1. Whether the change from the progressive payment system of retirement allowances to the fractional payment system is disadvantageous to the workers;

2. Procedures and effects of amendment to the rules of employment disadvantageous to workers;

3. Whether Article 95 of the Labor Standards Act is a mandatory provision

4. Method of including the bonus and annual allowance in the average wage in calculation of the retirement allowance; and

1. Change of retirement allowance payment system from the accumulated payment system of service year to the fractional payment system that pays only one month of service year from the accumulated payment system of service year is obvious in calculating the disadvantage to workers;

2. The amendment of the rules of employment requires the consent of collective decision-making by a group of workers subject to the previous rules of employment in order to unilaterally disadvantage workers. The consent method shall be deemed to have been effective as an amendment of the rules of employment, unless there exists a labor union consisting of a majority of the members’ meetings in the absence of such union, and the same shall apply to workers who have individually consented to the amendment of the rules of employment.

3. Article 95 of the Labor Standards Act, which requires workers to meet strict requirements with regard to amendment of the rules of employment unfavorable to workers, is prepared to protect the existing rights and interests of workers, and thus has the nature of compulsory provisions. Therefore, even if the revision of the rules of employment is necessary and the contents of the amendment are legitimate, it shall not be deemed valid unless the above requirements are met.

4. In calculating the monthly average wage of a worker, it is reasonable to calculate that the bonus has been actually received or would have been actually received for one year prior to his retirement in the calculation of the monthly average wage of the worker, and it is reasonable to calculate the amount actually received by the worker for one year prior to his retirement.

Articles 20, 27, 28, and 95 of the Labor Standards Act

Ein and one other

Korea Ship Owner Corporation

1. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff Lee Jong-ju 26,813,022 won, gold 51,301,931 won to the same stuffing area, and 50% per annum from July 14, 1985 to July 24, 1987, and 25% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

2. Each of the plaintiffs' remaining claims is dismissed.

3. Ten percent of the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiffs, and the remainder shall be borne by the defendants.

4. The above paragraph (1) can be provisionally executed.

The defendant shall pay 30,816,198 won to the plaintiff Lee Jong-jo and 57,710,251 won to the plaintiff Park Jong-gu and 57,710,251 won per annum from July 14, 1985 to the delivery date of a copy of the complaint of this case, and 25 percent per annum from the next day to the full payment date.

The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant, and a judgment of provisional execution

1. The facts that Gap 2, 9, Gap 3, Gap 4, Eul 6-1, Gap 7-2, Gap 10-10, Eul 7-10, Eul 10-2, and Eul 10-10 and 2-9 were newly established as the retirement allowance for the above 3-year period from 197. The defendant company was established as the Korea Shipping Corporation under the Korea Shipping Corporation Act on January 1, 1950, under the revised 197. The defendant company's 1-6th of the above 197's 1-6th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 197th of the 197th of the 197th of the 197th of the 197th of the 197th of the 197th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the retirement allowance.

2. Determination as to whether the labor contract relation is terminated or not

Therefore, the above plaintiffs submitted resignation to the defendant company on December 31, 1971, which was forced by the defendant company. At the time, the defendant company submitted resignation to all the employees including the plaintiffs in form to revise the rules of employment and took measures to re-enter the whole following day. Thus, the previous labor contract relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant company was asserted that the above company continued without being cut off as the submission of the above employees. The defendant company submitted resignation by free will at the time of December 31, 1971, and even if not, the plaintiffs received retirement pay under the previous rules of payment of retirement pay, it was approved of dismissal. Thus, the previous labor contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant company was cut off and re-entered as a new labor contract. Thus, this study examined this issue.

Therefore, even if the above Gap 10-1 and 2 had no dispute over the establishment of Gap 10-1 and 9-2, Gap 1 and 7-1 through 5 (the above 19-10-200-200-100-700-100-100-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-000-00-00-000-00-00-000-00-000-00-00-000-00-000-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-0-0-00-00-00-00-0-00-00-00-).

3. Determination on the validity of the amendment to the rules of employment of the defendant company

The fact that the defendant company revised the rules of employment around December 31, 1971 and changed the retirement allowance payment system for the land-wons of the defendant company to the fractional payment system that pays only one month per year of continuous service in accordance with the criteria as shown in attached Table 1 as well as the retirement allowance payment system for each year of continuous service according to the same criteria as shown in attached Table 1 is clear that the above change in the retirement allowance payment system is disadvantageous to workers.

Therefore, with respect to whether the rules of employment regarding the above criteria for the payment of retirement allowances of the defendant company is effective to the employees of the defendant company, including the plaintiffs, the revision of the rules of employment is required to unilaterally change the contents of the existing rules of employment to a disadvantage to the employees by a collective decision-making method of the worker group that was under the application of the previous rules of employment. The consent method requires the consent of a majority of the workers' meeting if there is a labor union composed of majority of the workers, and if there is no such union, it is not effective as a modification of the rules of employment without the consent as above. This is also the same to the employees who have consented individually to the above modification of the rules of employment. Thus, when the defendant company amends the retirement allowances payment system of the above rules of employment to a disadvantage to the employees with a short-term payment system as seen earlier, there is no explicit consent of the above employees of the defendant company to the above change of the rules of employment, regardless of whether the majority of the whole members of the defendant company had already been admitted to the above association or the above change of the rules of employment.

The defendant company first revised the rules of employment as mentioned above at the time, because the defendant company operated the shipping industry due to the aggravation of the overall shipping competition and the excessive treatment of the employees in the shipping industry due to the strike of the employees in the U.S. region, it was an inevitable measure for the reorganization of the defendant company. Further, since the retirement allowance payment criteria at the time were set too high compared with other companies due to the reason that it received the rules of employment indisrushly, and the revised rules of employment did not violate the Labor Standards Act, the revised rules of employment are reasonable. Thus, considering the essence that the rules of employment are unilaterally prepared and written by the employer, as long as it is necessary and reasonable, the revised rules of employment should be deemed as valid. However, the provisions of the Labor Standards Act (Article 95) demanding the employees to amend the rules of employment to the disadvantage of workers as seen above are to have been established to protect the existing interests and interests of workers, the defendant company's assertion that there is no need to revise the rules of employment in the above premise that the above revised rules of employment cannot be justified.

Furthermore, even if the above revised rules of employment were invalid, the defendant company received retirement allowances pursuant to the revised rules of employment as of June 30, 1985 when the plaintiffs were serving after re-admission of the above rules of employment and retired again on June 30, 1985. Thus, the plaintiffs confirmed the invalid act of revising the rules of employment or waive their right to action, and even if not, they asserted that the act of nullifying the above revised rules of employment was converted to be effective due to the plaintiffs' act of receiving retirement allowances without objection. Thus, unless there are circumstances such as explicitly recognizing that the above revised rules of employment was invalid even though the plaintiffs received retirement allowances as of June 30, 1985, the above revised rules of employment was invalid (in this regard, there is no assertion from the defendant company). Thus, the fact that the plaintiffs received retirement allowances pursuant to the revised rules of employment as of June 30, 1985 without objection cannot be viewed as valid or ratified as invalid, and it cannot be viewed as invalid and the revised rules of employment became invalid.

In addition, the defendant company and its employees believe that the revised rules of employment were effective by the plaintiffs and its employees without raising any objection for more than 13 years after being subject to the revised rules of employment as above, and the revised rules of employment were established as a customary practice, which is a fact, and all employees and workers have believed that the revised rules of employment were effective. The plaintiffs' assertion that the above revised rules of employment are unfair because it is not contrary to the above fact-based customs, and it is against the principle of good faith or the principle of equity. Thus, it cannot be said that the revised rules of employment were formed as a customary practice, which is a fact-finding, just because the plaintiffs did not raise an objection for more than 13 to 14 years after being subject to the revised rules of employment, and that the revised rules of employment violate the provisions of Article 95 of the Labor Standards Act, which is a mandatory rule, and therefore, it cannot be viewed that the plaintiffs and the defendant company's retirement allowance system cannot be regulated as a norm, and the plaintiffs' assertion that the revised rules of employment and retirement allowance were null and void by the revised rules of employment for more than 13 years.

4. Calculation of retirement amount;

As above, the previous rules of employment shall continue to apply to the plaintiffs if the plaintiffs' labor contract relations were not interrupted and the revision of the above rules of employment by the defendant company is null and void. Thus, in the retirement of the plaintiffs on June 30, 1985, the defendant company is obligated to pay retirement allowances calculated according to the previous rules of employment for the number of years of continuous service from the date of their initial employment until June 30, 1985, counting from the date of their initial employment to June 30, 1985. Thus, the amount of retirement allowances should be viewed as the amount of their retirement allowances

Therefore, the amount of Defendant Company’s 10 and 4. The total annual salary of KRW 1, 2, and 3 (payment records) of KRW 1, 12 of KRW 10, 13-1, 14, and 15 of KRW 10 and KRW 90 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 50 of KRW 10 of KRW 50 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 50 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 5 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 5 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 5 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 5 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 9 of KRW 10 of KRW 10 of KRW 8 of this year’ of KRW 10 of this year’ of KRW 30 of this year’ of retirement.

Meanwhile, in calculating the average wage for one month of the plaintiffs, it is reasonable to calculate the monthly salary of the plaintiffs to the extent that the plaintiffs were actually able to actually receive or actually receive (in the case of plaintiff's stuffing stuffing) for one year prior to their retirement (in the case of plaintiff's withdrawal from office, it is reasonable to calculate the amount that the plaintiffs were actually paid for one year prior to their retirement (However, according to the above conditions, the plaintiffs were paid for one year from December 1984 to June 30, 1985 to six months from January 30, 1985 to June 1985, so the 1984 portion of the bonus was clearly paid to the plaintiffs' 1/190 of the average wage for one year prior to their retirement, the 1984 portion of the bonus is to be paid to the plaintiffs' 1/100 of the average wage for one year prior to their retirement as stated in attached Table 2-D and 1-4 years and 2-4 years and 1-6 years and 1-6 years and 4 years of the number of retirement.).

However, according to the evidence Nos. 2 and 9 of the above, the plaintiffs can recognize the fact that the defendant company retired from office on June 30, 1985 and received the second entry in the attached Form Nos. 2-(f) as retirement pay, and there is no counter-proof otherwise. Since the plaintiffs received the first entry in the attached Form Nos. 1-(f) as retirement allowance upon submitting the resignation on December 31, 1971, the plaintiffs received the first entry in the attached Form Nos. 1-(f) as retirement allowance, it is obvious that the retirement allowance to be paid by the defendant company to the plaintiffs should be deducted from the above total retirement pay.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the defendant company is obligated to pay damages for delay at the rate of 26,813,02 won and 51,301,931 won and 51,301,931 won to the plaintiff's Lee Jong-gu and 1987.7.24, the date of the above retirement (the plaintiff is entitled to pay damages for delay at the rate of 25,000% per annum from the day after the delivery of copy of the complaint of this case to July 24, 1987, which is the date of the judgment of this case. However, it is reasonable for the defendant company to dispute the existence or scope of the above retirement payment of this case until the date of the judgment of this case. Thus, the plaintiffs' claims of this case are justified only within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining damages for delay shall be dismissed by applying Article 39 of the Civil Procedure Act Article 9 of the Act to each of the above provisional execution.

Judges Lee Jae-soo (Presiding Judge)