2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The reasoning of this court's judgment is the same as that of the judgment of the court of first instance except for a partial revision as follows. Thus, it is accepted in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

Parts used for cutting.

○ From 4th to 11th, the following is changed.

2) Even if not, the part of the instant land amounting to 436,830 square meters, which was actually used as a site for a stock farm around 2001 when the Plaintiff closes its business, is real estate related to the business, even if used for the rental business thereafter, and thus the corresponding property tax, comprehensive real estate tax, and interest for arrears should be included in the corporation’s deductible expenses. However, the Plaintiff asserts that the disposition of imposing corporate tax on the portion of the instant land among the instant disposition should be revoked. However, the Plaintiff asserted that the corporate tax should be revoked on the ground that the objective data necessary for calculating this should not be submitted, and thus, the entire disposition

○ From Nos. 18 to 7, the following are replaced by the 5th page 12:

A) Article 49(1)1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act provides that "real estate that is not used directly for the business of a corporation constitutes an asset irrelevant to the business, but is excluded from real estate due to unavoidable reasons prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance," and Article 26(5)17 of the Enforcement Rule of the Corporate Tax Act provides that "real estate which is not used directly for the business due to the suspension, closure or transfer of all or part of the business, and for which five years have not passed since the date of such suspension, closure or transfer."

The plaintiff discontinued the livestock industry around 2001. The land of this case is real estate that the plaintiff was not directly used for business as a result of the closure of the livestock industry around 2001. The land of this case constitutes a non-business-free asset during the taxable period of this case for which five years have passed since such closure date.

B) Meanwhile, Article 26(4) of the Enforcement Rule of the Corporate Tax Act provides that “Where a parcel of land without a building is leased (excluding the case of leasing land directly used for a corporation’s business, such as land annexed to a factory and building) in the application of Article 49(1)1 of the Decree, the said parcel of land shall be deemed as real estate not used directly

The plaintiff imposed a condition that the land of this case be used for the livestock industry at around 2003 when leasing a lot of land of this case to YAK, etc., but such circumstance alone does not constitute "a case where the plaintiff changed the type of business from the livestock industry to the real estate rental business, or the land of this case was leased to the corporation directly used for the business of the corporation under Article 26 (4) of the Enforcement Rule of the Corporate Tax Act, with the lease from around 2003 when the plaintiff ceased to use the land of this case which was not directly used for the business due to the closure of the livestock industry around 201."

C) With respect to the interpretation of Article 26(4) of the Enforcement Rule of the Corporate Tax Act, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance responded to the inquiry that “where a corporation operating a livestock farming business discontinues the livestock industry and leases the land used therefor, the land is excluded from the scope of real estate not related to the business pursuant to Article 26(4) of the Enforcement Rule of the Corporate Tax Act if the land was used directly for the livestock industry” (Article 26(4) of the Enforcement Rule of the Corporate Tax Act). However, such interpretation cannot be applied to the case where the Plaintiff leases the land of this case, which was not used directly for the business due to the closure of the livestock industry around April 2001 by the Plaintiff.

Therefore, the answer to the question cannot be the basis for the illegality of the disposition of this case.

2. Conclusion

Since the judgment of the first instance is justifiable, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is groundless.