Expenses for appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The defendant shall not use the trademark and service mark listed in attached Form 1. The goods listed in attached Form 2 and the service business listed in attached Form 3. The advertising advertisements using the trademark and service mark listed in attached Form 1. It shall not use the outer walls, inner and external signboards, labels, printed materials, and the above publicity advertisements kept or displayed in the defendant's office, warehouse, and other places, and shall destroy the defendant's office, warehouse, and other places, and shall delete the trademark and service mark listed in attached Form 1.

Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked. The same shall apply to the purport of the claim.

[Evidence A] 1-3, 5-10 evidence, 1-4 evidence Nos. 1-4 (including branch numbers, if any) and the purport of the whole pleadings

A. On January 24, 1969, the Plaintiff: (a) was engaged in housing construction business, real estate sale and lease business, etc. after the registration of incorporation was completed; (b) was changed from the trade name as of February 28, 1989 to a Dongbu Construction Co., Ltd. (Dongbu Construction Co., Ltd.). The Defendant completed the registration of incorporation of the trade name on March 14, 1984 to a Dongbu Construction Co., Ltd. (Dongbu Construction Co., Ltd.) and completed the registration of incorporation; and (c) was engaged in housing construction business, real estate sale and lease business, and civil engineering work business.

B. The Plaintiff merged with the East Industry Co., Ltd. on January 4, 1997. On January 29, 198, the merged subsidiary Industry Co., Ltd. filed an application for the trademark registration as indicated in the attached Table 1 with the designated goods as indicated in the attached Table 2 as of January 29, 198, and obtained the trademark registration with the registration number No. 174522 on July 11, 1989. On January 29, 1988, the designated service business was classified as the civil engineering and construction business of Chapter 104 (the designated service business was added as indicated in the attached Table 3 as of May 22, 1989) with the registration number No. 9651 on May 22, 1989, and the Plaintiff completed the registration of the service mark (hereinafter referred to as “instant registered service mark”) under the name of the Plaintiff Co., Ltd. on May 31, 197.

C. The plaintiff was established on January 24, 1969, and was listed on the Korea Stock Exchange around October 1978, when conducting civil engineering, construction work, electricity and machinery construction work, etc., and belonged to the so-called "Dong Branch Group" with affiliated companies such as Dongbu Tourism, Dongbu Mutual Saving and Finance Company, Dongbu Life Insurance, Dongbu Business Start-up Investment, Dong engineering, Dong engineering, Dong engineering, and Dong industry. From around 1989, "Dong Group" used the name of "Dong Branch" as an affiliated company within the group. Since around 1999, the plaintiff constructed and sold apartment units with the sign "Dongbu Loan," 3.8 billion won for the advertisement of apartment units constructed and sold from 2000 to 207, and from 2000 to 207, 2004, the size of the apartment units in Korea was 1.1.5 billion won for 20 years to 20 years to 20 years to 3 years to 205.4 years to dong culture.

D. Meanwhile, since 2001, the Defendant constructed or sold an apartment using the sign "Briman" or "Brimanation of East House", and on May 7, 2002, the Defendant applied for the service mark "BRLINTE" or "Briman" with the designated service business as a building sales business, etc., and obtained each service mark registration on November 6, 2003 as the registration number No. 92829 and No. 928300.

2. Summary of the plaintiff's assertion

A. The Plaintiff is the owner of the trademark and service mark of the instant registered trademark and service mark, and the Plaintiff’s trademark and service mark rights are infringed by using the mark “Dong House” similar to the Dong House, which is the instant registered trademark and service mark, or using the mark “Dong House” or “Dong House” which can be perceived as a “Dong House” or “Dong House House”, while engaging in apartment construction and sales business.

B. The plaintiff, a company belonging to the Dong Branch group, used the signs of "Dong Branch" or "Dong Branch" to construct and sell apartment buildings, and as a result, "Dong Branch" or "Dong Branch Loan" or "Dong Branch Loan" was widely recognized and well-known and well-known in Korea as a trademark mark or business mark of the plaintiff in relation to the apartment construction and sale business. The defendant used the plaintiff's trademark "Dong Branch" or "Dong Branch House" or "Dong Branch House" to use the mark "Dong Branch" or "Dong Branch House" in order to gain the reputation of the plaintiff's trademark use, or constructed and sold apartment with the mark "Bluri" in Korean, and caused confusion with the plaintiff's product mark or business mark, or caused confusion with the plaintiff's economic support relationship with the plaintiff as a co-owned brand. The defendant's act constitutes an act of causing confusion with another person's product mark or business mark as provided in Article 2 subparagraph 1 (a) and (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (hereinafter "Unfair Competition Prevention Act") or the reputation of another person.

C. Therefore, under the Trademark Act and the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, the defendant has a duty to suspend the infringement of trademark and service right on the instant registered trademark and service mark and unfair competition act against the plaintiff.

3. Determination

A. Determination on the assertion of infringement of trademark right

The similarity of trademarks shall be determined by whether there is a concern for ordinary consumers or traders to mislead or confuse the origin of goods in trade by observing the appearance, name, and concept of two trademarks used for the same kind of goods objectively, comprehensively, externally, and externally, based on the direct perception that ordinary consumers or traders feel with respect to the trademark. Even if one of the appearance, name, and concept is similar, if it is possible to avoid confusion of the origin clearly as a whole, it shall not be deemed a similar trademark, but if it is easy for ordinary consumers to mislead or confuse as to the origin because the name or concept is similar even if one of the different parts is similar, it shall be deemed as a similar trademark (Supreme Court Decision 9Hu1096 delivered on April 25, 200).

First of all, according to the facts found by the Defendant in the instant case, it can be known that the Defendant constructed or sold an apartment using the sign "Brigrae" or "Bridong House" from 2001, and there is no evidence to prove that the Defendant constructed or sold an apartment using the sign "Brigrae", "Dong House", or "Dong House" (in accordance with the evidence No. 4-1, 2, and 11, according to the statement of evidence No. 4-1, 2, and 11, it appears that the owner or broker of the apartment constructed by the Defendant and sold the apartment site, but it appears that the owner or broker of the apartment, who sold the apartment, has sold the apartment as a unit of the apartment site, was using the apartment as a business mark, and therefore, it cannot be deemed that the Defendant used the apartment as a "Dongdong House" or a similar mark with the Plaintiff's registered trademark in this case. Therefore, it is limited to the case where the Defendant used the apartment as a "Dong House" or a similar mark in this case.

First, it is clear that the appearance, name, and concept of the Plaintiff’s trademark and service mark are completely different from that of the Plaintiff’s trademark and service mark, and that it is not similar to each other, since the appearance, name, and concept of the Defendant’s “Dong” are completely different.

Then, as to whether the Plaintiff’s registered trademark/service mark and the Defendant’s “Dong-dong house” are similar, the Plaintiff’s registered trademark/service mark is composed of only one word “Dong-dong house” and the Defendant’s registered trademark/service mark, but it is likely that each constituent part of the apartment house “Dong-dong house” or “Dong-dong house” can be called and conceptualized only because it is a combination of three different terms “Dong-dong house”, “house-building” and “Dong-dong housing” used by the Defendant. However, in light of the Plaintiff’s registered trademark/service mark’s overall purport of oral argument, it is difficult to view that the apartment house-building or apartment-building apartment-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building-building building (hereinafter “Dong apartment-building-building-building-building building-building building-building building-building building-related building-building”-building.

Furthermore, as to whether the Plaintiff’s registered trademark, service mark, and the Defendant’s “Blue of the East House” marks are similar, the health room and the “Dong House Blue” column 8, which are the registered trademark and service mark of this case, are divided into two sections, and the overall appearance of “Dong House Blue”, which is the registered trademark and service mark of this case, differs. “Dong House Blue of the Dong House Blue” is additionally combined with “Dong House Blue” which is entirely different from the name and concept of Dong House Blue, and its title and concept are different.

Therefore, since the Plaintiff’s registered trademark/service mark of this case and the Defendant’s mark “Blue House Blue” are not similar, the remainder of the Plaintiff’s claim based on the infringement of trademark/service right is without merit, without having to examine any further.

B. Whether the act constitutes an unfair competitive act

(1) Whether the act constitutes an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (a) and (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act

An act of causing confusion with another person's business activities using a mark identical or similar to another person's trade name, trademark, or any other mark widely known in the Republic of Korea, or selling or distributing goods using such a mark to cause confusion with another person's goods (Article 2 subparagraph 1 (a) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act) or using a mark identical or similar to a mark indicating another person's business, such as another person's trade name or mark widely known in the Republic of Korea, constitutes an unfair competition act.

In the instant case, according to the facts acknowledged above, the Defendant’s act of constructing or selling apartment units using the signs of “Buhoe” or “Bridong Housing Blue” from 2001 constitutes an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparag. 1 (a) and (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act (the same shall apply as seen earlier). According to the facts acknowledged above, the Plaintiff was a company belonging to the Dongbu Group, which used the goods or business marks of “Dongbu Group” or “Dongbu Loan” from 1999, and engaged in apartment construction and sales business using the goods or business marks of “Dongbu” or “Dongbu Loan,” and the size of the apartment units from 2004 to 1.1.41.5 billion won, it was widely known to the Plaintiff’s residential premises or apartment units from 2005 to 2005 to 205 to 205 to 205 to 205 to 1.4 years to 20 years to 20 years to 20 years to 20 years to 2.

However, in order to constitute an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparag. 1 (a) and (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, a trader or ordinary consumer should mislead and confuse the infringing person’s mark as the goods or business activities of the right holder as to the similarity between the right holder’s and the infringing person’s product mark or business mark. However, the fact that “Brihh” or “Dong House Brihhhn”, a mark used by the Defendant, is not similar to the Plaintiff’s goods mark or business mark as a whole, has already been determined on the infringement of the trademark and service mark. Thus, if the circumstances are the same, the phrase “Dongbugl” added to “Dongbugl” as the mark used by the Defendant cannot be deemed similar to “Brihn” or “Dong House Brihn” as the mark used by the Defendant.

Ultimately, the Defendant’s use of “Blue” or “Blue House Blue” as the mark used by the Defendant cannot be deemed as similar to the Plaintiff’s product mark or business mark, which is the Plaintiff’s product mark or business mark, or as such, it cannot be said that there is misconception or confusion as to the source of goods or business activity. Therefore, the Defendant’s use of “Blue” or “Blue House Blue” for apartment construction and sales business does not constitute an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparag. 1(a) and (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act against the Plaintiff.

(2) Whether the act constitutes an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (c) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act

In addition to acts of causing confusion under subparagraph 1 (a) or (b) of Article 2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, acts of using a mark identical or similar to another person's trade name, trademark, or any other mark widely known domestically without justifiable grounds prescribed by Presidential Decree, such as non-commercial use, or selling or distributing goods using such a mark, thereby impairing the distinctiveness or reputation of another person's mark constitutes an unfair competition act (Article 2 subparagraph 1 (c) of

However, in order to constitute an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparag. 1 (c) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, the similarity between the product mark or business mark should be premised. The fact that the Defendant’s mark, “Blue” or “Dong House Blue” is not similar to the Plaintiff’s product mark or business mark, or “Dong House Blue” or “Dong House Blue” which is the Plaintiff’s business mark. In addition, in order to constitute an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparag. 1 (c) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act that damages the distinctiveness or reputation of another’s mark, the degree of “domestic widely known recognition” should exceed the degree of well-known recognition (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da13782, May 14, 2004). At least after 205, it can be seen that the Plaintiff’s construction or business mark or apartment complex Blue is widely known in the Republic of Korea as a mark indicating the Plaintiff’s products or business activity in connection with the apartment construction business, but it can not be seen that the Plaintiff’s construction or apartment.

Therefore, without further review, the Defendant’s use of “Brihovah’ or “Brihovah’s house booming” for the apartment construction and sale business does not constitute an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparag. 1(c) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act against the Plaintiff.

(3) Sub-decisions

The Defendant’s act of using “Brihovah’ or “Brihluh’s house bluh” for apartment construction and sale does not fall under any of subparagraph 1(a), (b), and (c) of Article 2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act against the Plaintiff, and thus, the Plaintiff’s claim for unfair competition against the Plaintiff is without merit.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just in its conclusion, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment]

Judges Choi Sung-sung (Presiding Judge)