2. Costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The reasons for the judgment of the first instance are reasonable, and thus, it shall be quoted as the reasons for this judgment in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act: Provided, That the matters that the plaintiff claims additionally

2. Determination on additional assertion

The Plaintiff asserts that the instant rental housing was acquired in the name of the Plaintiff in 1992 and transferred after completing the registration of ownership transfer in the Plaintiff’s future due to the gift in 1999, and there is no gains from transfer considering price increase in the acquisition price in 1992. ② On the other hand, while the transfer price of the instant housing was merely KRW 235 million, the Plaintiff paid the total amount of KRW 245 million, including brokerage commission, lease deposit, registration fee, facility interior repair cost, liability, etc., and if necessary, the transfer income tax cannot be imposed even if no gains from transfer were available.

However, when the Plaintiff reported the transfer income tax of this case, the Plaintiff reported the acquisition value as KRW 73,70,000 in actual acquisition value in 192 as alleged by the Plaintiff, and thereafter, it is recognized that the Defendant calculated the transfer margin by applying the above reported acquisition value as it is (No. 2, No. 1, No. 1-2). On the other hand, the acquisition value, one of the necessary expenses for calculating the transfer margin under the Income Tax Act, refers to the amount actually disbursed for acquiring the subject real estate, and there is no ground to deduct the increased amount in consideration of the price increase in the amount of expenditure, and there is no need to review the above argument. Then, the above argument is without merit. Then, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the above increase in the amount of the transfer margin and the transfer margin under the provisions of Article 97(1) of the former Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 9897, Dec. 31, 2009), Article 16(1)7 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21934, Dec. 7, ) cannot be considered as necessary expenses for acquisition value of the subject to be deducted.

Meanwhile, the Plaintiff’s assertion in the first instance trial that the instant house constitutes a long-term rental house excluded from three or more houses for one household, i.e., the Plaintiff’s assertion that the instant house constitutes a long-term rental house excluded from a house which falls under the principle of no taxation without the law, or a non-taxation requirement or tax reduction requirement, barring special circumstances, and the interpretation of tax laws and regulations shall be interpreted as a statutory interpretation and shall not be allowed either extensively or analogically without reasonable grounds (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Du7200, Mar. 12, 2004); and so long as the requirements for recognition of a long-term rental house clearly stipulated in the proviso of Article 167-3(1)2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 20931, Jul. 24, 2008), the instant house cannot be deemed to constitute a long-term

3.In conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim seeking the revocation of the disposition of this case is unlawful, and it is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is justified. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.