1. The court below acknowledged the facts charged in the case where Defendant A, as an employee of the Korea Telecommunication Corporation on June 14, 1991, discharged exhaust gas containing 64 percent (40%) and above 64 percent (4%) of exhaust gas, which is the maximum permissible emission level of light oil used in front of the Daejeon Daejeon Daejeon Hospital B, as an employee of the Korea Telecommunication Corporation, and applied Article 57 subparagraph 6, Article 36, and Article 60 of the Clean Air Conservation Act to each of the Defendants as a fine.

2. The Clean Air Conservation Act (amended by Act No. 4535, Dec. 8, 1992; hereinafter the same shall apply) established to achieve the administrative purpose that all citizens can live in a healthy and comfortable environment by preventing danger and injury to public health and the environment due to air pollution and properly managing and preserving the atmospheric environment, shall set various administrative regulations on automobile exhaust gases which are substances causing air pollution under Article 31 not more than Article 31, and in particular, Article 36 provides that “any person operating a motor vehicle shall operate the motor vehicle in compliance with the permissible emission standards for motor vehicle exhaust gases as prescribed by the Presidential Decree” in subparagraph 6 of Article 57 provides that “any person who operates a motor vehicle in excess of the permissible emission standards for motor vehicle exhaust gases as prescribed by the Presidential Decree shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for not more than six months or by a fine not exceeding two million won, and Article 60 provides a separate penal provision for the juristic person in case where any employee, etc. of a juristic person commits the above violation with respect to the business of the juristic person

Considering the legislative purpose of the above Act and the purport of the relevant provisions, Article 36 of the above Act, namely, the act of violating Article 36 of the above Act, that is, the provision of Article 57 subparagraph 6 of the above Act, which intends to punish the act of operating an automobile while discharging exhaust gas exceeding the statutory permissible emission levels, should be interpreted as a provision punishing an automobile operator as well as intentional crime, namely, the act of operating the automobile when recognizing that the exhaust gas emitted from the automobile exceeds the permissible emission levels of the automobile for the prescribed operation, and even if the automobile operator did not recognize such contents due to negligence, i.e., negligence, negligence of operation, and negligence of the operator (see Supreme Court Decision

3. On the other hand, in this case, it is clear that Defendant A’s annual concentration of exhaust gas emitted from the instant automobile exceeds the permissible running car emission level, examining whether the said Defendant, who is the operator, can be deemed to have satisfied the above subjective requirements, such as intention or negligence.

First of all, there is no basis to acknowledge that Defendant A was operating the exhaust gas exceeding the permissible emission level set by the said vehicle even if based on all the evidence related to the lower court.

In addition, according to the records, the above automobile was purchased by the Korea Telecommunication Corporation directly from the Korea Telecommunication Corporation on December 3, 1990, and was in the state of the total mileage 4,851km as of June 14, 1991, and was in the manufacturer's free guarantee period. The above automobile immediately after this case's repair and inspection requested the above automobile inspection agency for the maintenance and inspection of the automobile. As a result, it can be seen that the annual concentration of exhaust gas has decreased from 64% to 10% by the corrective measure to adjust the quantity of transmission from the project implementer pumps. In light of these circumstances, unless the defendant operated or damaged the devices, parts, etc. related to the above automobile's exhaust gas, it cannot be viewed that there was negligence, without recognizing that the exhaust gas was emitted in excess of the permissible limit during the operation of the above automobile.

Ultimately, the court below did not consider whether Defendant A actually recognized or failed to recognize it by negligence with respect to the discharge of exhaust gas containing exhaust gas exceeding the permissible limits in the operation of the automobile of this case in relation to the business of Defendant Korea Telecommunication Corporation. Under the premise that if the vehicle operator discharges exhaust gas exceeding the permissible limits, it constitutes a crime under Article 57 subparagraph 6 of the Clean Air Conservation Act. The court below found Defendant A guilty on the ground that the act constitutes a crime under Article 57 subparagraph 6 of the Clean Air Conservation Act. The court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the elements of crime under the above law, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations.

4. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Sang-won (Presiding Justice)