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(영문) 대법원 2012. 5. 9. 선고 2010다88880 판결

[임금][공2012상,964]

Main Issues

[1] In a case where the Appeal Commission for Teachers made a decision to change a disposition by a person with authority to take a disposition, whether a change in the legal relations between a teacher and a school juristic person is caused by such decision (affirmative)

[2] In a case where a school foundation is unable to give lectures because it did not allocate subjects and hours of lectures with the intention to exclude university professors from performing its principal duties, whether it is obligated to compensate for mental suffering suffered by university professors (affirmative in principle)

[3] The case holding that the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles on the ground that Gap school juristic person has a duty to compensate for mental suffering suffered by Eul and it is necessary to claim in advance for wages and consolation money after the date of closing argument in the court below, in case where Gap school juristic person's rejection of wage payment and exclusion from Eul's school affairs was made and confirmed after the correction of Gap school juristic person's removal from Gap school juristic person's office for professor Eul due to the suspension of three months after the suspension of office period

Summary of Judgment

[1] In light of the purport of Articles 9(1) and 10(2) of the Special Act on the Improvement of Teachers’ Status (hereinafter “Special Act”), Article 16(2)3 of the Regulations on Petitions for Teachers, and Article 16(2)3 of the Special Act on the Status of Teachers to improve teachers’ status and promote the development of education by improving honorable treatment and treatment of teachers and strengthening their status guarantee (Article 1), when the Appeal Commission made a decision to change the disposition of the person who is subject to the disposition of the Appeal Commission for Teachers, the legal relationship between the teacher and the school juristic person as soon as possible is changed.

[2] Barring special circumstances, an employer is obligated under the good faith principle to ensure that an employee can realize his/her personality by promoting the development of the personality which he/she has learned through the provision of labor to the extent consistent with the exercise of his/her right to command and order of work through the conclusion of an employment contract with the employee. Therefore, an employer’s continued refusal of the provision of labor against the employee’s will constitutes an infringement of the employee’s personal legal interests and thus, an employer is obliged to compensate for the emotional distress inflicted upon the employee’s own major and development of his/her academic research through the lectures of his/her major and the strong development of his/her own academic research constitutes an essential part of the realization of the personality right. Thus, an employer’s act of a university professor’s professor’s failure to give lectures by failing to allocate subjects and hours under his/her intent to exclude the university professor from his/her main duties constitutes infringement of personal legal interests and a school juristic person bears the obligation to compensate for the emotional distress suffered by a university professor.

[3] The case holding that the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles on the ground that, in a case where Gap's school foundation's continued refusal of payment of wages and consolation money after the date of closing argument in the court below's judgment, and Gap's school foundation's refusal of payment, failure to assign lecture subjects and time, etc. were affected by Eul's personal legal interests by its change in the contents of the decision, although Gap's school foundation's continued refusal of provision of labor without justifiable grounds, and Eul's school foundation's refusal of payment of wages, etc. after the closing of argument in the court below's judgment, and Eul's school foundation's refusal of payment of wages, etc. after the closing of argument in the court below's judgment, and it is sufficiently possible to exclude Eul's school affairs from Eul's school affairs, even though Eul's prior claim for payment of wages and consolation money after the date of closing argument in the court below's judgment.

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Articles 1, 9(1), 10(2) and (4) of the Special Act on the Improvement of Teachers' Status; Article 16(2)3 of the Regulations on Petitions for Teachers / [2] Article 751 of the Civil Act / [3] Article 751 of the Civil Act; Article 251 of the Civil Procedure Act; Articles 9(1), 10(2) and (4) of the Special Act on the Improvement of Teachers' Status; Article 16(2)3 of the Regulations on Petitions for Teachers

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 94Da30478 delivered on November 22, 1994 (Gong1995Sang, 76) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 95Da6823 delivered on April 23, 1996 (Gong1996Sang, 1552), Supreme Court Decision 2006Da30730 Delivered on June 26, 2008 (Gong2008Ha, 1046)

Plaintiff-Appellee-Appellant

Plaintiff (Attorney Hun-Ba et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant-Appellant-Appellee

Defendant School Foundation (Attorney Cho Jae-in, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Gwangju High Court Decision 2009Na3437 decided October 8, 2010

Text

The part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Gwangju High Court. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

A. Ground of appeal No.1

A lawsuit for future performance may be instituted only where a prior claim is required. The "case where a prior claim is required" refers to the case where a debtor cannot expect the voluntary performance when the due date comes or the conditions are satisfied, as in the case of a claim for non-performance of the conditions, since the existence of an obligation is disputed prior to the due date (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da3891, Jan. 15, 2004, etc.).

Meanwhile, Article 9 (1) of the Special Act on the Improvement of Teachers' Status (hereinafter "Special Act") provides that "when a teacher is dissatisfied with a disciplinary action or any other unfavorable measure against his/her will, he/she may file a petition with the Appeal Committee for Teachers within 30 days from the date he/she becomes aware of such disposition." Article 10 (4) 3 of the Regulations on Petitions for Teachers (amended by Presidential Decree No. 20740, Feb. 29, 2008; Presidential Decree No. 20740, Feb. 29, 2008; Presidential Decree No. 10 (2) of the Special Act on the Improvement of Teachers' Status provides that "if a request for review of an appeal seeking the cancellation or change of a disposition is deemed well-grounded, the decision of the Appeal Committee for Teachers shall bind the person who has the authority to take the disposition," and Article 10 (2) of the Special Act provides that "if the person intends to improve the status and status of teachers by enhancing their status, it shall be deemed that the school juristic person is 197.

However, according to the evidence duly admitted by the court below, the defendant decided to dismiss the plaintiff and notified the plaintiff on March 17, 2008, but the teachers' appeals review committee decided to change the above removal from office for three months on July 21, 2008, and the defendant filed an administrative litigation to seek the cancellation thereof on November 11, 2008, and thereby the decision of the above teachers' appeals review committee became final and conclusive as it is. Thus, the above removal from office for three months after suspension from office was changed to the above three months, and the legal relation according to the decision of the above teachers' appeals review committee was changed between the plaintiff as a teacher and the defendant as a school juristic person. Thus, unless the removal from office for three months after suspension from office for the defendant's own, the defendant still argues that the removal from office for three months after the period of suspension from office for the plaintiff still remains valid, and even if the period of suspension has elapsed, it can be known that the plaintiff is excluded from the school affairs affairs of the court below, such as refusing to pay wages to

According to the above legal principles and factual relations, the defendant still asserts that the removal disposition in this case is valid even after the closing of argument in the court below, and refuses to pay wages, etc. and excludes the plaintiff from the school affairs. Therefore, it is necessary to claim in advance the payment of wages and consolation money after the date of closing of argument in the court below. Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on future performance litigation. The plaintiff's ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.

B. Ground of appeal No. 2

An employer, barring special circumstances, bears the duty under the good faith principle to consider in order for an employee to realize his personality by promoting the development of personality which he participated through the provision of labor to the extent consistent with the exercise of his right to command and order work. Thus, continuing refusal of labor without justifiable reason against the employee’s will constitutes an infringement of the employee’s personal legal interests and thus, the employer is obliged to compensate for mental suffering suffered by the employee (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 95Da6823, Apr. 23, 1996). A university professor’s lectures on his major and develops his academic research beyond it constitutes an essential part of its personality right realization. Thus, an employer of a university professor’s school juristic person, who is an employer of the university, causes interference with the exercise of his right to command and order work, etc. Thus, the employer is obliged to compensate for mental suffering of the employee’s teacher (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Da682360, Jun. 26, 2008).

According to the evidence duly admitted by the lower court and the first instance court, as seen earlier, the decision to revise the Teachers’ Appeal Committee became final and conclusive, and the Plaintiff demanded the Defendant to take follow-up measures, such as restoring teaching staff, etc. on several occasions after the said decision, but the Defendant continues to exclude the Plaintiff from school affairs by failing to assign the Plaintiff the subjects and time of the first semester and the second semester in 2009, even though there are no special circumstances, such as where the instant disposition is still valid, i.e., disputing that the instant disposition would interfere with the exercise of the right to command, etc., unless he/she did not make a separate disposition of suspension for three months.

Therefore, the Defendant, a school juristic person, continuously rejects the Plaintiff’s provision of labor without any justifiable reason, thereby infringing the Plaintiff’s personal legal interests. Therefore, the Defendant has a duty to compensate for the Plaintiff’s emotional distress inflicted upon the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the lower court’s rejection of the Plaintiff’s claim for consolation money on the grounds as indicated in its reasoning is erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal doctrine regarding consolation money. The Plaintiff’

2. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

A. Ground of appeal No.1

Inasmuch as wages for workers shall be paid in full to workers, the employer shall not set off against workers' wage claims with loans or claims arising out of tort except for over-paid claims for the return of wages (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 94Da26721, Dec. 21, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 97Da14200, Jun. 26, 1998).

It is apparent that the Defendant’s assertion of the offset defense as an automatic claim is a damage claim arising from the Plaintiff’s tort. Thus, in light of the above legal doctrine, it is evident that the Defendant’s counterclaim should be rejected regardless of whether the automatic claim is recognized. Therefore, even if the lower court’s rejection of the Defendant’s counterclaim by deeming the Defendant’s counterclaim as a means of attack and defense against the actual time limit, such mistake does not affect the conclusion of the judgment.

B. Ground of appeal No. 2

As seen earlier, when the Appeal Commission for Teachers makes a decision to change the disposition by the person who is subject to disposition, it shall be deemed that there has been a change in the legal relations between the teacher and the school juristic person immediately by such decision.

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that the Appeal Commission for Teachers decided to change the defendant's disposition of suspension from office for three months, and that the decision became final and conclusive, and thus the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was formed. There is no violation of law by misunderstanding legal principles as argued in the

The decision of the Constitutional Court as asserted in the ground of appeal is not appropriate because it is related to the decision of the Special Committee on Examination of Appeal against Teachers under the Special Act on the Relief of Persons Deserting the Fixed-Term Faculty Appointment System.

C. Ground of appeal No. 3

The main text of Article 10(1) of the Special Act on Teachers' Status provides that "the Appeal Commission for Teachers shall make a decision thereon within 60 days from the date of receipt of a request for review of an appeal, and does not impose any restriction on the contents of the decision, etc., except Article 10(4) provides that "it shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree." Therefore, it shall be determined reasonably by taking into account the purpose of the Special Act on Teachers' Status, the function of the Commission, etc., and the purpose of the special Act on Teachers' Status, the improvement of teachers' status and the development of education by improving the honorable treatment and strengthening the status guarantee of teachers, and the appeal review of teachers is for correcting and remedying other unfavorable measures against the will, the Appeal Commission for Teachers shall examine and dismiss the request for review, order the revocation or alteration of the disposition disadvantageous to the person entitled to disposition, order the revocation or revocation of the disposition, or the validity of the disposition, or order the person entitled to disposition to take disposition to take such action, and therefore, it shall not be deemed that the provisions of the appeal are inconsistent with the purport of the above.

The judgment of the court below is justified in light of the above legal principles, and the decision of the court below is justified in rejecting the defendant's assertion that the provision on a teacher's appeal is against the Constitution or the law, and there is no error of omission of judgment, etc. as alleged in the ground of appeal.

D. Ground of appeal No. 4

A criminal defendant shall be presumed innocent until a judgment of conviction becomes final and conclusive (Article 27(4) of the Constitution). Therefore, the fact that the plaintiff was indicted due to obstruction of business, etc. and was under criminal trial shall not be deemed to have erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment below against the plaintiff is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. The defendant's appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench

Justices Min Il-young (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-광주고등법원전주재판부 2010.10.8.선고 2009나3437