Case on the Livelihood Protection Standard

[9-1 KCCR 543, 94Hun-Ma33, May 29, 1997]

A. Background of the Case

In this case, the Court delivered a decision of constitutionality for the livelihood protection standards that prescribed the payment of livelihood benefits that were lower than the minimum cost of living.

The complainants, husband and wife, were protected under Article 6 Section 1 of the Protection of Minimum Living Standards Act and Article 6 Item 1 of the Enforcement Decree thereof and were recipients of the livelihood benefits calculated under the "1994 Livelihood Protection Standard" in the 1994 Guidelines for Livelihood Protection Programs, which was promulgated by the Minister of Health and Welfare in January. The couple filed a constitutional complaint against the "1994 Livelihood Protection Standard," alleging that the amount of the payment was far below the minimum living cost and therefore infringed on the constitutionally guaranteed rights to the pursuit of happiness and a humane livelihood.

B. Summary of the Decision

After reaffirming the state's responsibility to protect people's living standards, the Constitutional Court held that the "1994 Livelihood Protection Standard" does not violate the fundamental rights of the complainants, for the following reasons.

In the course of the development of capitalism, poverty was recognized as a task to be solved by the state. Our Constitution accordingly guarantees to the people the right to a humane livelihood (Article 34 Section 1) and imposes on the state a duty to promote social security and welfare (Article 34 Section 2). In particular, Article 34 Section 5 of the Constitution explicitly prescribes the state's duty to protect those who are incapable of earning a livelihood due to old age or other reasons. This duty was further elaborated by the Protection of Minimum Living Standards Act, which was enacted by the legislature for the purpose of carrying out such duty.

Therefore, the legislature violates the state's duty to protect people without economic ability and the people's right to humane livelihood if the state does not legislate at all in the area of livelihood protection or the content of the legislation

is so irrational that the state has clearly deviated from its discretion. However, the constitutionality of the livelihood protection standards cannot be judged by the livelihood benefit payments under the Protection of Minimum Living Standards Act alone, but by the aggregate level, including those livelihood protection payments or exemptions provided by other laws.

In 1994, for example, in-house recipients (like the complainants), in addition to the living assistance payment of 65,000 won per month, received a winter subsidy of 61,000 won per year. Those aged 70 or older received an elderly allowance of 15,000 won a month. Those of ages 65 or older receive a bus fare allowance of 3,600 won per month. All welfare recipients also receive exemptions on water supply and drainage taxes; 2,500 won for television reception charges; and a monthly exemption of 6,000 won on telephone charges.

In consideration of all these benefits, even if their aggregate sum does not meet that year's minimum cost of living for a household of two (a per capita monthly amount of 190,000 won for a major city, 178,000 won for a small to medium city, and 154,000 won for rural areas in 1994), this fact alone does mean that the "1994 Livelihood Protection Standard" violates the complainants’ right to pursue happiness or to a humane livelihood.

C.Significanceof the Decision and Aftermath of the Case

The case came to a close after three years upon the Court’s dismissal, but created much social discourse on welfare policies.

The Court’s decision held significance in that it set the direction on the question as to what extent the right to a humane livelihood confines the policy decisions of the state concerning the level of protection it provides to people incapable of earning a livelihood.

Critics of the decision, however, argued that the Court was excessively conscious of the impact that the state's active intervention in the sphere of public benefits would bring about on its fiscal and economic policies and allowed too broad a policy discretion to the state in its setting of the level of protection for people without economic ability (Jeong Tae-Ho,Basic Social Rights as a Principle).

In 2004, the issue of livelihood protection standards once again became the subject of adjudication at the Constitutional Court. The Court held that the Minister of Health and Welfare’s publication of the 2002 Livelihood Protection Standard, which calculated the standard based only on the number of persons in the household, without determining a separate minimum cost of living for those with increased expenditure cost due to disability, does not infringe upon the right

to human dignity and worth or to the pursuit of happiness of the members of indigent households with disabled persons. (2002Hun-Ma328, October 28, 2004).

On February 23, 2012, the manner in which the National Basic Living Security Act assessed minimum living costs by converting property such as houses into income, to include it in “recognized income,” became an issue. The Court stated that as the benefits provided under the National Basic Living Security Act were supplementary, it was constitutionally acceptable to convert property into income to include it in the scope of recognized income, so as to exclude those who were capable of making a livelihood from their property by disposing of it or using it to earn interests. In particular, given the fact that housing costs account for the highest share of costs necessary for maintaining a basic livelihood, and that people owning houses can receive benefits for life through the reverse mortgage program, the relevant provision of the National Basic Living Security Act does not infringe the right to a life worthy of human beings guaranteed under Article 34 of the Constitution (2009Hun-Ba47).