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(영문) 대법원 2002. 8. 23. 선고 2002도2112 판결

[약사법위반][공2002.10.1.(163),2268]

Main Issues

[1] The elements to acknowledge the admissibility of a protocol in which a prosecutor or senior judicial police officer made a statement by a person other than a suspect

[2] Whether the testimony of a police officer in charge of investigation who made a confession of a criminal defendant in a timely manner is admissible (negative)

Summary of Judgment

[1] A protocol in which a prosecutor or a senior judicial police officer made a statement of a person other than a suspect is admissible as evidence only when it is acknowledged to be genuine by the person making the original statement at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial. Here, the authenticity of the protocol refers to both the formal authenticity of the protocol, such as seal, signature and seal, and the actual authenticity that the content of the protocol is recorded as stated by the person making the original statement, and the defendant did not agree to be admitted as evidence. The protocol in which the person making the original statement was signed and sealed on the public trial date and the defendant did not agree to be admitted as evidence. In case where the person making the original statement denies the authenticity of the actual establishment of the protocol in which the statement was made because he did not make any statement like the contents of the protocol, it cannot be admitted as evidence, and the police officer who prepared the protocol in question made a statement that the person making the original statement prepared the protocol as stated on the public trial and

[2] The testimony that the police officer, who arrested the defendant and examined the defendant in the police, led to a net confession of the crime in the police investigation, is inadmissible in light of the purpose of Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, as long as the defendant denies the statement by the police.

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Articles 312(1) and 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act / [2] Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 90Do1474 delivered on October 16, 1990 (Gong1990, 2348) Supreme Court Decision 92Do737 delivered on June 9, 1992 (Gong1992, 2175) Supreme Court Decision 94Do1853 delivered on September 23, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2907), Supreme Court Decision 95Do1761, 95Do83 delivered on October 13, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 3847 delivered on April 11, 1997), Supreme Court Decision 96Do2865 delivered on April 11, 197 (Gong1997, 195Do197989 delivered on April 29, 209)

Defendant

Defendant 1 and four others

Appellant

Defendants

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul District Court Decision 2001No9036 delivered on April 19, 2002

Text

All convictions against the Defendants among the judgment below are reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul District Court Panel Division.

Reasons

The defendants' grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Facts charged;

Of the facts charged in the instant case, the lower court found guilty as follows.

Defendant 1: (1) The representative director of the drug company, Defendant 3, and Defendant 4 were each drug distributor, Defendant 5 was established for wholesale purposes, etc.; (2) the drug company, Defendant 1 and Defendant 3 supplied drugs to Defendant 3, who did not obtain permission for wholesale of drugs from Gwangjin-gu, Seoul; and (3) Defendant 3 conspired to sell drugs supplied by Defendant 1 in wholesale to his pharmacy; and (5) through 10% of the sales proceeds from the drug wholesale until May 27, 1998; (4) Defendant 3, who did not obtain permission for wholesale of drugs from Defendant 1 to 00,00,000 won from the market price of Songpa-gu to 10,000 won; and (5) Defendant 2, who did not obtain permission for wholesale of drugs from Defendant 1 to 30,000,000 won from the market price of Songpa-gu to 10,000 won; and (3) Defendant 1 and 3, who did not obtain permission from Defendant 196.

2. The judgment of the court below

On the grounds that there is a lack of evidence to prove the above facts charged, the court below reversed the judgment of the court of first instance and found the Defendants guilty on the grounds that the above facts charged are proved by the statement of the statement of the witness in the court of first instance, the assistance in the preparation of the judicial police assistant, the disturbance in favor of the witness, and the statement of the statement of the witness in the court of first instance.

3. Judgment of the Supreme Court

However, it is difficult to accept the judgment of the court below for the following reasons.

A public prosecutor or judicial police officer may use a protocol which contains a statement of a person other than a suspect as evidence only when it is acknowledged to be genuine by the person making the original statement at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial. Here, the authenticity of the protocol refers to both the formal authenticity of the protocol, such as seal, signature and seal, and the actual authenticity that the contents of the protocol are recorded as stated by the person making the original statement. The defendant did not agree to the admissibility of the protocol of statement as evidence. However, if the original person made a statement that he did not make a statement like the contents of the protocol of statement at the public trial, and the defendant did not agree to the admissibility of the actual establishment of the protocol of statement, it cannot be admitted as evidence, and the police officer who prepared the protocol of statement at the public trial and made the statement that the person making the statement was signed and sealed, and thus, it cannot be admissible as evidence (see Supreme Court Decision 95Do1761, 95Do83, Oct. 13, 195). 198; and in light of the purport of Article 28 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the police testimony of the defendant.

However, according to the records, since the above defendant 2's accounting officer or senior officer of the above medical corporation or senior officer's testimony was not admitted as evidence, each statement made by the judicial police officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior witness's senior officer's senior officer's senior witness's senior officer's senior witness's senior witness's senior witness's senior witness's senior witness's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior officer's senior.

Nevertheless, the court below's finding the defendants guilty of the above facts charged by admitting the admissibility of each of the statements in the court of first instance, the assistance of the court of first instance, the knife, the knife, the knife, the knife, and the knife's knife's knife's knife's knife's knife's knife'

4. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendants shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Cho-Un (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-서울지방법원 2002.4.19.선고 2001노9036
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