2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

A. The primary purport of the claim is to confirm that an administrative disposition against the Plaintiff on November 11, 2015, which the Defendant issued against the Plaintiff and an order to return the illegally received amount of money (hereinafter referred to as “disposition issued on November 11, 2015”), is invalid.

B. Preliminary claim: Revocation of the disposition dated November 11, 2015.

2. Purport of appeal 1);

The part against the defendant in the judgment of the first instance is revoked, and the plaintiff's claim corresponding to the revocation is dismissed.

The reasoning of the judgment of the court in this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the modification and addition of the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance as stated in the following 2. Thus, it is accepted in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420

2. Parts to be corrected and added; and

A. The part on determining the lawfulness of the revocation of recognition of the instant case

If the 8th to 20th of the judgment of the court of first instance reveals the existence of the grounds under Article 19(2)1 of the Vocational Skills Development Act as follows, and the whole purport of the pleadings is gathered, the plaintiff applied for recognition of "U" to the defendant on June 20, 2013 as training course. However, the defendant made notification of the delay of recognition of the process on July 1, 2013, and rejected it on September 17, 2013. Since the plaintiff received the training course No. 8th of July 24, 2013 and August 24, 2013, 2013, the plaintiff's assertion that "the plaintiff's vocational skills development training course was conducted as if it were operated as an unlawful training course" under Article 19(2)1 of the Vocational Skills Development Act, "the plaintiff's allegation that the training course was conducted as of July 13, 2013 and as of September 8, 2013."

With respect to the remaining training courses, there is insufficient evidence to prove that the Plaintiff did not actually intend to conduct the training courses presented by the application for recognition at the time of applying for recognition to the Defendant for recognition in order to recognize them as occupational ability development training courses (the Plaintiff attempted to conduct each of the training courses of this case as recognized by the Defendant, but the Plaintiff appears to have opened and operated a lecture which is later accepted by the employees on the grounds that there are circumstances such as the lack of awareness to the employees, and the recruitment of students is not smooth, etc.). As to each of the above training courses, it is difficult to view that there is a ground for disposition under Article 19(2)1 of the Vocational Skills Development Act. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s allegation in this part is with merit.

The part of the first instance judgment No. 9 is revised as follows: "The fact that the plaintiff received subsidies from the defendant in relation to the training courses No. 1 through 3, 5, and 8 during the vocational ability development training course conducted as above by the plaintiff is not a dispute between the parties. As to the training courses No. 1 through 3, 5, and 8, there are grounds for each disposition under Article 19 (2) 2, 5, and 4 of the Vocational Skills Development Act as to Article 19 (2) 5 of the Vocational Skills Development Act.

○ Whether there is a ground under Article 19(2)4 of the Vocational Skills Development Act, i.e., No. 11 of the first instance judgment, 21 of the Act

Comprehensively taking account of the above evidence and evidence evidence No. 34’s purport of the entire pleadings, it is acknowledged that the Plaintiff provided training different from the content of the training courses No. 7 and No. 8, but provided the employees attending each of the above training courses with a total of KRW 270,031,00 for training expenses No. 7, and KRW 21,685,00 for training expenses No. 8. 8. This constitutes Article 19(2)4 of the Vocational Skills Development Act. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

D) Sub-committee

The grounds for the cancellation of recognition recognized by the court under the subparagraphs of Article 19(2) of the Vocational Skills Development Act, which is a ground for the cancellation of recognition as a written disposition on November 11, 2015 for each of the instant training courses, are as follows.

A person shall be appointed.

Meanwhile, even if some of the grounds for dispositions are lawful in the course of an administrative disposition, where the legitimacy of the disposition is recognized as the grounds for other dispositions, such disposition cannot be deemed unlawful (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 96Nu1184, May 9, 1997; 2013Du963, Oct. 24, 2013). As above, even if the grounds for other dispositions are not legitimate, the disposition to revoke recognition of each of the training courses of this case is lawful, unless the remaining grounds for other dispositions are recognized as the grounds for other dispositions. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion on a different premise is without merit.

B. The part on the determination of the lawfulness of the instant restrictions on entrustment and recognition

○ In the first instance judgment, the part on the 12th to 6th is modified as follows, and the 12th to 6th to 12th shall be corrected in writing, except in extenuating circumstances prescribed by Acts and subordinate statutes (Article 24(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act). The contents of the 2nd to 3th to

In the case of punitive administrative disposition setting a period, the period of sanctions and the starting point of the period is the core contents of the disposition.

In light of the aforementioned facts and circumstances: (a) the instant restriction on entrustment and recognition is difficult to view that the first day of the period of the restriction on entrustment and recognition of each of the training courses is specific and clearly indicated solely on the statement of the relevant restriction on entrustment and recognition; (b) the instant restriction on entrustment and recognition is defective (the Defendant was sentenced to the judgment against the Plaintiff in an appeal litigation seeking the revocation of the restriction on recognition on the grounds of the apparentness of the disposition as of July 10, 2015 and of August 21, 2015; (c) the period of restriction on entrustment and recognition and recognition and the starting day of such restriction on the respective training courses; (d) the period of restriction on entrustment and recognition and recognition as to the preceding 10-year restriction on the preceding disposition and the preceding 2-year restriction on the preceding disposition, including 10-year restriction on the preceding disposition and the preceding 1-year restriction on the previous disposition and the preceding 2-year restriction on the previous disposition, and (e) the preceding disposition and the preceding 1-year restriction on the entrusted disposition and the preceding 1-year.

Unless there is any provision related to the addition and upper limit of the period, it seems impossible to grasp the actual period of sanctions and the starting point of the period. This is considerably lacking the requirements for specification and clarity required for punitive administrative dispositions. Therefore, the defendant's above assertion is not accepted. Accordingly, this part of the plaintiff's assertion is with merit.

○ Amendment to the provisions of Sections 7 through 20 of the first instance judgment as follows.

The Defendant stated each of the instant training courses on November 11, 2015 (including the first and second training courses), August 21, 2015, and November 11, 2015 (No. 5, 6, 7, and 8), with the purport that it is the starting point of the sanction period following the instant consignment and recognition restrictions. However, the Defendant’s disposition on August 21, 2015 (including the cancellation of recognition of the training course No. 3 and the entrustment and recognition restrictions on the whole training course) was conducted on each of the instant training courses, and the training courses were concluded on August 21, 2015, and thus, it is probable to deem that the training courses were concluded on August 21, 2015, and were issued on each of the instant training courses on each of the following grounds: (i) the date on which the training courses were conducted on each of the instant courses, and (ii) the date on which the training courses were concluded on the date on which the training courses were concluded.

○ In the first instance judgment, the term “date of revocation of recognition” of No. 14, No. 19, is amended to “the date of the first disposition”. The part of determining the legitimacy of the disposition of the return order of this case

The following are added between the first instance judgment No. 16, 18 and 19. The defendant asserts that Article 56(2) of the Vocational Skills Development Act provides that "a person whose recognition has been revoked pursuant to Article 19(2) of the same Act," and Article 19(2)4 of the same Act provides that "where a worker who participates in vocational skills development training receives training costs by fraud or other improper means, he/she may order the plaintiff whose recognition has been revoked even if the worker received the subsidy by fraud or other improper means."

However, each subparagraph of Article 19(2) of the Vocational Skills Development Act requires that the person whose recognition has been revoked pursuant to Article 19(2) shall be provided with subsidies or other improper means (Article 56(2)1), a subsidy shall be provided for the purpose other than the purpose of payment (Article 56(2)2), or a subsidy shall be provided to the other party to an order of return (Article 56(2)2). If a trainee fails to meet the requirements for receiving the subsidy, “the other party to an order of return shall be provided with the subsidy.” Therefore, even if a trainee pays tuition fees to the Plaintiff and receives the corresponding subsidy from the Defendant and belongs to the Plaintiff, the economic benefits from the subsidy granted to the trainee (employee) may not be considered as being subject to an order of return by deeming the Plaintiff as the amount subsidized by the Defendant as the Defendant’s assertion. Therefore, the above Defendant’s assertion cannot be accepted.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all of the plaintiff's main claims are dismissed, and the conjunctive claims are justified only within the scope of the above recognition and the remainder is dismissed. The judgment of the court of first instance is just and it is so decided as per Disposition by the defendant's appeal.

Judges Kim Gin-han

Judges are accommodated in judges;

The portion exceeding 428,536,600 won was revoked among the disposition of restriction on recognition, the return of illegally received amount, and the additional collection, respectively, and the Plaintiff

On March 6, 2018, the name of the petition of appeal shall be dismissed on March 6, 2018, as the court of first instance rejected an order to correct the acknowledgement.

The order was issued and the order became final and conclusive because the plaintiff did not file an immediate appeal.

2) Even if based on the written disposition dated November 11, 2015, the Vocational Skills Development Act is based on the grounds for cancellation of recognition of the training course No. 4.

Only Article 19(2)1 and 5 shall be listed.