Attorney C, D, and E

1. As to the ground of appeal No. 1, Article 45 of the Constitution provides, “A member of the National Assembly shall not be held responsible outside the National Assembly with respect to speaking and voting held in the course of performing his/her duties,” thereby recognizing the exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption includes not only the expression of an opinion, such as speaking and voting within the National Assembly that is essential to the National Assembly member’s duties within the National Assembly, but also acts incidental thereto. Whether such exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption exemption is an incidental act should be determined on an individual basis that the National Assembly guarantees that a member of the National Assembly can freely speak and vote within the National Assembly as a representative of the National Assembly, thereby ensuring that the member of the National Assembly can properly exercise the authority granted by the Constitution, such as legislation and national control, and the purpose, place, mode, etc. of the specific act individually (see, Supreme Court Decisions 205Da5752, Jan.

The court below held that, unlike distributing news reports for the convenience of news reports to reporters prior to the National Assembly’s remarks, considering the following: (a) it is difficult to see that the posting of news reports on the Internet was made within the National Assembly with easy access to anyone at any time and place; (b) the exemption privilege is to ensure that a member of the National Assembly can freely speak and vote within the National Assembly; (c) the posting of the news reports on the Internet does not seem to have any particular relation to Defendant’s free speaking within the National Assembly; and (d) the distribution of news reports to reporters prior to the National Assembly’s remarks is limited to the distribution of news reports on the Internet; and (e) each media company that received the above news reports on the Internet homepage did not publish them in the press without being selected by each person’s responsibility; and (e) the posting of news reports on the Internet homepage could not be deemed as an act of posting the news reports on the Internet homepage within the scope of exemption privilege.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the exemption privilege as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

The Protection of Communications Secrets Act prohibits any act of censorship of mail, wiretapping of telecommunications, recording or listening to conversations between other persons, etc. (hereinafter referred to as “illegal wiretapping, recording, etc.”) not under the Protection of Communications Secrets Act, the Criminal Procedure Act, or the Military Court Act (hereinafter referred to as “the act”) from collecting contents belonging to communication secrets, and provides that the act of violation shall be punished (Articles 3(1) and 16(1)1), and the act of disclosing or divulging the contents of communications or conversations collected through illegal wiretapping, recording, etc. shall be subject to the same punishment (Article 16(1)2). As such, the Protection of Communications Secrets Act equally prescribes that the act of disclosing or divulging communication secrets is subject to punishment equal to the act of unlawful wiretapping, recording, etc., and the same statutory punishment is that the act of disclosing or divulging such information should not have existed originally by prohibiting the use of the information itself regardless of the content of the information collected by the infringement of communication secrets, and that such act shall also be prohibited from gaining unlawful profits, and that such act shall be removed from 3817.

In light of the legislative intent above, even if some of the contents of illegal wiretapping, recorded or recorded communications or conversations have already been made public to the general public, the act of disclosing or divulging the part of such communications or conversations which has not yet been made public shall be deemed as falling under the act of disclosure or leakage as stipulated in Article 16(1)2 of the Protection of Communications Secrets Act.

According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, the instant Do governor’s fee, which was illegally recorded and recorded by a state agency, contains a conversation on September 197, 197, about F and G’s issue of supporting the value of the instant Do governor’s Do governor’s Do governor’s Do governor’s Do governor’s Do governor’s Do governor’s Do governor’s Do governor’s high-ranking person. However, on July 2005, the overall content of the instant Do governor’s Do governor’s Do governor’s Do governor’s fee was disclosed through the media, but the relevant prosecutor’s real name was not disclosed. The Defendant obtained the instant Do governor’s data around August 2005 and posted it on

In light of the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, even if some of the content of the Do Office data of this case was already disclosed to the media, the Defendant’s act of disclosing the real name of the relevant prosecutor who was not yet disclosed among the content of the unlawfully recorded conversation and disclosing the contents of the conversation specifically constitutes disclosure or leakage under Article 16(1)2 of the Protection of Communications Secrets Act.

In the same purport, the lower court’s determination that recognized the establishment of a crime of violating the Protection of Communications Secrets Act as to the posting of the Internet homepage of the instant news report materials is justifiable. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine

3. As to the third ground for appeal

Based on its stated reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s act of disclosing communication secrets by posting the instant report materials on the website cannot be deemed as a justifiable act under Article 20 of the Criminal Act, which constitutes a case where illegality is dismissed. This is justifiable as it is in accordance with the purport of the judgment of remanding. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee In-bok

Justices Park Poe-young

Justices Kim Gin-