[채무부존재확인,보험금][공1993.6.1.(945),1389]
A. Whether the insurer may terminate the insurance contract for breach of duty to notify (affirmative) in a case where the policyholder stated differently in the column of commercial transport and joint use of the subscription form for the insurance at the time of the conclusion of the automobile insurance contract the policyholder may terminate the insurance contract for breach of duty to notify (affirmative);
B. In the case of the above “A”, there was no significant change or increase in the risk of the occurrence of the accident due to the false description, and thus, it is not possible to terminate the contract for the reason of breach of duty of disclosure (=contractor).
A. At the time of concluding an insurance contract, any question described in the questionnaire prepared by the policyholder at the request of the insurance company may be presumed to fall under important matters in the insurance contract, unless there are other special circumstances. Moreover, the insurance premium of a motor vehicle used for commercial transport in the automobile insurance contract shall be calculated by a special rate of 120% to 300% of the basic insurance rate. Thus, if the policyholder knows that the motor vehicle is continuously used for commercial transport at the time of concluding the insurance contract and states differently in the column of commercial transport and joint use of the insurance subscription form “not for commercial transport and joint use,” the insurer may terminate the insurance contract for reasons of breach of duty to notify.
B. In the case of the above “A”, the policyholder must assert and prove that the termination of the contract is not possible on the ground that the risk of the occurrence of the accident has not been significantly changed or increased due to the fact that the disclosure obligation was breached.
(b)Articles 651 and 651-2 of the Commercial Code;
A. Supreme Court Decision 92Da28259 delivered on October 23, 1992 (Gong1992, 327)
[Defendant-Appellant] Korea Automobile Insurance Co., Ltd., Counsel for defendant-appellant
Defendant 1’s Counsel for the defendant-appellant
Seoul High Court Decision 92Na8202, 8219 (Counterclaim) decided October 16, 1992
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff).
We examine the grounds of appeal.
1. On the first ground for appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found that the accident vehicle of this case was originally purchased on February 13, 1990 by Nonparty 1 as the introduction of the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant; hereinafter the Plaintiff) company's new agency, and the insurance contract of this case was concluded on behalf of the Defendant on the same day by the above Nonparty. The above non-party 1 initially purchased the vehicle as the agent of the non-party member Steel Co., Ltd. located in Gangnam-gu, Seoul (hereinafter the "Members Steel Co., Ltd.") for the purpose of transporting the steel, and the above vehicle was purchased for the purpose of using the said vehicle for transporting the steel. The above non-party 1 parked the above vehicle mainly in the members steel agency, employed the non-party 2 as a driver, and delivered the steel work ordered by the above non-party 1 to the above non-party 1, who did not have any means of transportation and delivered the freight to the defendant's agent. Meanwhile, the accident of this case was that the non-party 1 and the above non-party 2 suffered from the accident of this case.
In light of the records, the above recognition by the court below is acceptable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the grounds alleged in the lawsuit.
2. On the second ground for appeal
In addition, according to the court below's decision, the insurance premium for an automobile used for commercial transport in the above insurance contract shall be calculated at a special rate of 120% or 300% of the basic insurance rate, unless there are other special circumstances, it can be presumed that the matters to be asked in the questionnaire prepared by the policyholder at the time of the conclusion of the above insurance contract fall under the important matters in the relevant insurance contract (see Supreme Court Decision 68Da2082, Feb. 18, 1969). Thus, if the defendant, as the policyholder, stated "not being transported or used for common use" in the column of commercial transport and joint use of the insurance subscription prepared and delivered by the plaintiff at the time of the conclusion of the above insurance contract, the plaintiff, the insurer, can terminate the insurance contract on the ground of the breach of duty of disclosure, and even though it stated differently from the fact, it cannot be concluded that the contract cannot be terminated on the ground of the violation of duty of disclosure, the defendant, the policyholder, should prove that it is not justified.
3. On the third ground for appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff lawfully terminated the insurance contract of this case on the ground that the defendant violated the " obligation to inform the whole contract of this case" under Article 40 (1) of the General Terms and Conditions of Business Motor Vehicle Insurance, and Article 10 (1) 7 of the Terms and Conditions of this case alleged by the theory of lawsuit lists losses which have not been compensated since the insurance contract has been maintained and it is different from the above plaintiff's assertion. Thus, since the facts alleged by the plaintiff in this case constitute grounds for existence of non-compensation of the insurance obligation due to termination of the insurance contract as stipulated in Article 40 (1) of the above Terms and Conditions of Business Automobile Insurance, as long as the facts alleged by the plaintiff in this case constitute grounds for existence of non-compensation of the insurance obligation due to the termination of the insurance contract as stipulated in Article 40 (1) of the above Terms and Conditions,
4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)