2. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

3. Of the costs of lawsuit, 4/5 shall be borne by the Plaintiff, and the remainder by the Defendant, respectively.

A. The Plaintiff, as the project implementer of the instant project (hereinafter “instant project”) constructed on the ground ( Address 1 omitted) of Songpa-gu Seoul (hereinafter “ Address 1 omitted”), applied for permission to occupy and use a road for the vehicle access route, etc. (hereinafter “instant section”) on the south side of the land ( Address 1 omitted). On November 6, 2014, the Defendant permitted the Plaintiff to occupy and use a road with the following contents (hereinafter “instant occupancy and use permission”).

Permission for occupation and use of this case

Table 1. A Table contained in the main sentence; 2. A road (road) in front of Songpa-gu Seoul ( Address 1 omitted) for occupancy and use; 3. A vehicle access facility and building for occupancy and use, access road, access road, parking surface number of at least 10,00,000 won (value-added tax) for the occupancy and use period from October 14, 2014 to December 31, 2016, from October 31, 2014 to December 31, 2016;

B. On November 7, 2014, the Defendant imposed, on the Plaintiff, the road occupation fees of KRW 1,146,835,470 (including value-added tax) calculated on the basis of 79 days from the occupancy date of November 2014, and the road occupation fees of KRW 5,298,670,520 (including value-added tax) calculated on the basis of 12 months from the occupancy date of March 13, 2015, respectively (hereinafter “each of the instant dispositions”).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1-1 to 4, purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiff's assertion

A. The occupation and use section of this case is for the sake of the general public’s convenience in traffic, and thus the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to specially use the occupation and use section of this case under the Road Act, so it does not constitute subject to the imposition of occupation and use fees under the Road Act.

B. The Defendant expressed his/her intent to grant permission to the Plaintiff for free occupation and use of the instant portion through the Convention on the Establishment of Slocked Road (hereinafter “instant Convention”) concluded with the Plaintiff on June 2014, and thus, each of the instant dispositions is unlawful against the principle of trust protection.

C. Since the occupation and use section of this case is in contact with not only the land ( Address 1 omitted), but also the land ( Address 2 omitted), which is the land site for tin village park (hereinafter “road 2 omitted”), the Defendant calculated the occupation and use fee based on the arithmetic mean of the officially assessed individual land price of each of the above land pursuant to the Enforcement Decree of the Road Act, but also imposed excessive occupation and use fee on the Plaintiff on the basis of only the officially assessed individual land price of the land. Thus, each of the dispositions of this case is unlawful.

D. In the instant section where the Defendant imposed the road occupation and use fee, the part of the road on the ground ( Address 1 omitted) owned by the Plaintiff (hereinafter “the private land part of this case”), and the Plaintiff established free divided superficies for the purpose of installing and maintaining and managing the private land of this case through the instant agreement with the Songpa-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government (hereinafter “Songdong-gu”) on the private land of this case. Considering that the Plaintiff occupied and used the private land of this case for the purpose of entering the road does not meet the requirements for imposing road occupation and use fee under the Road Act, and that the Plaintiff contributed to promoting public interest by entering the private land of this case, it constitutes deviation and abuse of discretionary power to impose the road occupation fee on the private land of this case, and that the Defendant did not impose the road occupation fee on the private land of this case in the future, it is unlawful against the Plaintiff’s legitimate trust, which established the divided superficies as above.

E. In each of the dispositions in this case, the same occupation charges were imposed in duplicate on the ground sections and underground sections, and even if the level of the Plaintiff’s special use is not high, the statutory maximum occupation charges were imposed, and the Plaintiff imposed enormous occupation charges of KRW 5.3 billion per year, even though the Plaintiff installed an underground passage of a diving road and contributed to the donation and bears all of the maintenance expenses. This constitutes deviation and abuse of discretionary authority contrary to the principle of proportionality.

3. Relevant statutes;

Attached Form 3 shall be as listed in attached Table 3.

4. Determination

(a) Facts of recognition;

1) On June 2014, Songpa-gu entered into an agreement on the installation of an underground road (including ancillary facilities; hereinafter referred to as “instant underground road”) in the eight-lanes from the Plaintiff, etc. to the point of charge of the Plaintiff, etc., to set up an underground road (including incidental facilities; hereinafter referred to as “instant underground road”) in Songpa-gu, Seoul at the expense of the Plaintiff, etc., and the location and size of the instant underground road under the said agreement are as follows.

A person shall be appointed.

2) Under the instant agreement, the Plaintiff et al. shall complete the establishment registration of divided superficies (including ancillary facilities) to which Songpa-gu is a party before the completion of construction (Article 5) and underground passage (including both structures and ancillary facilities in the public and private land) (including both the underground passage road and its appurtenant facilities) provide that the Plaintiff et al. shall gratuitously contribute to Songpa-gu under the National Land Planning and Utilization Act and the Public Property and Commodity Management Act without any condition (Article 6). Meanwhile, Article 7 of the instant agreement provides that “1.” On the other hand, the Plaintiff et al., et al. shall obtain permission to occupy and use the road each year from Songpa-gu for circular roads excluding four lanes of the main road along with the road entrance and exit of Songpa-gu and the main road along with the road entrance and exit of Songpa-gu, and the amount of permission to occupy and use the road shall not exceed the annual amount of permission to use the road and the annual amount of permission to use the road after the completion of construction.

3) The “Annex 1” drawings attached to the instant Convention are as shown in attached Form 1.

4) On October 31, 2014, the Plaintiff filed an application for permission to occupy and use the instant section with the area occupied and used as the area of 7125 square meters, and the drawings attached to the Plaintiff’s application for permission to occupy and use are as shown in attached Table 2. On the area occupied and used on the ground, 2,386.2 square meters, the protruding part abutting on the land ( Address 2 omitted) (attached Form 2 omitted) (hereinafter “instant protruding part”) is included in the area of 24 square meters (hereinafter “instant protruding part”). The Defendant occupied and used the area of 2,386.2 square meters on the above ground portion (hereinafter “instant area”) and the area of 7,739.5 square meters (hereinafter “instant underground area”).

5) The details of calculation of road occupation fees for each of the dispositions of this case are as follows.

○ KRW 1,042,577,70 = 1,042,57,700 [the officially assessed individual land price of the land] ¡¿ 3,800,000 won x 7125 square meters (area for occupancy and use) x 0.02 (area for occupancy and use) x 0.02 (area for occupancy and use) x 79/365 days, and less than 100 won] + 104,257,70 (value-added tax)

○ KRW 5,298,670,520 = 4,816,973,20 won [the officially assessed individual land price of the land] ¡¿ 3,800,000 won x 7125 square meters (area for occupancy and use) x 0.02 (area for occupancy and use) x 12/12 months, and less than 10 won] + 481,697,320 (value-added tax)

6) On September 16, 2015, when the instant lawsuit was pending, the Defendant: (a) obtained permission to change the content that the area of occupation and use of the instant occupation and use was reduced to 7,101.7 square meters (excluding protruding part 24 square meters in the instant protruding part) (hereinafter “instant permission”); (b) accordingly, the Defendant notified the Plaintiff on September 17, 2015 that KRW 3,862,650 in the occupation and use fees in 2014, and KRW 17,846,40 in the occupation and use fees in 2015, respectively, should be refunded.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, 3, 6 (including each number), Eul evidence 1, 8, 10, 11, the purport of the whole pleadings

B. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

1) As to the special use of the occupation section of the instant case

A) The term "road occupation and use" under the Road Act means the so-called special use of a specific part of a road for public use by the general public separately from such general use. Such special use of a road is not necessarily exclusive or exclusive, but it is possible to coexist with the general use of a road in accordance with its intended use. In such a case, it cannot be said that the road occupation and use is at the same time public use for the general public. On the other hand, whether the road is deemed a special use or as a general use should be determined depending on the main use and function of the road (see Supreme Court Decisions 98Du17906, May 14, 1999; 94Nu5830, Feb. 14, 1995, etc.).

B) First, with respect to the special use of the instant ground section, the Plaintiff asserts that, on the ground level of the ground level of the attached Table 2, “(i) the part indicated as “(ii)” is not simply used as the passage for entering and leaving the adjacent buildings, but rather as the passage for the moving route of ordinary vehicles or the U.S. internship (in the case of a vehicle entering the area as a diving from the northwest Road distance, through the lot section, 2) is above ground and after going through the loting course, 1) is offered as a useful function, and 3. In the case of the part indicated as “(iii), the Plaintiff asserts that the part indicated as “in the case of the part as indicated, it is considerably used for the purpose of entering and leaving the adjacent buildings, including the KTP branch and the Seoul SP branch (attached Form 1, 2 through the office of office in the second lot) and the part used as a useful function for the moving route or internship of ordinary vehicles, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff is not able to use the instant special part.

According to the images and the attached drawings of Gap evidence Nos. 17 and 18 (including paper numbers) and the attached drawings, in order for the vehicles from the KTP branch office and the Seoul diving post office to enter the KTP direction, it is recognized that the part indicated as above is to be used. However, according to the images of Eul evidence No. 14, it is not always impossible to enter the KTP branch office before the entrance to the KTP branch office is moved to the KTP direction without going through a locking path. However, according to the attached drawings No. 2, it is reasonable to view that the vehicles from the KTP branch office are not to enter the KTP branch office in the direction of the KTP branch without going through the KTP branch office's entrance to the new direction of the KTP branch office. However, according to the attached drawings No. 2, the KTP branch office and the land for the KTP branch office in the direction of the KTP branch office in addition to the above section of the KTP branch office in question.

C) Next, as to the special use of the instant underground segment, the Plaintiff asserted that the instant underground passage was not built for the exclusive use of the Plaintiff, but is planned for the purpose of building the Defendant’s Song Culture and Arts Center and enhancing the convenience of residents using the above center, etc. The instant underground section is not used only for the purpose of entering the second lot, and it is also used for the purpose of entering the bus bus parking lot in the sericultural basin, and therefore, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff is a special use of the instant underground passage or that it was installed solely for the purpose of resolving traffic congestion caused by the Plaintiff (quasi 11p, 10).

In full view of the purport of the arguments in evidence Nos. 28 and 32, and evidence No. 20, it is acknowledged that the above part of the underground passage of this case is currently being used only for the purpose of entering the 2nd parking lot, and that there is no evidence that the above part of the general bus and bus No. 20 are being used for the purpose of the construction of the 2nd road as well as for the purpose of enhancing convenience in the access and use of the 19th. However, according to each image of evidence No. 26-6, No. 26-8, and No. 19-6, the above part of the 2nd parking lot of this case is currently in the construction of the 2nd parking lot, and even according to the plaintiff's assertion itself, it is reasonable to recognize that the 2nd parking lot of this case is currently in the construction of the 2nd parking lot, and that the above part of the general bus and bus No. 20 had to be used for the purpose of using the 2nd parking lot.

D) Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

2) As to the assertion that since the defendant expressed his/her intent to grant permission for free occupation or exemption from occupation and use, it goes against the principle of trust protection.

A) In general in administrative legal relations, in order to apply the principle of protection of trust to an act of an administrative agency, first, an administrative agency should name a public opinion that is the subject of trust to an individual, second, there should be no reason attributable to the individual with respect to the trust that the statement of opinion of the administrative agency is justifiable, third, the individual should have trusted and trusted that the name of opinion of the administrative agency, third, the administrative agency should have conducted any act corresponding thereto. Fourth, the administrative agency's disposition contrary to the above statement of opinion is against the above statement of opinion, thereby infringing the individual's interest. Lastly, when taking an administrative disposition in accordance with the above statement of opinion, it should not be likely to seriously undermine the public interest or legitimate interests of a third party (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Du46, Jun. 9, 2006, etc.).

B) First of all, as to whether the Defendant expressed the public opinion that the Plaintiff would not take any of the instant dispositions, the Health Council and the Plaintiff expressed their intent to exempt the Plaintiff from the occupation fees and the usage fees of the road under Article 7 of the instant Convention. In this regard, the Plaintiff stated that the Plaintiff would permit the use of the annual usage fees of the facilities under Article 7 subparag. 3 of the instant Convention. Accordingly, the Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff provided that “the Plaintiff would permit the free occupation and use of the facilities during the period calculated by dividing the assessed value of the facilities by the annual occupation and use fees.”

However, according to the evidence Nos. 19 through 23 and No. 17-2, prior to the conclusion of the instant agreement, the Plaintiff’s employees and Defendant’s employees agreed on the imposition of road occupation fees and facility usage fees for the occupation and use sections of this case from February 2, 2014 to April 2014, which were before the instant agreement, and at the time, the Defendant responded to the purport that the usage fees for the occupation and use of the road of this case may be imposed, as well as the land usage fees for the use of the road of this case. The Songpa-gu asked the Plaintiff’s employees about the scope of imposition of land usage fees and the scope of imposition of facility usage fees for the underground passage, and it is difficult to determine that the usage fees for the use of the facilities of this case calculated by the use fees for the use of the facilities other than the overlap with the Road Act under the Public Property and Commodity Management Act can be imposed on the underground passage. Meanwhile, Article 7 of the instant agreement provides that the Defendant’s free use of the usage fees for a certain period of public property of this case No. 2 is exempt from the usage fees. 3.

C) Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

3) As to the assertion on the method of calculating road occupation and use fees

A) According to the delegation of Article 66(4) of the former Road Act (amended by Act No. 13086, Jan. 28, 2015; hereinafter “former Road Act”), the attached Table 3 of Article 69(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Road Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 26753, Dec. 22, 2015; hereinafter “former Enforcement Decree of the Road Act”) provides that the occupation and use fees for the part of the road which is occupied and used as a parking lot entrance and exit shall be calculated by multiplying the land price by 0.02, and the land price shall be calculated by multiplying the land price by 0.02, the land (excluding the road site) abutting on the occupation and use part of the road (excluding the road site). According to the form and content of the provision, it does not necessarily mean that it is reasonable to determine the current status of the part of the road or the part of the land, other than the part of the road occupation and use to be occupied and used as a parking lot, 10.

B) As seen earlier, the Defendant calculated the occupation and use fees of each of the dispositions of this case based on only the officially assessed individual land price (33,800,000 won) of the land.

C) First, as seen in the above facts, as to the method of calculating occupancy charges of the instant ground portion, the drawings attached to the Plaintiff’s application for occupancy permission include the protruding part adjacent to the land ( Address 2 omitted), and the Defendant obtained the occupancy permission of this case with the total area of 7125.7 square meters as the area of the instant protruding part, and imposed the Plaintiff the occupancy fees on the basis of this. As long as it is evident that the instant ground portion for which the Defendant obtained the occupancy permission is physically in contact with the land through the instant protruding part, it is reasonable to view that the occupancy charges of the instant ground portion should be calculated based on the arithmetic average price of each individual land price of the land ( Address 1 omitted) and ( Address 2 omitted).

In this regard, the Defendant asserts that the protruding part of the instant protruding part corresponds to the exit of the public parking lot of the Songpa Tourism Information Center, and since the entrance is not included in the instant protruding part, it cannot enter the said public parking lot through the instant protruding part. Therefore, the said protruding part is irrelevant to the Plaintiff’s purpose of occupation and use, and there is no reason to be included in the occupancy and use section, and there is no agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant to be included in the occupancy and use section, and it is not included in the instant protruding part. ② Even if the permission to occupy and use the protruding part of the instant protruding part was granted, this is due to the Defendant’s mistake, and since the Defendant revoked the permission for the relevant part through the instant change on September 16, 2015, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the above protruding part of the protruding part of the instant protruding part adjoins the land

However, even if the part of protruding out of the public parking lot is located outside of the blocking 1st, it seems possible to enter the general vehicle. ② In the case of the vehicle visiting the second lot, it is difficult to readily conclude that it does not have any connection with the purpose of the Plaintiff’s occupancy and use since the vehicle used the protruding out of the above public parking lot. ③ Even if there is a defect in the act, the agency which performed the administrative act can cancel it by itself without any legal basis. However, if the act is the so-called beneficial administrative act giving citizens the right or interest, it can be cancelled by itself without any legal basis. However, if the act is the so-called beneficial administrative act giving citizens the right or interest, it is necessary for the public interest to cancel the act, such as infringement of the right to vested in the party, protection of trust and stability of legal life, etc. It is difficult to see that the Plaintiff’s right to occupy and use and use and use of protruding out from the part of the above public parking lot to the extent that the need for public interest can be justified (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Da14).

D) Next, as to the method of calculating the occupation charges of the underground segment of this case, the construction structure of the instant underground road is located within 300 meters from the boundary of the land ( Address 3 omitted) and ( Address 2 omitted). The underground section of this case (other than the fourth lane on the underground road) subject to the permission of this case is located within 750 meters again from the boundary of the above construction structure. As long as the underground section of this case is limited to the part of the two-lane circulation way starting from the land ( Address 2 omitted), it cannot be deemed that the underground section of this case is physically in the land. Accordingly, the Defendant’s assertion that only the individual land price of the instant land is calculated in accordance with the former Road Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act is lawful and without merit.

4) Regarding the imposition of occupation fees on the private land of this case

A) The part of the instant private land is included in the instant occupation and use section, and the fact that the Plaintiff established free divided superficies for the purpose of installing and maintaining and managing underground roads to Songpa-gu for the private land through the instant agreement does not conflict between the parties.

B) However, Article 1 of the former Road Act provides, however, that the purpose of this Act is to contribute to the construction of roads and the improvement of public welfare by providing for matters concerning road network planning, designation of road routes, standards for the implementation of road works, road facilities, management and preservation of roads, the burden of expenses, etc. shall be borne by the public. Article 4 provides, no private right shall be exercised against land constituting roads, retaining walls, and other facilities. Article 61 provides, any person who intends to build, rebuild, alter, or remove structures, things, and other facilities, or to occupy and use roads (including road zones) due to other reasons shall obtain permission from the road management agency, and the road management agency shall collect occupation and use fees from the person who occupies and uses the roads with permission to occupy and use the roads. In light of all the above provisions, since the authority to impose road occupation and use fees under Article 66 of the former Road Act cannot be deemed to be the ownership of a road site, it cannot be deemed that the road management agency has the authority to impose road usage fees on the public, regardless of whether the Plaintiff acquired ownership of the land.

C) In addition, in the event that there are grounds for reduction or exemption of occupation and use fees, the determination of reduction or exemption of occupation and use fees belongs to the discretion of the authority imposing the occupation and use fees, and if it is not considered at all despite the grounds for reduction or exemption (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Du7031, Jul. 15, 2010, etc.). However, inasmuch as Article 68 of the former Road Act and Article 73 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Road Act separately provide for the reduction or exemption of occupation and use fees and the rate of reduction or exemption, reduction or exemption of occupation and use fees is not allowed for reasons other than those listed in the above provision, and even if the Plaintiff established a sectional superficies on the part of the private land of this case to Songpa-gu, it is practically the same effect as the donation, the Defendant’s failure to reduce or exempt occupation and use fees shall not be deemed to constitute a deviation or abuse of discretionary authority, taking into account such circumstances.

D) Meanwhile, the Plaintiff thought that the road occupation and use fees for the private land of this case are exempted and set up the divided superficies as above, and therefore, the Plaintiff asserts that the imposition of road occupation and use fees for the private land of this case goes against the principle of trust protection. However, under the agreement of this case, the Plaintiff merely stipulates the Plaintiff's obligation to pay road occupation and use fees for the private land of this case, and it does not distinguish the private land of this case from the public land of this case, and there is no evidence suggesting that the Defendant expressed the public opinion that he will not impose the road occupation fees for the private land of this case.

5) As to the assertion of deviation or abuse of discretionary power

A) The Defendant did not reduce the occupation and use fees of the underground section while imposing duplicate occupation and use fees on the instant ground section and underground section, and calculated them by applying the rate of 0.02 uniformly. We examine whether the Plaintiff’s act of accepting the instant underground passage and not reducing the occupation and use fees against the principle of proportionality is a deviation and abuse of discretionary authority, even though the Plaintiff was fully responsible for the maintenance and use fees.

B) According to the above evidence and evidence evidence Nos. 16, if the area of the instant land and the underground segment is considerably overlapped, the Defendant did not uniformly reduce the occupation and use fees by applying the rate of 0.02 to the instant land and the underground segment, respectively. The Plaintiff’s donation of the instant road to underground passage in accordance with the instant agreement and bears the maintenance and management expenses for the entire structure and the occupation and use of the instant zone. Meanwhile, comprehensively taking account of the purport of each statement No. 15 and 16, the aforementioned provision of the Ordinance on the occupation and use of roads and the collection of occupation and use fees, etc. of Songpa-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government (amended by Ordinance No. 1236, Dec. 30, 2014; hereinafter “former Ordinance”), Article 7(1)3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Road Act provides that the standards for calculating the occupation and use fees of the instant land and the area of the instant zone shall not be separately prescribed in the attached Table 10,000,0000 square meters of the attached Table 1.

C) However, as seen earlier, inasmuch as Article 68 of the former Road Act and Article 73 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Road Act separately provide for the reduction of or exemption from the fees for occupancy and use, it is not allowed to reduce or exempt the fees for occupancy and use for reasons other than those listed in the above provision, and it is difficult to view that the term “where the fees for occupancy and use may be reduced or exempted, and the rate of reduction or exemption” includes “matters necessary for the collection of fees for occupancy and use, such as the standards for calculation of fees for use and use” under Article 66(4) of the former Road Act. Thus, if a road management agency other than a national road collects fees from a person who occupies and uses a road pursuant to Article 66(1) of the former Road Act, it can be determined by the municipal ordinance of the local government to which the road management agency belongs within the scope prescribed by the Presidential Decree, and based on the above provision, it cannot be determined by the latter part of Article 68 and Article 76(3) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Road Act.

D) Therefore, even if the area of the above ground and the above ground are partially overlapped, as long as the location of each of the above ground and the above ground are different, it is possible to impose a fee for occupancy and use of the above ground, and as long as the above ground area does not fall under the grounds for reduction under Articles 69 and 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Road Act (if the depth of the above ground area is not less than 20 meters underground, 1/2 of the occupation and use fee, and where the depth is not less than 40 meters underground, 4/5 of the occupation and use fee, respectively), the defendant cannot be said to have reduced the occupation and use fee of the above underground area. In addition, even if the plaintiff donated the above underground road and bears the maintenance and management expenses for the above underground road and the above road, it shall not be deemed that the above reduction and exemption of the occupation and use fee should not be made in consideration of the above circumstances.

E) Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

C. Sub-decision

Therefore, in imposing the fees for the occupation and use of each of the instant dispositions, the Defendant shall calculate the fees for occupation and use on the basis of the arithmetic average of the respective individual land prices of the land ( Address 1 omitted) and ( Address 2 omitted). According to the evidence No. 5, the individual land price of the land ( Address 1 omitted) in 2014 is recognized as having been 3,80,000, and the individual land price of the land ( Address 2 omitted) in 2015 was 2,840,000. In the case of the year 2015, the individual land price of the land was determined as of March 13, 2015, which was at the time of the imposition of the fees for occupation and use, and the above individual land price of each year 2014 shall be applied (the Defendant also calculated the fees for occupation and use in 2015 by applying the officially assessed land price of each year 2014). Accordingly, the fees for occupation and use shall be calculated as follows:

○ KRW 970,948,00 for road occupation charges in 2014 = 882,680,000 for road occupation charges in 2014 = [189,232,80 for the ground occupation charges in the instant case = 2,386.2 square meters x 79/365 days x 0.02 x 18,320,000 won (=(33,800,000 + 2,840,000)/ 2), and less than 100 won] + + 693,447,200 for the instant underground occupation charges in the instant case (i.e., 4, 739.5 square meters x 79/365 x x 0.00 x 33,800,000 x 100 value-added tax) + 88,208,000 won

○ KRW 4,486,026,160 = 4,078,20 [2,386.2m2 x 0.02 x 18,320,00 won [3,80,000 won + 2,840,000 won + 2,840,000)/2] + 3,203,902,00 won for the road occupation charges in 2015 + (4,739.5m2 x 33,800,000 won for the ground occupation charges in the instant case] + 407,820,560 won for the underground occupation charges in the instant case (3,203,902,00 won + 4,739.5m2 x 0.02 x 33,80,000 won)] +

Therefore, the Defendant’s imposition of KRW 970,948,00 of the imposition of KRW 1,146,835,470 against the Plaintiff on November 7, 2014 and the imposition of KRW 4,486,026,16,160 of the imposition of KRW 970,948,00 against the Plaintiff on March 13, 2015 against the Plaintiff on March 13, 2015.

5. Conclusion

The plaintiff's claim of this case is justified within the scope of the above recognition. The plaintiff's remaining claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment Omission]

Judges Kim Byung-soo (Presiding Judge) et al.;