in the separate list which the plaintiff originally owned (hereinafter referred to as the "real estate of this case"), on June 7, 1991, "the plaintiff shall execute the procedure for the transfer registration of ownership based on the sale and purchase of the real estate of this case on September 30, 1974", each adjustment was completed, as to the real estate of this case listed in the separate list No. 2067 as of July 24, 192, No. 2067 as to the above list No. 1 as to the second real estate of this case listed in the separate list No. 1 as to the above list No. 18469 as of June 28, 191, the fact that the transfer registration of the real estate under the name of the defendant was completed on September 30, 197, the fact that the defendant purchased the real estate of this case under the name of the non-party 1 as to the non-party 1 as to the above list No. 3 evidence No. 1 as to this case No. 4

However, Article 7 of the former State Property Act (amended by Act No. 2950 of Dec. 31, 1976) provides that an employee engaged in the affairs related to State property shall not acquire, or exchange with, his/her own property except when he/she obtains permission from the competent Minister (Paragraph 1). The purpose of the State Property Act is to protect the state property and ensure the appropriateness of the acquisition, maintenance, preservation, operation, and disposal thereof (Article 1 of the same Act). Accordingly, each of the above provisions strictly prohibits employees engaged in the affairs related to State property from using the most obvious act that may be suspected of any unlawful act in order to promote the fairness of the affairs related to State property, while null and void the judicial effect thereof, the act of acquiring the above forest under the name of a third party (hereinafter referred to as a "public official in charge of government affairs") shall be construed as null and void not only to apply the above provisions to the person acquiring the State property under the name of the public official in charge of the State Property Act, but also to the relation of the person acquiring the State property under the title 2.

Therefore, as seen above, the above sales contract for the real estate concluded in the name of the plaintiff and the defendant is null and void as a contract concluded by the above non-party 1, who is a public official in charge of government administration, borrowed the above real estate in the name of the defendant with the third party for his own account in order to acquire the above real estate, and the above transfer registration under the name of the defendant for this reason is also null and void unless there are special circumstances. Thus, the real

2. Judgment on the defendant's defense

A. First, the defendant asserts that the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the defendant with respect to the real estate of this case has been made pursuant to the above mediation protocol, and that the mediation protocol has the same effect as a judicial compromise, and unless it is revoked by a quasi-deliberation lawsuit, the parties to the above mediation cannot make any assertion different from the fact that the above mediation protocol has acknowledged the reversion of ownership or the loss or invalidity of a sale contract under res judicata effect. However, the plaintiff asserts that the above sale contract between the defendant is null and void in the lawsuit of this case, and that the ownership of the above real estate is owned by himself cannot be permitted

However, res judicata of the conciliation protocol only affects the conclusion of the judgment on the existence of legal relations alleged as a subject matter of lawsuit, and it does not affect the existence of legal relations, which are the premise thereof, and therefore, even if the conciliation became final and conclusive that the plaintiff will implement the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer of the above real estate against the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff purchased the above real estate from the plaintiff, the res judicata of the conciliation protocol does not affect the existence of the right to claim the registration of ownership transfer, which was the subject matter of lawsuit, or the existence of ownership of the above real estate or the loss or invalidity of the sales contract, which is the premise thereof. Therefore, the above argument of the defendant on the ground that the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff

B. The defendant, in spite of the fact that the above non-party 1 borrowed the above non-party's name and was disqualified from state property in 1985, the plaintiff recognized the defendant's purchase of the real estate in the above mediation procedure on June 7, 1991. In light of the above, although the above non-party 1 did not obtain permission from the competent Minister at the time of purchase of the above real estate, it is concluded because the above sales price was appropriate and the above sales contract was necessary to secure the plaintiff's financial revenue, the plaintiff's above act is confirmed and thus, it is asserted that the plaintiff's act constitutes an effective ratification.

However, as seen earlier, the sales contract in violation of the above provisions of the State Property Act is null and void and is not subject to ratification due to its nature, and the above sales contract cannot be deemed as an expression of intent to have the same effect as the permission of the competent minister with respect to the above sales contract between the plaintiff and the non-party 1, and it cannot be deemed as an effective ratification. Thus, the defendant's assertion is without merit.

C. In addition, the defendant asserts that the defendant acquired the ownership of the above real estate by prescription on September 30, 1994 since he purchased the real estate of this case from the plaintiff on September 30, 1974, by occupying it in peace and openly and openly with the intention of possession, and then possessing it on September 30, 1994.

However, on September 30, 1974, the above non-party 1, who borrowed the defendant's name, concluded a sales contract with the plaintiff on the above real estate on September 30, 1974, and had the defendant conclude an adjustment among the plaintiff on June 7, 1991 by pretending that the defendant purchased the real estate of this case from the plaintiff, and had the plaintiff undergo the registration of ownership transfer from the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant's possession of the real estate of this case cannot be viewed as an autonomous possession. The above non-party 1, the actual purchaser of the real estate of this case, even if based on the above non-party 1's possession, who was the above non-party 1, the above non-party 1, who was the actual purchaser of the above real estate, was aware that the above sales contract was null and void because it was necessary to obtain permission from the Minister of Justice to which he belongs. Thus, the defendant's assertion cannot be accepted.

D. Finally, the Defendant: (a) sold the instant real estate and used the proceeds as funds for economic development pursuant to the strong necessity of securing financial revenue for the development of the national economy; (b) did not incur any loss to the Plaintiff since the highest price was sold to the bidders in the public sale procedure and received the payment in full; and (c) in around 1985, it was revealed that Nonparty 1 purchased the State property by borrowing his relative name, but the Plaintiff did not make any defense or investigation during the above conciliation procedure and recognized that the above sales contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant was lawful. However, even if the Defendant had been more than 20 years since September 30, 1974, and the Plaintiff’s assertion that the above sales contract between the Defendant and the Defendant violated the above State Property Act and thus null and void is not permissible.

However, even if the sale of the real estate in this case was conducted according to the longer needs of the plaintiff, and the price was used according to its necessity, and the sale was made at an appropriate price and did not cause any damage to the plaintiff, it cannot be readily concluded that the plaintiff's assertion of invalidity of the above sale contract against the mandatory law is in violation of the principle of speech and good faith, and thus, it cannot be concluded that the plaintiff's assertion of invalidity of the above sale contract cannot be permitted. The plaintiff's assertion in this case, which is a separate lawsuit that does not have res judicata effect on the grounds that the plaintiff did not assert in the above mediation procedure, also goes against the principle of speech and good faith and the principle of good faith. The null and void juristic act does not require any special act or procedure to invalidate it, and it is naturally null and void, and is not converted into a valid or effective one, and therefore, it cannot be viewed that the plaintiff's assertion is contrary to the principle of speech and good faith and the principle of good faith.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, as long as it is clear that the real estate in this case is still owned by the plaintiff, and the defendant is dissatisfied with it, the defendant is obligated to implement the procedure for ownership transfer registration based on the restoration of the true name of registration concerning the real estate in this form. Therefore, the plaintiff's claim in this case is justified and it is decided as per Disposition by applying Article 89 of the Civil Procedure Act to the burden of litigation costs (attached Form omitted).

Judges Jeong-ju (Presiding Judge)