1. The purpose of interference with general traffic under Article 185 of the Criminal Act is to punish all acts that make it impossible or considerably difficult to pass by interfering with traffic by destroying land, etc. or blocking by obstacles, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 95Do1475, Sept. 15, 1995). The term “land” refers to a place provided for the traffic of the general public, i.e., a place with a public nature where many and unspecified persons or vehicles and horses are able to freely pass by without any specific person (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 83Do2617, Sept. 11, 1984; 2002Do7292, Feb. 28, 2003). The term “land” refers to a place where a person using a road as a means of traffic safety falls under the land stipulated in the above provision, even if there is little number of persons having access to the road, but it does not constitute an incidental use by a land owner with his/her own consent as a temporary passage.

2. The reasoning of the lower judgment and the record reveal the following facts.

A. The instant farm road runs on both sides of the non-packaged road, and there are the land owned by the Defendant, the land owned by Nonindicted Party 1, and the land owned by Nonindicted Party 2, and part of the land owned by the Defendant is included in the instant farm road.

B. Around 196, Nonindicted Party 2 was established at the time of purchase of each land in around 1996 and around 1997; however, Nonindicted Party 1 had been trying to stop for farming. Around 2003, the Defendant purchased his own land and limited the passage of the farmland using the said land by installing a chain, etc. at the location abutting on a big path from around 2007. Nonindicted Party 2 passed through the instant farmland with the Defendant’s temporary approval from the time of the purchase.

C. However, around March 7, 2014, Nonindicted Party 1 began to expand and pass through the access road part of the instant farm road to the owner of a construction vehicle while constructing a new house on his own land, and there was a dispute with the Defendant seeking to prevent passage during that process.

D. There are cement packagings that allow entry into the land owned by Nonindicted Party 1 and the land owned by Nonindicted Party 2 on a large channel, and the present situation is that it was set up in Yeongdeungpo-gun by installing a drails, etc. as it was not used.

3. Examining these facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, around March 2014, it was difficult to view the instant farmland as a place with a public nature where many and unspecified persons or vehicles and horses are allowed to freely pass, and the land owned by Nonindicted Party 1 and Nonindicted Party 2 was not used at the time, but was connected with cement packaging. Therefore, the instant farmland is merely a passage through which Nonindicted Party 1 and Nonindicted Party 2, who resides in the land adjacent to the Defendant’s land, obtained temporary consent from the Defendant, was merely a passage, and thus, it cannot be deemed as a land as referred to in Article 185 of the Criminal Act.

The lower court is justifiable to have found the Defendant not guilty of the instant facts charged on the ground that the instant farm road cannot be deemed land. In so determining, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence inconsistent with logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on interference with general traffic, or by violating the principle of court-oriented trial and direct

4. The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)