[손해배상(기)][공2011상,417]
The case holding that there is no proximate causal relation between negligence and death of the deceased where the commander, etc. of a unit, who had committed suicide, had the deceased live in barracks beyond the period prescribed by the Army Regulations.
In a case where a sentry, who was on duty at the Army Corps, committed suicide in barracks, the case holding that it is difficult to recognize the predictability of special circumstances that a public official of the said soldier’s team could commit suicide, and therefore, there is no proximate causal relation between the above official’s error in the performance of duties and the death of the deceased, on the grounds that it is extremely exceptional to recognize the possibility of expectation of special circumstances that the deceased may commit suicide, on the grounds that it is difficult to find out that there was a special causal relation between the above official’s error in the performance of duties and the death of the deceased.
Article 2 of the State Compensation Act, Article 750 of the Civil Act
Plaintiff 1 and 3 others (Law Firm Dong, Attorneys Jeong Jong-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Korea
Seoul High Court Decision 2009Na110523 decided August 18, 2010
The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.
We examine the grounds of appeal.
1. The court below, citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, acknowledged facts as stated in its reasoning, and determined that since Nonparty 1 was unable to adapt to the military unit due to the nature of resistant and friendly sentiments, the commander, etc. of the above soldiers' team should have more attention and help Nonparty 1 adapt to the military unit, and should have been able to have Nonparty 1 reside outside the military unit from December 1, 2008 after having been aware of the amended Army regulations, especially the amended Army regulations, so that he had Nonparty 1 reside outside the military unit from December 1, 208. However, due to the negligence of interest to Nonparty 1, the early death, and the negligence that caused Nonparty 1, who had shown an unstable emotional character in the military and caused suicide, the defendant was liable to compensate for damages suffered by Nonparty 1 and the plaintiffs due to these negligence by the public officials of the above soldiers' team.
2. However, the lower court’s determination is difficult to accept for the following reasons.
A. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the records, the non-party 1 was aware of the fact that the non-party 2 had been on the non-party 1's old age or on the non-party 8's old age or on the non-party 1's daily life. The non-party 2's old age or on the non-party 1's old age or on the non-party 2's old age or on the non-party 8's old age or on the non-party 1's old age or on the non-party 2's old age or on the non-party 1's old age or on the non-party 2's old age or on the non-party 1's old age or on the non-party 2's old age or on the non-party 1's old age or on the non-party 2's old age or on the non-party 1's old age or age. However, the non-party 1's old age or age changed to the non-party 2's old age.
B. According to these facts, it cannot be deemed that there was an error by the commander of the military team, etc., who did not help Nonparty 1 adapt to the military unit with a more interest. However, in violation of the above provisions, there was negligence that Nonparty 1 had Nonparty 1 reside in the military base without being aware of the Army regulations. However, Nonparty 1’s life in the military, such as leaving the house at the house of the sergeant in the aftermath of work or the end of the week, or conducting computer games, was not a strict internal base of the military branch, and even according to Nonparty 6’s instructions, it was difficult to recognize that there was a special causal relation between Nonparty 1’s life in the military and his officer’s life in the military. Thus, it is difficult to view that Nonparty 1 was an occupational soldier, rather than a private soldier, and it was difficult to view that Nonparty 1’s life in the military was a special burden, considering that there was no special causal relation between Nonparty 1’s life in the military and his official life in the military.
C. Nevertheless, the lower court determined otherwise that there was a proximate causal relationship between the occupational negligence of the public official of the above public official team and the suicide of Nonparty 1. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the proximate causal relationship in the State’s liability, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The Defendant’s assertion
3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Lee Hong-hoon (Presiding Justice)