2. The plaintiff's remaining claims against the defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center and the defendant's claims against the defendant Han Emergency Medical Center are dismissed.

3. Of the costs of lawsuit, 50% of the portion arising between the Plaintiff and the Defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center shall be borne by the Plaintiff, the remaining 50% shall be borne by the Defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center, respectively, and the portion arising between the Plaintiff and the Defendant

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

A. The Defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center is a local medical institution established by Gyeonggi-do pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Local Medical Centers, and its branch is the Defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center Hospital (hereinafter “Defendant hospital”).

B. On June 24, 2008, the deceased non-party 1 (hereinafter referred to as the “the deceased”) suffered from a acute fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorcing hospital (hereinafter referred to as the “Scoric bluorum hospital”) at the lusium of the Silvere University (hereinafter referred to as the “Sluor Hospital”) located under the left side of the luoral fluoral cluoral cluoral fluoral cluoral cluoral cluoral cluoral cluor

C. On October 31, 201, the Defendant Hospital concluded a lease contract for special ambulances (vehicle number omitted) (hereinafter “the instant lease contract”) with the Defendant Han Emergency Medical Center (hereinafter “Defendant Emergency Medical Center”) for the purpose of patient transport business (hereinafter “Defendant Emergency Medical Center”) and the term of the contract from November 1, 201 to October 31, 201.

D. When entering into the instant rental contract, the Defendants determined the duties of the Defendant Emergency Medical Center, the safe transfer of patients entering and leaving the hospital by the entrustment of the duties of the Defendant Hospital, the transportation of emergency patients to other institutions, the transportation of patients requested by the physician, the transportation of emergency patients after the work of the medical care protection facilities, etc. under the Medical Treatment Convention with the Defendant Hospital, and the blood transport of the Defendant Hospital, etc., and other cooperation related to the emergency room.

E. On January 13, 2012, at around 12:20, the Deceased visited the Defendant Hospital for the treatment of her mother. At around 14:00 on the same day, the Deceased performed Guto the floor while drinking alcohol on the same day. On the same day, at around 14:10 on the same day, Nonparty 3, who was contacted by the Defendant Hospital, discovered the Defendant Hospital and recommended the Deceased to treat her, had a serious fluencial disease.

F. The medical doctor non-party 2 of the first medical department at the Defendant hospital directly confirmed the status of the deceased in the emergency room. In the heart of the deceased, the opinion was presented in the ethic ethic fluorial fluorial ethic ethic fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluorial fluor

G. Non-party 4, who was dispatched for the transfer of the deceased, was employed by the Defendant Emergency Medical Center on (vehicle number omitted) ambulances (general first-aid vehicle in attached Table 16 of Article 38(2) of the Enforcement Rule of the Emergency Medical Service Act; hereinafter “instant first-aid vehicle”) and only the deceased and only the non-party 3 were on board the deceased and the non-party 1. On January 13, 2012, the Defendant hospital started at the Defendant Hospital around 14:58 on the same day and arrived at 14:58 on the same day (hereinafter “instant transfer”).

H. At the time of arrival of the Sungbin Hospital, the Deceased was in the state of mixed water at the time of arrival, the view of luculation was shown, and the depth of the luculation attached and observed external motive was in the heart.

I. In addition, the Deceased had been in the state of cardiopulmonary stop at the time of arrival of the SPPP Hospital. The medical professionals of the SPPP Hospital implemented cardiopulmonary Reculative Reculative Reculculic (Cadiopulic Reculcit), including dynamics and chronological pressure, and performed specialized cardiopulmonary cliculic cliculic cliculic cliculic cliffic cliffic cliffic cliculs.

(j) The Deceased was repeatedly conducted by the medical staff in the emergency room of the SPP Hospital, but the opinion of the popic of the popic of the popic of the popic of the popic of the popic of the popic of the popic of the popic of the popic of the copic of the popic of the copic of the popic of the popic of the popic of the copic of the popic of the popic of the popic of the copic of the copic of the copic of the copic of the copic of the copic of the copic of the

C. At around 21:00 on January 13, 2012, the Deceased died with acute heart color, the intermediate line event, and the stop of direct death.

(l) The Plaintiff is the sole heir of the deceased’s children.

[Ground of recognition] Facts that there is no dispute between the parties, Gap evidence 1 through 6, Gap evidence 7-1 through 3, Gap evidence 8, Gap evidence 12-1, non-party 2's testimony, fact-finding results of this court's fact-finding with respect to the head of Seongbuk Hospital, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiff's assertion on Defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center

A. Although the Defendant hospital, the operator of the instant ambulances, had the deceased board a doctor, nurse, or emergency medical technician on board in accordance with Article 48 of the Emergency Medical Service Act (hereinafter “Emergency Medical Service Act”) in the course of transferring the deceased’s first-aid vehicle, the Defendant hospital, who is the operator of the instant ambulances, did not perform such duty.

B. It can be inferred that if the medical personnel of the Defendant hospital took advantage of the medical personnel or emergency medical technician who could immediately carry out cardiopulmonary resuscitation at the time of transfer of the deceased, they could have sufficiently sought the life of the deceased. As such, there is a proximate causal relation between the negligence of the medical personnel of the Defendant hospital and the death of the deceased.

C. Even if the Defendant hospital is not an operator of ambulances, etc. as prescribed by the Emergency Medical Service Act, the Defendant hospital is obligated to provide the deceased with medical appliances and human resources necessary for safe transport. Thus, the Defendant hospital delayed the view that the Defendant hospital should transfer the vehicle to the 129 first-way vehicle, when it was waiting for a 129 first-way vehicle, which entered into an entrustment contract with the Defendant hospital for the transfer, and the fire station Nonparty 5, who had been temporarily driven by the Defendant hospital, had been waiting for the patient to leave the hospital to the fire station.

D. The Defendant Emergency Medical Center that entered into the instant rental contract with the Defendant Hospital constitutes an assistant to the implementation of the Defendant Hospital, and the negligence of the Defendant Emergency Medical Center should be viewed as the negligence of the Defendant Hospital.

E. According to Article 15(2) of the Medical Service Act and Article 11(2) of the Emergency Medical Service Act, when transferring patients such as the deceased, a medical specialist who can take emergency measures, such as an emergency medical technician, should have taken measures to safely transfer the deceased by taking advantage of the physician, nurse, or employee of the Defendant hospital, although no person who confirmed the safe transfer of the deceased did not have any person who confirmed the safe transfer of the deceased, this violates the duty to provide the medical appliances and human resources necessary for safe transfer.

3. Determination on the Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center

(a) Whether the Defendant hospital is an ambulance operator, etc. as prescribed by the Emergency Medical Services Act;

(1) The applicable provision

(3) No one, other than those falling under any of the following subparagraphs, may operate an ambulance, etc.: 1. The State or a local government; 2. A person who may have an ambulance, etc. under Article 3 of the Medical Service Act; 4. A non-profit corporation that has obtained permission for the establishment of the Minister of Health and Welfare under this Act (hereinafter referred to as "transfer business") may entrust the operation of ambulances, etc. to a non-profit medical institution under paragraph (1) 4 or a non-profit emergency medical technician who has been entrusted with the operation of such ambulances, etc. with the operation of emergency medical technicians:

(2) Determination

Article 44(1) of the Emergency Medical Service Act provides that the State or a local government, a medical institution under Article 3 of the Medical Service Act, a person who has obtained permission for the business of transporting emergency patients and a non-profit corporation which has obtained permission for the establishment of the Minister of Health and Welfare for the purpose of transferring emergency patients, other than those who are entitled to have an ambulances, etc. under other Acts and subordinate statutes, may independently entrust the operation of the ambulances, etc. to a person who has obtained permission for the business of transporting the ambulances, etc. or a non-profit corporation under Article 44(2) of the same Act. On the other hand, the State or a local government, or a person who is entitled to have an ambulances, etc. under other Acts and subordinate statutes, did not provide grounds for entrusted operation of the ambulances, etc., and Article 48 of the Emergency Medical Service Act provides that the head of an emergency medical institution is not a medical institution but an operator of the ambulances, etc. who is not a medical institution, and Article 48-2(2) of the Emergency Medical Service Act provides that the head of an emergency medical institution shall not simply notify an assistant of the defendant hospital.

B. Whether the Defendant hospital’s breach of all of its duty under the Emergency Medical Service Act is recognized

(1) The applicable provision

(1) Emergency medical personnel shall be able to provide emergency medical services in good faith so that emergency medical services may always be provided to emergency patients. (2) When they find that emergency medical services are requested during their duties, they shall not refuse or evade such request. Article 11 (Transfer of Emergency Patients) of the Emergency Medical Services Act. (1) Where the head of a medical institution deems it impossible to provide appropriate emergency medical services to an emergency patient due to the capacity of the relevant medical institution, he/she shall immediately transfer such patient to another medical institution capable of providing medical services. (2) The head of a medical institution shall, when he/she transfers an emergency patient pursuant to paragraph (1), provide medical instruments and manpower necessary for the safe transfer of the emergency patient, and provide records of medical treatment to the medical institution to which the patient is transferred. (3) The head of a medical institution shall be equipped with the requirements for medical treatment and emergency medical service information center under Article 4 (Procedures for Transfer of Emergency Patients and Medical Service Records) of the Enforcement Rule of the Emergency Medical Services Act, and other necessary matters concerning the supply of such medical services by other medical institutions.

(2) Determination

(A) In performing medical acts such as diagnosis and treatment, a physician has a duty of care to take the best measures required to prevent risks depending on the patient’s specific symptoms or circumstances in light of the nature of the duties of managing the patient’s life, body, and health. Such duty of care is based on the level of medical practice performed in the clinical field, such as a medical institution, etc. at the time of performing the said medical act. The level of medical care refers to the so-called medical consciousness generally known to and known to ordinary doctors at the time of performing the medical act, and thus, should be grasped at a normative level in light of the medical environment, conditions, characteristics of the medical act, etc. (Supreme Court Decision 2010Da20563 Decided July 8

(B) As seen above, Article 11(2) of the Emergency Medical Service Act provides that the head of a medical institution shall provide necessary medical appliances and human resources when he/she transfers an emergency patient pursuant to Article 11(1) of the same Act and provide a medical record necessary for medical treatment to the medical institution to which the patient is transferred. According to the testimony of Nonparty 2, the deceased is unable to preserve his/her life or may cause serious mental or physical harm unless he/she immediately receives necessary first aid due to illness, childbirth, various accidents, accidents, or other emergencies as at the time of the transfer of this case, or those prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Health and Welfare as patients or persons equivalent thereto (1) of attached Table 1 of Article 2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Emergency Medical Service Act, and b) who are determined by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Health and Welfare as patients unable to preserve his/her life or those likely to cause serious mental or physical harm to the deceased’s life-related patient’s life-related patient’s life-related patient’s life-related symptoms or mental and physical harm to the patient’s life-related treatment.

(C) Meanwhile, in determining the above transfer measures, the head of the Defendant hospital, which is a medical institution, did not perform the duty to provide medical instruments and human resources necessary for the safe transfer of an emergency patient under Article 11(2) of the Emergency Medical Service Act (Article 11(3) of the Emergency Medical Service Act, on the ground that the head of the Defendant hospital, who is a medical institution, does not have any duty to provide or arrange appropriate means of transport according to the condition of the deceased, such as whether the emergency medical technician was on board in the transfer of the deceased, whether the special emergency medical vehicle equipped with the automatic external engine necessary for the deceased (see attached Table 16 of the Enforcement Rule of the Emergency Medical Service Act), and whether the special emergency medical vehicle equipped with the automatic external engine necessary for the deceased was transferred to the deceased (Article 739 of the Civil Act).

(D) The defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center and the defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center are corporations under Article 3 of the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Local Medical Centers. Under Article 35 of the Civil Act, the director or other representative is responsible for compensating for damages inflicted on another person in connection with his duties. Since the head of the defendant hospital, a medical institution, violated the duty under Article 11(2) of the Emergency Medical Service Act, the defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center's tort liability is recognized. Thus, the defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center is responsible for compensating for all damages inflicted on the plaintiff due to the representative's illegal acts.

C. Determination on causation

(1) In compensating for damages caused by a tort, if the tortfeasor's tort was caused by competition not only the tortfeasor's tort but also the victim's act and other causes attributable to it, if the tortfeasor's tort was caused by the tortfeasor's tort, the tortfeasor is liable for compensating for the damages caused by the tort (Supreme Court Decision 99Da47129 delivered on May 16, 200).

(2) In the case of an emergency medical technician boarding a special emergency medical service vehicle, he/she has been engaged in the duties of emergency medical treatment to secure the emergency patient’s ability as a kind of emergency medical treatment during the process of transporting the emergency patient, to recover from heart consent and to prevent significant aggravation of his/her life or symptoms (under the proviso of Article 42 of the Emergency Medical Service Act, Articles 34 and 33 of the Enforcement Rule of the Emergency Medical Service Act, and the scope of duties of an emergency medical technician of February 2 of the attached Table 14 of the Emergency Medical Service Act, without specific instructions from the physician, the emergency medical technician did not perform the emergency medical treatment to remove the deceased’s life or significant mental and physical harm from the emergency medical treatment because it is evident that the emergency medical technician could not perform the first aid to remove the deceased’s life or significant mental and physical harm from the emergency medical treatment hospital of this case because it was no more necessary to actively respond to the situation where the patient was in need of rescue during the process of transferring the emergency medical technician.

D. Scope of damages

(1) The deceased's lost income of KRW 66,269,233 (the fact that there is no dispute)

(2) Funeral expenses KRW 3,000,000 (in the absence of any dispute)

(3) Limitation of liability

In light of all the circumstances indicated in the record, the Defendant-do Medical Center’s liability is limited to 30% of the Defendant-do Medical Center, taking into account the following: (a) the deceased was suffering from a cardiopulmonary surgery and treatment; (b) the medical staff of the Defendant Hospital actively recommended the deceased to treat and transfer the deceased; and even according to the Plaintiff’s assertion, the deceased with a heart disease was over the day immediately before the transfer of the instant case; (c) the deceased had a medication experience due to urology, high blood pressure, and had a smoking and drinking experience at the time of the transfer of the instant case; and (d) other circumstances indicated in the record.

(4) Consolation money

(A) Taking into account the deceased and the Plaintiff’s age, gender, occupation, and all other circumstances shown in the records.

(b) Deceased: 15 million won;

(C) Plaintiff: Three million won;

(5) Calculation

(A) Loss of the Deceased

34,880,769 won = Property damage 19,880,769 won (=6,269,233 won x 0.3) + Mental damage 15,00,000 won)

(B) Plaintiff’s damages

3,900,000 won = Property damage of 900,000 won (=3,00,000 won x 0.3) + Mental damage of 3,000,000 won)

(C) Total amount of damages due to sole inheritance

38,780,769 won = 34,880,769 won (the loss of the deceased) + 3,900,000 won (the loss of the plaintiff)

E. Sub-decision

Therefore, Defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center is obligated to pay to the Plaintiff 38,780,769 won and the amount equivalent to 5% per annum under the Civil Act and 20% per annum under the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from January 13, 2012, the transfer date of this case, to February 13, 2014, which is the date the judgment of this case is rendered by Defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center.

4. Determination as to the Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Emergency Medical Center

As seen earlier, since part of the claim against the primary Defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center is accepted, the conjunctive Defendant Emergency Medical Center does not make any judgment otherwise.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim against the main defendant Gyeonggi-do Medical Center is justified within the above recognition scope, and the remaining claims are dismissed as it is without merit. The plaintiff's claim against the ancillary defendant first-aid center is dismissed as it is without merit.

[Attachment]

For the purpose of transfer by judge