Daejeon District Court-2017-Gu Partnership-107512 (Law No. 12, 2018)

A person supplied with a tax invoice for the transfer of business without consent of a lessor is an existing contractor.

(1) A tax invoice issued by a lessee who operates a real estate rental business without the consent of the lessor (as in the first instance judgment) by the lessor who is supplied with the transferor who is an existing contractor who is not the lessor, according to the comprehensive acquisition by transfer of the business.

Article 75 of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act

2018Nu12020 Revocation of Disposition Rejecting Value-Added Tax Correction

○○ Co., Ltd.

○ Head of tax office

Daejeon District Court Decision 2017Guhap107512 Decided July 12, 2018

July 12, 2018

August 16, 2018

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked. On December 8, 2016, the defendant revoked the disposition of refusal against the plaintiff as to the claim for refund of value-added tax amounting to KRW 5,400,00 for the second term of 200,000 for the second term of 2012, and KRW 16,20,000 for the first term of 203,000 for the second term of 2013.

1. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

The ground for appeal by the plaintiff is not significantly different from the argument in the first instance court, and the fact-finding and decision in the first instance court are justified even if the evidence submitted in the first instance court is different from the evidence submitted in this court.

Accordingly, the reasoning for this Court regarding this case is that the reasoning for the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as that for the judgment of the court of first instance, except as otherwise stated in addition, supplementation or correction of the following contents, and thus, it is acceptable in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act

The first instance court's decision No. 8 of the first instance court's 4th " was provided", and in light of these circumstances, AA can be seen as impliedly consenting to the transfer of the right of lease or the change of the lessee.

○ On the 6th page of the judgment of the first instance court, the "in accordance with the judgment of the first instance" in the 4th sentence is "in accordance with the judgment of the first instance (including provisional execution orders) as executive title."

○ In Part 6 of the 6th decision of the court of first instance, the witness testimony of the court of first instance is added to the 8th [based grounds for recognition] of "D's testimony."

○ The following shall be added from the bottom of the 8th judgment of the first instance to the point issued as the third expense.

It does not seem that the lessee at the time of entering into the instant lease agreement was expected to be changed from BB to the Plaintiff, and that the official door sent by BB to the treatment securities on October 11, 2012 is merely the fact that BB changed from BB to ○○○ (Plaintiff) and thus, it does not mean that the lessee of the instant lease agreement was changed from BB to the Plaintiff or consented to the transfer of the right of lease, and that it is difficult to view it as an implied consent to the change of lessee on the ground that the instant lease agreement was not taken any measure against BB, and that, in other words, AAB’s nonperformance of obligations or the contract period (from October 9, 2012, until December 9, 2012) was changed to BB, and that the lessee and the lessee were intentionally avoided the Plaintiff’s lawsuit and the Plaintiff’s request for the change pursuant to BB agreement.

2. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

(c)