B. Whether the person who newly acquired the ownership of the land after the expiration of the prescription period for the acquisition of the land can claim the acquisition by prescription (negative)

(b) The possessor of land, the period of prescriptive acquisition of which expires, shall not be effective against the landowner at the time of expiration of the claim for the transfer registration of ownership based on prescriptive acquisition, and against the person who newly acquires the ownership of land after the expiration of the period of prescriptive acquisition.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant).

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff has a duty to implement the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership on the ground of completion of the prescriptive acquisition as long as the plaintiff occupied the land of this case from the non-party 1 on October 15, 1968 to the point of possession of the land of this case on October 20, 198, and since the prescription period for the acquisition of possession was completed on October 15, 198, the defendant (non-party 1 and the defendant 20 years from the point of possession of the land of this case) was completed, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it otherwise, and even if the plaintiff occupied the land of this case from October 15, 1968 to the point of possession of the land of this case, even though the plaintiff had raised the counterclaim of this case on July 19, 190, the prescriptive acquisition period was suspended, and the plaintiff's assertion that the above part of this case was not included in the counterclaim of this case by the time of this case.

2. Where possession has been succeeded in succession, the person who asserts the completion of the prescriptive acquisition has the option to assert only his own possession, or both his own possession and the former possessor’s possession. However, even in such a case, the former possessor cannot assert at his own discretion during the period of possession (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 80Da2614, Apr. 14, 1981). Although Nonparty 1, the former possessor of the Plaintiff, occupied the instant land from around 1943, he cannot assert at his own discretion the point of commencement of possession on October 15, 1968.

In addition, insofar as it is obvious that the court below rejected the above argument of the plaintiff, the theory of criticism against the judgment of the court below is also without merit on the premise that the above argument is not judged. The argument is without merit.

3. The court below also held that, even if the period of prescriptive acquisition expired on October 21, 1963, when Nonparty 1 occupied the instant land from around October 21, 1943 to whom the Plaintiff donated the instant land to the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff, Nonparty 1 occupied the instant land, and for whom 20 years passed thereafter, on the expiration of the period of prescriptive acquisition, the registration of ownership transfer was made in Nonparty 2 with respect to the instant land at the time of expiration of the period of prescriptive acquisition, but thereafter, on November 11, 1977, the registration of ownership transfer was made in the name of Nonparty 3, and again on May 23, 1982 under the name of the Defendant on May 23, 1982.

The possessor of land, the expiration of the period of prescriptive acquisition, is limited to the claim for ownership transfer registration based on prescriptive acquisition against the landowner at the time of expiration of the period of prescriptive acquisition, and it cannot be asserted against the person who newly acquired the ownership of the land after the expiration of the period of prescriptive acquisition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 89Meu1305, Apr. 9, 191). Thus, the above non-party 1’s claim for ownership transfer registration due to the expiration of the period of prescriptive acquisition can only be asserted against the above non-party 2, the owner at the time of expiration of the period of prescriptive acquisition, and it does not allow the defendant to claim

According to the records, the defendant is recognized to have acquired the land of this case from the above non-party 3 after he succeeded to the above non-party 2. However, it cannot be deemed that the above non-party 3 acquired the land of this case from the above non-party 3 and the obligation of the above non-party 1 or his heir to implement the procedure for the transfer of ownership based on the expiration of the period for the transfer of ownership from the above non-party 2, barring any other special circumstances, the defendant cannot be deemed to have succeeded to the above non-party 2's obligation for the transfer of ownership based on the expiration of the period for the transfer of ownership to the above non-party 1 or his heir. The precedents of the party members cited in the theory of lawsuit concerning the transfer of ownership in the third party's name after the expiration of the period for the transfer of ownership after the expiration of the period for the transfer of ownership was completed, and thereafter the ownership was restored to the owner at the

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the right to claim ownership transfer registration due to the expiration of the period of prescription.

In addition, regardless of whether the defendant succeeded to the above non-party 2's obligation as the seller against the above non-party 1, the defendant's theory that the defendant acquired the land of this case from the above non-party 3 or that the above non-party 2's cancellation of payment in kind or cancellation of agreement against the above non-party 3 is related to the new facts that were not alleged up to the original judgment, and thus, cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal. All arguments are without merit

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.