A. The defendant confirmed that the dismissal disposition against the plaintiff on July 20, 2018 against the plaintiff is null and void. B. The defendant paid 24,483,300 won to the plaintiff. The remaining claims of the plaintiff are dismissed.

2. Of the total litigation costs, 60% is assessed against the Plaintiff, and 40% is assessed against the Defendant, respectively.

3. Paragraph 1-b) shall be provisionally executed;

From January 1, 2020 to the date of reinstatement of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff paid money at the rate of KRW 4,413,300 per month (the Plaintiff).

The Court added the claim for payment of money at the trial.

A. Under Article 24 of the Act on the Establishment, etc. of the Financial Services Commission (hereinafter “Financial Services Commission Act”), Defendant is a special corporation established to perform the duties of inspection, supervision, etc. of financial institutions under the direction and supervision of the Financial Services Commission. The Plaintiff served as Defendant’s staff through the employment procedure for new staff in 2016.

B. On July 20, 2018, the Defendant passed a disciplinary procedure against the Plaintiff on July 20, 2018, and subsequently rejected the Plaintiff by unfairly changing the number of scheduled employees B, who are employees in charge of employment of the Defendant. This is based on Article 41 subparag. 1, subparag. 3, and subparag. 4 of the Personnel Management Regulations (hereinafter “instant dismissal disposition”). The Defendant’s personnel management regulations (hereinafter “the instant personnel management regulations”) and a written pledge submitted by the Plaintiff at the time of entry are as follows.

Article 41 (Persons subject to Disciplinary Action) (1) of the Regulations on the Management of Personnel Affairs may take disciplinary action against a person who commits any of the following acts: 3. A person who commits an unlawful act; 4. A person who disturbs the original order or damages the honor of a supervisor; 4. A disciplinary action under Article 48 (Classification of Disciplinary Action) shall be classified into dismissal, suspension from office, reduction of salary, and reprimand according to the seriousness of the disciplinary action.

D. Meanwhile, according to Articles 2 subparag. 3(b) and 82 subparag. 1 and 82(2) of the Act on the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management of Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (hereinafter “Corruption and Rights Act”), among the Defendant’s employees, those who retired ipso facto, removed, or removed from office due to an act of corruption in connection with their duties during the period of their retirement cannot be employed by a certain institution including public institutions for five years from the date of their retirement, and the Defendant directed the Plaintiff at the time of the dismissal of the instant case that the employment restriction system applies to the Plaintiff.

[Grounds for Recognition] Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, 12, Eul evidence Nos. 32, and the purport of the whole pleadings

A. The plaintiff 1);

Defendant B did not commit any unlawful act in the course of employing the Plaintiff. Even if Defendant B committed any unlawful act, Article 41(1)1, 3, and 4 of the Personnel Management Regulations applies to “offenders who actually committed an unlawful act, a pledge, or defamation.” As such, the Plaintiff itself did not commit any unlawful act, the aforementioned provision cannot be applied to the Plaintiff. Therefore, as the instant dismissal disposition is null and void as there is no ground for disciplinary action. (2) As long as the Defendant committed an unlawful act in the course of employing the Plaintiff for the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff also constitutes “a person who committed an unlawful act” as stipulated in Article 41(1)1 of the Personnel Management Regulations, which is just a person who would benefit from the Plaintiff’s unlawful act, and as long as the unlawful act committed by the Plaintiff was substantially controversial, the Plaintiff’s dismissal disposition against the Plaintiff is invalid or invalidated as the grounds for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff’s dismissal against the Plaintiff, even if the Plaintiff’s dismissal disposition against the Plaintiff was invalidated or invalidated as the grounds for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff’s dismissal against the Plaintiff.

B. Determination

1) As to whether the grounds for disciplinary action of this case are recognized, the employment rules are prepared by an employer to establish the criteria for the service discipline or working conditions of the relevant employee, and have the character of legal norms governing collective legal relations among the labor and management. In light of the nature of the employment rules, in principle, the employment rules should be interpreted in accordance with the objective meaning, and the interpretation beyond the objective meaning of the language should be prudent and strict (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da69631, Mar. 14, 2003, etc.). Furthermore, the content of the grounds for disciplinary action prescribed by the employment rules, etc. does not violate the Labor Standards Act and other relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, and it does not include that the employer cannot be deemed as the grounds for disciplinary action under the socially accepted norms (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 982Du4672, Mar. 26, 199).

B) Article 41(1) of the Personnel Management Regulations provides that “A person who has committed an act may be subject to disciplinary action.” Further, the language and text of the Personnel Management Regulations provides that “a person who has committed an act falling under the grounds for disciplinary action” may be subject to disciplinary action. In addition, the disciplinary action is basically a sanction against a worker’s breach of corporate order, such as cancellation or termination of a labor contract, etc.; ② a disciplinary action has a nature as a qualitative different order punishment under the Civil Act; ③ a disciplinary action is taken against a defendant on the ground of an unlawful or corrupt act related to his/her duties; and ③ even if the defendant takes a serious legal disadvantage, such as restriction on employment in accordance with the anti-Corruption and interests of prevention of corruption, the relevant worker is subject to disciplinary action against a worker who has committed an unlawful act, such as an unlawful act, or aiding and abetting such act, and thus, he/she cannot be deemed to have committed an unlawful act beyond the criteria for disciplinary action under Article 41(1) of the Personnel Management Regulations, and thus, the same does not apply to the pertinent disciplinary action or other unlawful act.

In regard to this, in the case where the defendant provided that "a person who has failed to meet the requirements for assistance and who has committed a false entry, alteration, or any other wrongful act in the document submitted," in the recruitment outline for new students of a university, the defendant asserts that if another person who is closely related to the applicant committed a wrongful act on behalf of the applicant, the applicant who would benefit from the illegal act is also the person who has failed to pass the examination under the above provision. In light of the Supreme Court Decision 2006Da23817 Decided July 13, 2006, the defendant should be construed as including the plaintiff who has committed an unlawful act under Article 41 (1) 1 of the Personnel Management Regulations as well. However, it is difficult to view that the failure to pass the examination of a university constitutes a disciplinary action as an order punishment, and it seems that it would be ex officio dismissal that causes the cancellation of a contract or the loss of status as a final one, and therefore, the defendant's assertion that the above case is different from the above case of this case cannot be accepted.

C) As to the instant case’s health group, although the Defendant’s employee B, as seen in the following paragraph 3, committed a fraudulent act that changes the number of employees to be employed and the number of successful applicants in written and written skills to pass the recruitment examination, and that the Plaintiff acquired profits by such unlawful act, and that Plaintiff’s father CD Finance Co., Ltd. notified the Defendant of the fact that the Plaintiff was supported by the Defendant and then B went to the above improper act is recognized.

However, inasmuch as there is no evidence to prove that the plaintiff participated in the process of informing E of the fact of assistance, the above fact of recognition and other evidence submitted by the defendant cannot be deemed to have committed the plaintiff himself/herself's illegal act, violation of a pledge, defamation against the defendant, and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise.

Therefore, the dismissal disposition of this case is null and void because there is no disciplinary cause. 2) First of all, as seen in Section 3-C, the labor contract between the plaintiff and the defendant cannot be deemed null and void. Thus, the defendant's assertion that the dismissal disposition of this case is valid as a notification of invalidation of the labor contract. However, the defendant's dismissal disposition of this case was made in the form of disciplinary dismissal through the disciplinary procedure, and the plaintiff stated that the dismissal disposition of this case constitutes the subject of disciplinary action under Article 41 (1) 1, 3, and 4 of the Personnel Management Regulations.

According to the above facts, the dismissal disposition of this case constitutes a disciplinary dismissal, and it cannot be said that the defendant also expressed his intent to cancel the labor contract with the plaintiff as a ground for mistake (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da45636 delivered on February 9, 1993, etc.).

Therefore, Defendant’s assertion on this part does not accept this case’s assertion (i.e., even if the Defendant appears to have expressed the intention of cancelling the labor contract through the instant dismissal disposition, the instant dismissal disposition and the expression of intent of cancelling the labor contract only exist, and cannot be viewed as the expression of intent of cancelling the labor contract, and the instant dismissal disposition as the disciplinary dismissal disposition still exists. Therefore, even if the Defendant expressed the intent of cancellation through the instant dismissal disposition, it is a separate theory that there is a change in the time when the labor contract is terminated, and that the instant dismissal disposition itself as the disciplinary dismissal disposition as the disciplinary dismissal is null and void. The Defendant’s allegation on this part cannot be accepted for this reason).

The dismissal disposition of this case is null and void as above. Nevertheless, although the defendant is disputing this issue, the labor relationship of the plaintiff and the defendant as stated in the following 3-Ma. paragraph 3 is terminated on January 24, 2019, the anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Act (i) has an employment restriction system against "the person who retired, removed, or removed from office automatically due to an act of corruption related to his duties during his duties" as seen above, and (ii) the defendant instructs the plaintiff at the time of the dismissal disposition of this case to be subject to the above employment restriction system, it is reasonable to consider that the dismissal disposition of this case has the legal status of the plaintiff at least there is danger or apprehension that the legal status of the plaintiff remains in the external form, and the removal of this is a valid and appropriate means to receive a confirmation of invalidation against the dismissal disposition of this case (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Da4011, Apr. 11, 1995).

Therefore, the plaintiff still has a benefit to seek confirmation of invalidity of the dismissal disposition of this case.

3. To claim unpaid wages.

A. The plaintiff 1)

Since the disposition of dismissal of this case is null and void, the defendant is against the plaintiff.

The defendant is obligated to pay the amount equivalent to the wages until the date of the plaintiff's reinstatement. 2) The defendant entered into a labor contract with the plaintiff. The defendant is the wind of making improper acts, such as improper solicitation, through the plaintiff's H, and the defendant entered into a labor contract with the plaintiff. Thus, since the labor contract of the plaintiff and the defendant is null and void by a juristic act with conditions or monetary compensation, the defendant is not obligated to pay wages to the plaintiff from the beginning to the plaintiff. (B) or the defendant entered into a labor contract with the plaintiff by mistake that the plaintiff passed a written screening as a relation that causes the plaintiff's unfair influence of the plaintiff C and E, and entered into a fair recruitment procedure with the plaintiff. Accordingly, since the labor contract with the plaintiff is an important part, the defendant may cancel it. The defendant is not obligated to pay wages from the beginning because the defendant expressed his intention to cancel the labor contract through the plaintiff's dismissal or the preparation document as of January 23, 2019, and there is no intention or intention to pay wages from the beginning to the plaintiff.

B. Around September 7, 2015, Defendant established a plan for the employment of new employees in 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “instant initial plan”) with the approval of the Chief Director F, who is the full-time decision-making authority. According to this, Defendant 65 (i.e., at least 48 persons in general service of class 5 + 5 persons in general service of class 6 + 12 graduates in career + 12), namely, at least 73 persons (i.e., at least 5 persons in general service of class 5 + 65 persons in general service of class 6 + 5 persons in career service, and 13 persons in general service of class 5 through class 7.

In addition, according to the initial plan of this case, the recruitment procedure of the plaintiff 1 was conducted by 20 : (1) : (5) : (2) 25 times the number of persons scheduled to be employed by 1,50 (1,50) ; (2) 4) : (3) : (5) ; (3) ; (4) ; (5) ; (5) ; (5) ; (3) ; (4) ; (5) ; (4) ; (5) ; (4) ; (5) ; (5) ; (5) ; (5) ; (5) ; (4) ; (5) ; (5) ; (4) ; (5) ; 2) ; (3) ; (4) ; 2) ; and (5) ; and (5) ;

6) B: (a) around November 3, 2015, the first 2nd 5th 2nd 2nd 6th 2nd 5th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 1st 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 7.

[Evidence] Gap's evidence Nos. 5, 15 through 35, Eul's evidence Nos. 1 through 5, 8 through 10, 17, 18, 22 through 31, and the purport of the whole pleadings

C. It is difficult to acknowledge that the employment contract between the plaintiff and the defendant is null and void or that the aforementioned facts and other evidence submitted by the defendant alone were associated with the wrongful conditions or interests in employing the plaintiff, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise. Accordingly, the defendant's assertion on this part is not acceptable.

D. In full view of the following circumstances: (a) whether there was a cause for cancellation of the employment contract between the plaintiff and the defendant; (b) whether there was an error in the material part of the law act; and (c) whether there was a mistake in the aforementioned facts and the overall purport of evidence and arguments, it is reasonable to view that the decision in this case was led and implemented to increase the number of recruitment applicants and the number of successful applicants of the written examination for the plaintiff's passing on November 6, 2015, constitutes a wrongful act detrimental to the fairness of the recruitment process; and (d) the chief deputy president, who was the defendant's discretionary decision-making authority, did not know that the fairness of the recruitment procedure was damaged by the above improper act; (b) it is reasonable to view that the plaintiff was determined as the final colon for the reason that the number of applicants did not appear to have passed the recruitment procedure; and (c) on the ground that there was no mistake in the above part of the decision to increase the number of applicants, the plaintiff and the defendant did not appear to have passed the employment contract in 15.

① Around September 7, 2015, the Defendant was scheduled to be employed until the time of the establishment of the instant initial plan, without specific specification, to the extent (5 class 5 general service class general service class 48-5). However, even according to the initial plan of the instant case, the Defendant was required to determine the number of prospective candidates for employment, which serves as the basis for the selection of successful applicants at each stage prior to the document screening or the latest screening type, as the number of prospective public service class 5 general service class 53 in the instant initial plan, through the instant initial plan, based on the document screening type, was to be selected as successful applicants (i.e., the number of prospective public service class 5 general service class 5 in the instant initial plan). Accordingly, on October 8, 2015.

In fact, from November 5, 2015, the day before the instant decision was rendered, the Defendant’s personnel team staff L and H up to November 1:45, 2015, even before the date when the instant decision was rendered, the Plaintiff was selected as disqualified persons under the premise that the number of employees scheduled to be employed in class 5 general service was 53. However, the instant written plan was based on the premise that the number of employees scheduled to be employed was 53 as prescribed by the instant written plan.

2. The Chief Director, who was the defendant or the former Director, could change the number of applicants to be employed by the 1st 5th 2th 2th 2th 2th 2th 6th 6th 6th 6th 5th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 66th 6th 66th 6th 66th 66th 66th 66th 66th 66th 66th 66th 66th 66th 66th 66th 66th 66th 66th 666th 666th 66th 666th 666th 666th 666th 6666th 6666th 206.

Considering each of the above circumstances, promoting and attempting the instant decision is not because it was reasonable to have increased employment capacity, but rather to have passed the Plaintiff.

B) In the course of the employment process of Defendant A’s staff, the process of performing the document screening, writing screening, 1, and 2 interviews is to demonstrate the ability by undergoing the fair process at each stage. However, the purpose of this case’s decision is to promote the increase in the number of persons scheduled to be employed and the number of persons passing the pen screening accordingly by having the Plaintiff, who is a specific person in this case, passed by the Plaintiff, constitutes an act detrimental to the fairness of the employment process.

C) Although having promoted the instant decision in order to allow the Plaintiff to pass the instant decision, B made a false statement to the president F as if he was promoting the instant decision on the grounds that it is anticipated to increase the number of employees by hiding such circumstances, and accordingly, F made the instant decision to have the Plaintiff pass the instant decision and thereby, F made the instant decision to select the Plaintiff as a successful applicant of the written judgment, by making a mistake that there is a reasonable ground to increase the number of employees by taking into account the circumstances that the instant decision would have impaired the fairness of the recruitment process by having the Plaintiff pass the instant decision. Accordingly, F selected the Plaintiff as a final successful applicant, excluding B, by mistake that the Plaintiff had the legitimate qualification to pass the written judgment and apply for the interview through a fair procedure. Furthermore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant were the Plaintiff.

As long as the plaintiff entered into an employment contract on the premise that he was selected as the final successful candidate through a fair recruitment procedure, the fairness of the employment procedure is deemed to have become the content of the contract. Thus, the defendant may cancel the employment contract between the plaintiff and the defendant as the ground for his mistake. 2) The defendant's fixed number of the defendant is determined upon obtaining approval from the Financial Services Commission in accordance with Article 45 (1) of the Financial Services Commission Act. As such, the defendant's fixed number of the defendant is decided upon with the approval of the Financial Services Commission in accordance with Article 45 (1) of the Financial Services Commission Act, the defendant's senior vice-president, who is the full-time decision-making authority in charge of the defendant's employment affairs, has a duty of care to prevent any occurrence of excess of the fixed number in violation of Article 45 (1) of the Financial Services Commission Act. 2) The plaintiff's error was caused by the defendant's gross negligence, and thus, it cannot be viewed that the defendant's mistake was caused in the plaintiff's responsible area.

B) We examine the case. Recognizing the facts as seen earlier, each evidence and the purport of the entire pleading.

The following circumstances are as follows: (a) in light of the fact that B was in general in charge of the job of new staff as the Defendant’s senior executive officers; and (b) was formally in the course of making the instant decision, it is difficult to conclude that there was gross negligence on the part of the Defendant on the ground that B did not properly supervise the Defendant’s senior vice president F B, etc. and did not properly grasp whether it is possible to increase the prescribed number of staff members, etc.; and (c) in light of the fact that the issuance of the unfair recruitment procedure was attributable to the Plaintiff’s former senior vice president E of the Defendant’s father C, a senior vice president of this case, the Plaintiff, a senior vice president of this case, notified the Defendant that he applied for the Plaintiff. In light of the fact that the Plaintiff did not directly participate in the instant decision process, it cannot be said that the Defendant’s exercise of the right to cancel was unfair against the principle of good faith or that there was gross negligence on the Defendant.

Therefore, we cannot accept the plaintiff's written order.

E. Although it is unreasonable to retroactively deny the effect of the provision of labor to workers who had been already provided pursuant to a labor contract, it shall not be deemed that the legal relationship established before cancellation of the labor contract, and the validity of the labor contract shall be extinguished only for the future after the expression of cancellation (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da25194, 25200, Dec. 22, 2017). This case’s health care unit and the defendant cannot be deemed to have expressed his intention of cancellation through the instant dismissal. However, the defendant expressed his intention of cancellation through a preparatory document dated January 23, 2019 through the plaintiff’s labor contract, and it shall be deemed that the above preparatory document was invalid from January 24, 2019 to January 24, 2019, and it shall be deemed that the above legal status of the plaintiff’s worker, who had not been provided with labor, reached the date of termination of the labor contract, and it shall be apparent that the plaintiff’s above legal status of the plaintiff’s worker was invalid.

Furthermore, according to the purport of the entire pleadings in Gap evidence No. 11, it is recognized that the wages that the plaintiff could have received during the above period were 24,483,300.

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff the unpaid wages of KRW 24,483,30,00. Thus, the plaintiff's claim for unpaid wages is justified within the scope of the above recognition.

4. Conclusion

The plaintiff's claim shall be accepted within the scope of the above recognition and the remaining parts shall be dismissed. Since the conclusion different from that of the judgment of the court of first instance is unfair, the judgment of the court of first instance, including the additional claim in the court of first instance, shall be modified as set forth in Section 1 of the Disposition.

Judges Park Jong-young

Judge Kang Jong-soo