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(영문) 부산지법 동부지원 2011. 9. 19.자 2011카합211 결정

[고리1호기가동중지가처분] 즉시항고[각공2011하,1335]

Main Issues

In a case where a company operating a nuclear power plant continues to operate the nuclear power plant whose designed life has expired with the permission of the Minister of Science and Technology, residents living in neighboring areas of the power plant have a safety problem in the continuous operation of the power plant, and applied for a provisional disposition to suspend the operation of the power plant, the case holding that the above residents have no right to seek the suspension of operation of the power plant.

Summary of Decision

In a case where a company operating a nuclear power plant continues to operate a nuclear power plant, the design life of which has expired after obtaining permission from the Minister of Science and Technology, residents living in an area adjacent to the power plant have a safety problem in the continuous operation of the power plant, and the company has applied for a provisional disposition to suspend the operation of the power plant, the case held that the above company has a private right to seek a suspension of operation of the power plant on the ground that the abstract risk that the above company is naturally obligated to prevent any disaster caused by leakage of the radioactive materials, etc., and the power generation of the nuclear power plant has a potential risk not being compared to other energy sources, and it cannot be viewed that there is a private right to seek a suspension of operation of the power plant on the ground that there is no possibility that there is a specific risk that the leakage of the radioactive materials is likely to occur due to the impossibility or lack of technical control over the potential risk factors in the continuous operation of the power plant, and that the above company has a right to seek technical control over the risk factors in the continuous operation of the power plant at this point.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 300 of the Civil Execution Act; Article 21-3 (see current Article 23 of the Nuclear Safety Act) of the former Atomic Energy Act (wholly amended by Act No. 10909, Jul. 25, 201); Article 42-2 (4) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Atomic Energy Act (wholly amended by Presidential Decree No. 23249, Oct. 25, 201); Article 42-3 (see current Article 37 of the Enforcement Decree of the Nuclear Safety Act);

Creditors

Creditor 1 and 96 others (Attorneys Kang Dong-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

The debtor

Korea hydroelectric Power Co., Ltd. (Korean Government Legal Service et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Text

1. The motion of this case is dismissed.

2. The filing costs shall be borne by creditors.

The debtor shall not continue to operate a nuclear power plant (hereinafter referred to as "Sari No. 1 nuclear power plant") located in the area of the head of Busan Gun.

Reasons

1. Basic facts

The following facts are recognized according to the records of this case and the purport of the entire examination.

A. The obligees are citizens who reside in the radius of 30 km from the center of Busan citizens or Gori 1 machine, and the obligor is a company operating Gori 1 machine.

B. The design lifespan No. 1 was expired on June 18, 2007, which was 30 years from June 19, 197, which was the first date of the contract with the operating permission for a design lifespan of 30 years.

C. The debtor filed an application with the Minister of Science and Technology for a continuous operation of the high-ri 1 aircraft based on Article 23-3 of the Atomic Energy Act and Article 42-2(4) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act on June 16, 2006, which was before the expiration of the design lifespan, for a continuous operation of the high-ri 1 aircraft. Pursuant to Article 42-3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Atomic Energy Act and Article 19-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act, the periodic safety evaluation report, the report on the evaluation of the name of major devices, and the report on the evaluation of the radiation environmental impact (hereinafter “the evaluation report in this case

D. The Minister of Science and Technology, in accordance with the opinion of the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) on December 11, 2007, granted a continuous driving license for 10 years in order to determine the adequacy of the instant evaluation report, and the debtor has commenced the re-dong of 1, 208 on January 17, 2008 and has been operating until now.

2. Creditors' assertion

The obligees seek a provisional disposition ordering the suspension of the operation of the Goi-ri No. 1, asserting that the continuing operation of the Goi-ri No. 1 has the following safety issues, and that the radioactive materials may cause harm to the obligees' health and the environment due to the radioactive materials.

(1) A studio 1 is in danger of radiation leakage due to the deterioration of important equipment that is frequently unable to cause frequent breakdown, repair, or replacement as a studio nuclear power plant due to its design lifespan, in particular, due to a studio-neutism of pressure vessels.

(2) The height of protective walls, earthquake-proof design, emergency power system, etc. of the 1st class flag are insufficient to cope with natural disasters, such as earthquakes and tidal waves, and terrorism and attack, etc., and there is no safety measures for neighboring residents.

③ The assessment report of this case, which is the review data of the permission for continuous operation of the high class No. 1, did not verify the safety of continuous operation externally.

(4) Not only a nuclear power plant, but also a nuclear power plant complex was being operated or planned to be constructed in a total of 12 nuclear reactors, while the suspension of operation of a nuclear power plant in a nuclear power plant in an old-age 1 nuclear power plant may prevent or reduce the increase of risk caused by the construction of a nuclear power plant complex.

3. Determination as to the existence of a preserved right

(a) requirements for recognition of the right to be preserved;

As seen in the accident of the nuclear power plant in Japan, if the leakage of radioactive materials is caused by the accident of the nuclear power plant, and the life, body, environment, property, etc., including persons, are exposed to radiation, it is very difficult to recover from the environment. Therefore, an obligor operating the scrap 1 is naturally obligated to prevent in advance disasters caused by the leakage of radioactive materials, etc. and to promote public safety by preventing in advance the occurrence of accidents. However, the abstract risk that the nuclear power generation has a potential risk of being in comparison with other energy sources does not necessarily mean that the obligee has a private legal right to seek the suspension of operation of the scrap 1. The obligor cannot be deemed to have a right to seek a suspension of operation of the scrap 1. The obligor’s right to seek a suspension of operation of the scrap 1.

B. Judgment on the grounds for individual suspension of operation asserted by the obligees

1) Non-disclosure of the instant assessment report

The assessment report of this case contains the contents related to national security, the debtor and the related company's trade secrets, and for this reason, the assessment report of this case was partially disclosed in accordance with the scope and method of disclosure of the assessment report of this case since there was no opportunity to review and verify the appropriateness of the assessment report of this case from the outside. Thus, the assessment report of this case was partially disclosed with the scope and method of disclosure of the assessment report of this case.

2) The problem of relaxing the nuclear power plant complex;

Even if it is necessary to mitigate the nuclear power plant complex construction, such request alone cannot serve as a reason to suspend the operation of the scrap 1 (if we look at from the factual judgment and value judgment on the consent of the nuclear power plant itself, it cannot be concluded that the distribution of nuclear power plant complex construction and distribution by power demand area is not only in terms of environment and efficiency, but also in terms of safety).

3) Failures or deteriorations of important equipment

A) According to the results of the instant examination, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety: (i) conducted three on-site inspections of the 1st nuclear fuel technology in the process of the instant evaluation report on the adequacy of the instant evaluation report and the possibility of continuous operation of the 1st nuclear fuel, and (ii) submitted to the Minister of Science and Technology a review report (Evidence No. 5) to the effect that the instant evaluation report was properly prepared on December 2007, and that the 10th nuclear fuel technology can be continuously operated for the next ten years; (iii) the Minister of Science and Technology requested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the appropriateness of the instant evaluation report and the safety of 1st high 1 nuclear fuel in the process of continuous operation permission (IEA SALO Peer Re-Examination); (iv) conducted a review on the instant evaluation report from July 23, 2007 to August 3, 2007, the International Institute presented its opinions on the safety technology of 10th 2nd 3rd 1 nuclear fuel.

B) We examine several major issues below. The following facts can be acknowledged according to the results of the examination of this case, such as the statement of evidence Nos. 5 through 15, 22 through 28, etc., and the descriptions of evidence Nos. 11, 12, and 13 alone do not interfere with the above recognition.

(1) The history of the breakdown of Mari-ri No. 1

Although there was a case of non-scheduled failure each year (average 5.8th annual average) from the commencement of operation, the accident of exceeding 3 grades 1 to 3 of the International Atomic Energy Accident and High Class 4 to 7 (accidents: 1 to 3) referred to as external emissions of radioactive materials has not occurred, and the record of international excellent performance, such as the achievement ofless driving from May 2005 to January 201, was recorded.

(2)Periodic safety inspections and replacement of major devices;

The debtor has formulated an annual plan to conduct regular and periodic test for 1st century, conducted self-inspection by the Minister of Education, Science and Technology on a regular basis, conducted an inspection on safety-related structure, and formulated and implemented an inspection plan to monitor and evaluate vulnerability of materials and performance in terms of stability function and performance of safety-related structure, systems, and devices every ten years. In addition to the periodic safety evaluation, the debtor has replaced and repaired the major safety equipment of 1st century based on the results of the safety inspection. The debtor was replaced and repaired in 1994, the replacement of remote control teams in 1994, the replacement of steam generator in 198, the replacement of the nuclear reactor coolant coolant in 2005, the replacement of the nuclear reactor coolant pumps in 207, the reinforcement of internal dust such as fuel refrigeror in 207, and the combination of materials for 2010.

(3) Safety of pressure vessels

고리 1호기 원자로의 압력용기는 설계수명이 40년이다(동종의 압력용기를 사용하는 미국 키와니 원자력발전소는 설계수명을 채우고 계속운전하고 있음). 중성자 조사로 인한 압력용기 취화와 관련하여, 고리 1호기 계속운전 허가과정에서 감시시편에 대한 파괴인성검사 결과 최대흡수에너지가 사고상태를 가정한 경우에도 기준치의 약 2.5배 안전여유도를 가지는 것으로 나타났고, 가압열충격 기준온도는 40년 운전을 기준으로 기준치 300℉에서 40℉ 여유가 있는 260℉를 나타내어, 계속운전기간에 대하여 압력용기의 안정성이 확인되었다.

4) Issues such as natural disasters

A) Preparation against earthquakes

Gori No. 1, which is applicable mutatis mutandis by the Atomic Energy Act, determined the maximum earthquake that may arise under Part 10CFR 100 Apendix A, and was designed in accordance with the earthquake-proof standard of 6.5 (Pendix 0.2g at the maximum site price) reflecting the safe leisure oil in the U.S.A., which is designed in accordance with the nuclear law, and the earthquake-proof performance has been strengthened by applying the Generic 3A, which is the most advanced technology level in the process of continuing driving permission, and by implementing all necessary improvements as a result.

(b) preparation for tidal waves, inundations, and power generation;

In preparation for the tidal wave No. 1, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology has been protected as a protection wall with a height of 7.5m more than 7.2m more than the expected maximum sea level, which is the investigation, assessment, and standard announcement of the floodgate and maritime characteristics of the site for nuclear reactor facilities, in accordance with the "Public Notice of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology" No. 2009-37 of the notification of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, compared with the emergency diesel power generator 2, and compared with the flooding of the emergency diesel power generator. Furthermore, in order to cope with the increase in risk of tidal wave due to global warming and climate change, the protection wall is strengthened by 10m, additionally installing a floodgate and flood control pumps in the emergency diesel power generator, and the plan is being formulated and implemented to introduce the mobile power generator of vehicles.

(c) security measures and other emergency plans for nearby residents;

The debtor is formulating and implementing a radiation emergency plan in accordance with the "Act on the Protection of Nuclear Facilities, etc. and Prevention of Radiation Disasters". The function and duties of the emergency response organization, organization of emergency personnel, command and control system, emergency command and control standards, etc. are determined. The nuclear power plant is organizing and operating a 1 and 2 emergency medical institution centered on the nuclear power plant, and prepares safety measures in the event of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, by preparing working manuals. Furthermore, the counterterrorism training is regularly conducted and 32 resident relief centers are designated.

C. Sub-committee

As seen above, the obligor can be deemed to properly control potential risk factors arising from the continuous operation of the scrap 1 machine at the present point of time (However, there is a problem that the nuclear fuel itself storage space after the use of nuclear fuel from the obligor's high headquarters, including the scrap 1 machine, is anticipated to be spreading in 2016), and there is no evidence to prove specific risk that the radiation disaster is likely to occur at the scrap 1 machine. Therefore, the obligee cannot be deemed to have a judicial right to seek the suspension of operation of the scrap 1 machine.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the obligees' motion of this case is dismissed as it is without merit since there is no vindication as to the right to be preserved. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Park fixed-up (Presiding Judge) Promotion