2. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

3. One-six of the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff, and the remainder by the Defendant, respectively.

4. Restrictions on the recognition of entrustment for six months of the entire course among dispositions specified in paragraph (1) and the revocation of designation of a workplace skill development training establishment shall be suspended until the judgment in this case becomes final and conclusive;

(z) Disposition on consignment and recognition restriction, one year for the pertinent training course (from February 25, 2010 to February 24, 201)

A disposition of entrustment and restriction on recognition, a disposition of returning training expenses of KRW 7,071,640, a disposition of additional collection of KRW 7,071,640, a disposition of restricting the payment of vocational training expenses for one year, and a disposition of revoking the designation of a designated vocational training facility on January 29, 2010 shall be revoked.

A. The Plaintiff is operating a technical school located in Seo-gu, Gwangju (hereinafter referred to as “instant facilities”), and the instant facilities were designated from the Defendant as a vocational skills development training establishment under the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers.

B. The plaintiff set a training period of six months (from January 29, 2007 to July 28, 2007) for the product application model training courses (hereinafter referred to as the "product application training courses") between the defendant and set a training period of one year (from March 2, 2007 to March 1, 2008; hereinafter referred to as the "first semiconductor training courses") for the training period of one year (from March 2, 2007 to March 1, 2008) for each of the above training courses (hereinafter referred to as the "computer training courses of this case"), and concluded an entrustment contract for each of the training courses of semiconductor equipment (hereinafter referred to as "the semiconductor 207 to February 19, 2008") as the training period of 6 months for each of the above training courses (hereinafter referred to as "the above training courses of this case").

C. On January 22, 2010, the Defendant issued a 20-year measure on the Plaintiff’s training course D, trainees E, F, and trainees of the first semiconductor training course of this case, and the second semiconductor training course of this case, despite the Plaintiff’s departure from Korea during each training period, and received 7,071,640 won for training expenses by fraudulent or other illegal means, the Defendant was amended as Act No. 9316 on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers (amended by Act No. 11272, Feb. 1, 201; hereinafter referred to as “former Vocational Development Act”), Article 16 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22356, Aug. 25, 2010; hereinafter the same shall apply); Article 16 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10671, Dec. 31, 2008; hereinafter referred to as “former Vocational Training Act”).

[Reasons for Recognition] Evidence No. 1-1 and No. 2-2, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether each of the dispositions of this case is legitimate

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) The Plaintiff was unaware of the fact that the trainee was present at the training center on behalf of the trainee D, E, F, G, or H (hereinafter referred to as “D, etc.”). As long as the Plaintiff was aware of such fact and received training expenses, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have managed the withdrawal of D, etc. by fraud or other improper means, or to have received training expenses.

2) Although D et al. shall be limited to training costs during the period of his/her actual acting attendance, the defendant is erroneous in recognizing training costs for the entire training period as an illegally received amount after his/her substitute attendance.

B. Relevant statutes

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Facts of recognition

1) The facility of this case confirms the attendance of trainees on the card, and according to the Regulations on the Implementation of Vocational Skills Development Training including the unemployed (hereinafter referred to as “training Regulations”), where attendance is not confirmed on the card due to unavoidable reasons, it may enter the attendance status of trainees on the ex officio entry ledger and enter it ex officio on the computer network (Article 30(4)), and where a trainee continues to absence for more than five days without justifiable reasons, such as natural disasters, if a trainee leaves his/her card to another trainee, he/she shall be excluded from training (Article 31(1)1 and 5): Provided, That where a trainee fails to undergo training due to a national examination or job examination related to training, etc., he/she shall be deemed to have undergone training according to the number of days required (Article 30(2)).

(ii) management of withdrawal from D, etc. and receipt of training costs;

A) Students D of the applied training courses of this case were trained on February 2, 2007; May 22, 2007; May 23, 2007; May 25, 2007; May 28, 2007; and on November 21, 2007; November 23, 2007; November 23, 2007; November 23, 2007; November 23, 2007; and the trainee E of the same course was absent from each of the instant training courses from November 21, 2007 to November 23, 2007; and on November 23, 2007; and on August 28, 2007; and on each of the instant semiconductor training courses from November 23, 2007 to November 23, 207 (the date the trainees were absent from each of the instant training courses.

B) The Plaintiff continued the pertinent training courses for D, etc., and had D, etc. complete each relevant training course.

C) The amount received by the Plaintiff from the Defendant as training expenses for D is KRW 18,670, May 22, 2007; KRW 18,670, May 23, 2007; KRW 74,690, and KRW 74,690, and the amount received as training expenses for E due to the Plaintiff’s failure to dispose of the amount as training expenses for February 23, 2007; KRW 38,830, and KRW 38,830 received as training expenses for F due to the Plaintiff’s failure to dispose of the amount as training expenses for May 23, 2007; KRW 10,000 received as training expenses for 20,000 for 20,000 for 20,000 for 10,000,000 for 20,000 for 20,000 for 15,010,000 for 10,017.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, purport of whole pleading

D. Determination

1) The meaning of "any false or other fraudulent means" under Article 16 (2) 2 of the former Functional Development Act

"False or other unlawful means" under Article 16 (2) 2 of the former Vocational Development Act refers to all acts that are not correct by social norms in order for a person who is not eligible to receive training costs to see as if he/she is qualified or to conceal the fact that he/she is not qualified, and "training costs" refers to expenses that are paid in compensation for training conducted by a person who is entrusted with workplace skill development training (hereinafter referred to as "trustee"). Even if a trainee has not received training, if a trustee claims training costs differently from the fact that he/she has received training due to a violation of the law or contractual obligations on the management of rehabilitation of trainees, etc., he/she shall claim training costs that should not be actually paid, so even if he/she was unaware of the fact that he/she did not receive training.

In addition, even if a trustee conducted training for a trainee and requested the payment of such training, if the trainee had already been removed from the training, and the training teacher, etc., who is subject to his/her management and supervision, knowingly conducted training in violation of the legal or contractual obligations that require the expulsion of the trainee, he/she shall not be paid for due process, so it is reasonable to interpret that the training is not merely a violation of the consignment contract, but also a fraudulent or other unlawful method (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du377, Jun. 13, 2013).

2) Whether the instant entrustment contract was lawfully terminated

A) In light of the above facts, as long as the Plaintiff claimed training costs differently from the fact that D et al. had received training, even though D et al. did not receive training, it would be deemed that D et al. did not receive training. Even if D et al. did not know the fact that D et al. received training costs by fraud or other improper means, it would constitute “the case where D et al. received training costs by fraudulent

B) In addition, considering the following circumstances, i.e., training regulations, guidelines for the vocational training card system, and the contents of the consignment contract for each of the instant training courses, which can be known by adding the purport of the entire pleadings, the plaintiff must pay more attention to the above facts, i.e., (i) training regulations, guidelines for the vocational training card system, and the contents of the consignment contract for each of the instant training courses; (ii) training training is important and essential matters in the vocational training course; and (iii) training is conducted in violation of the consignment agreement without any unlawful act as a result of failing to faithfully manage D, etc. for one day or five days; and (iii) training is performed in bad condition to the extent that the training is likely to be conducted.

C) Therefore, the instant consignment contract was lawfully terminated in accordance with Article 16(2)2 and 3 of the former Vocational Development Act.

3) Whether there exist grounds for the disposition

(A) restrictions on consignment and recognition for six months in total of the course, and restrictions on recognition of commission for one year of the training course;

(1) Article 16(3) of the former Vocational Development Act and Article 13(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provide that the State or a local government may not entrust or recognize workplace skill development training to a person whose commission contract is terminated pursuant to Article 16(2) of the same Act within the scope of five years from the date of termination. While there are no particular exceptions for cases of violation of a commission contract, where training costs are paid or intended to be paid in a false or other unlawful manner, the training costs are less than KRW 1,00,000 if the training costs are less than KRW 1,00,000.

On the other hand, the Defendant deemed that the training costs that the Plaintiff received by false or other unlawful means are at least 5,00,000 won, and limited to the entrustment of one year pursuant to Article 16(3) of the former Vocational Development Act and Article 6(3) [Attachment Table 1] [Attachment Table 1] 1(b)(c) and Article 9(4) [Attachment Table 2] 1(b)(c) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act. As to each of the instant training courses, the Defendant restricted the recognition of the entrustment of one year pursuant to Article 16(3) of the former Vocational Development Act, Article 6(3) [Attachment Table 1] and Article 6(4) [Attachment Table 2] 1(b) [Attachment Table 4] of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act.

(2) Restrictions on the entrustment and recognition of the entire course for six months

The fact that the Plaintiff continued to conduct training without removing D, etc. that the Plaintiff had the Plaintiff attend the training on behalf of the Plaintiff constitutes a violation of the entrustment contract, separate from the fact that the evidence submitted by the Defendant alone is insufficient to recognize that the Plaintiff continued to conduct training on D, etc. with the knowledge of the above substitute attendance, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this. Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the standards for calculating training fees paid by the Plaintiff by false or other unlawful means include only training expenses paid for the number of days of absence such as D, etc., and that the Plaintiff conducted training without removing the trainee in violation of the entrustment contract, and that training expenses paid for the period of absence of KRW 247,200 as KRW 247,20,00 and less than KRW 1,000, which are excluded from the entrustment and recognition. Thus, the Defendant’s mistake that training expenses were up to KRW 7,071,640, and thus, the Defendant’s disposition of restriction on entrustment for six months as a whole is unlawful.

(3) limit on commission and recognition for one year of the pertinent training course;

According to the above facts, since the case where workplace skill development training was conducted in violation of a consignment agreement, it constitutes "in violation of a consignment agreement to the extent that it violated the purpose of training" or "in the event that training was conducted by fraudulent or other illegal means" or "in the event that the training personnel was operated or the party was managed by the party concerned", the defendant can take a disposition to restrict the commission and recognition of the training course for one year pursuant to Article 16 (3) of the former Vocational Development Act, Article 6 (3) [Attachment 1] 1 (b) (a) (c) (a) and Article 6 (3) [Attachment 1] 1), Article 9 (4) [Attachment 2] subparagraph 1 (b) (b) (b) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act. Thus, the defendant's disposition to restrict the entrustment and recognition of the training course

B) According to Articles 31(1)3 and 29 subparag. 9 of the Act on the Revocation of Designation of Workplace Skill Development Training Facilities, the designation of the workplace skill development training facilities should be revoked if the workplace skill development training facilities are commissioned or recognized. However, some of the training courses commissioned or recognized are not subject to the restrictions on commission or recognition. As seen earlier, the restriction on commission for six months to the entire process is unlawful as the grounds for the restriction on commission do not exist, and the restriction on commission pursuant to the one-year restriction on commission for each of the training courses of this case is merely a restriction on commission for some training courses. Accordingly, the revocation of designation of the workplace skill development training facilities is also unlawful as the grounds

C) Disposition of restricting the payment of vocational ability development training costs for one year

(1) Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act provides that "the Minister of Labor may order a person who has received or intends to receive support for employment security and vocational skills development programs under the provisions of this Chapter by fraud or other improper means to restrict such support or to return the amount of support by fraud or other improper means, as prescribed by Presidential Decree." Here, a person who has received support for employment security and vocational skills development programs refers only to a business owner who conducts employment security and vocational skills development programs under Chapter III of the former Employment Insurance Act, a local government, or a non-profit corporation or organization prescribed by Presidential Decree. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret that a trustee entrusted workplace skill development training by the State or a local government pursuant to Article 16(1) of the former Vocational Development Act does not constitute a subject of sanctions under Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du3777, Jun. 13, 2013

On the other hand, the Plaintiff’s trustee entrusted with the workplace skill development training course by the State or a local government is not subject to sanctions under Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act, and thus, the disposition of restricting the payment is unlawful.

D) Disposition to return training costs of KRW 7,071,640;

Article 16 (5) of the former Vocational Development Act shall order a person whose entrustment contract is terminated pursuant to paragraph (2) to return the amount paid or subsidized by fraud or other improper means among training expenses paid or training allowances provided in connection with workplace skill development training.

As seen earlier, since training costs paid to the Plaintiff by fraud or other improper means are KRW 247,200, the Defendant is entitled to order only the return of the amount. Therefore, the portion exceeding KRW 247,200, out of the return disposition of KRW 7,071,640, the amount of which exceeds KRW 247,200, should be revoked in an unlawful manner.

(E)an additional collection of KRW 7,071,640.

According to Article 16 (6) 1 of the former Vocational Development Act and Article 13-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, an administrative agency may additionally collect an amount not exceeding five times the amount provided by fraud or other improper means from a person whose entrustment contract is terminated, if the amount provided by such person is less than 1,00,000 won, and if the amount provided by such person is more than 1,00,000 won, an amount not exceeding such amount may

On the other hand, the defendant regarded the plaintiff's illegal receipt amount as KRW 7,071,640 and additionally collected the amount corresponding thereto. As seen earlier, the defendant's disposition on this part is unlawful, and the defendant's disposition on this part is only 247,200 won, and in light of the above provisions, the defendant has discretion to additionally collect the amount not exceeding five times the above 247,200 won. Thus, the above unlawful disposition on additional collection should be revoked in its entirety.

4. Suspension of execution.

In full view of the records in the instant case, it is recognized that there is an urgent need to prevent any irrecoverable damage caused to the Plaintiff due to the suspension of execution of a disposition revoking the designation of a workplace skill development training establishment, among all dispositions in the instant case, for six months of the entire course, and there is no evidence to acknowledge that such suspension of execution may have a serious impact on public welfare. Therefore, the restriction on entrustment and recognition of six months of the entire course, and the revocation of the designation of a workplace skill development training establishment shall be suspended

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is justified within the above scope of recognition, and the remaining claims are dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Hong Young-jin

Judges Park Young-young

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.