(b) The case holding that an ex post facto agreement on the exemption from the liability for dispute under a collective agreement was invalidated by an illegal industrial action against the union; and

C. Whether it is incomplete to dismiss an application for resumption of oral argument after the closure of oral argument in the lower court after remanding.

B. The case holding that the agreement on the exemption of liability for the dispute, which is made by a collective agreement between the employer and the chief of the Trade Union and the Trade Union, is naturally null and void and it is deemed that the above agreement has been reached so that the members, including the chief of the Trade Union and the Trade Union, can be subject to disciplinary action on the ground that if the chief of the Trade Union and the Trade Union have led the members to engage in an illegal collective action in the form of denial of operation on the grounds of different reasons every two occasions once again, the agreement on the exemption of liability for the dispute, which is made by the collective agreement between the Trade Union and the Labor Union and the Labor Union, has been reached, on the grounds that the above agreement is naturally null and void and void, and as the members, including the chief of the Trade Union and the Trade Union, have engaged in an illegal collective action once more than two times.

C. Whether to accept an application for the resumption of pleadings by the parties falls under the court's discretion. Thus, the court's dismissal of the application for the resumption of pleadings in order to provide a new evidence after the closure of pleadings after remanding the case, is not erroneous in the incomplete hearing, since the parties have sufficiently been able to submit a evidence of assertion.

The supplemental appellate brief not timely filed is examined together to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed.

1. According to the records of this case, Article 47 of the collective agreement of the defendant company, which had already been effective prior to the dismissal of the instant disciplinary action against the plaintiff, provides that "the disciplinary action against the employee of the defendant company shall be governed by the separate regulations of the disciplinary committee", and the provision of disciplinary action against the employee of the defendant company under this provision was enforced after the enactment of July 1, 1987, and its disciplinary provision was immediately a ground provision for the dismissal of this case.

As seen above, a separate provision on disciplinary action has been enacted under the collective agreement, and so long as the provision on disciplinary action has been established under the provision, it cannot be said that there should be an agreement between the company and the worker on the contents of the specific provision. The right to personnel affairs concerning the punishment, etc. of workers is an employer’s inherent authority and the right to disciplinary action, which is within the scope of the employer, naturally recognized as an employer under the nature of business operation or labor contract, so long as the contents of the disciplinary provision are not contrary to compulsory regulations or collective agreement, the employer may freely determine the specific contents thereof, and the provision does not go against the procedures for concluding the Annex to the collective agreement or collective agreement. The grounds for appeal cannot be accepted in light of the premise that there was no disciplinary provision at the time of the occurrence of the disciplinary action in this case or that

2. According to the records of this case, the matters concerning dismissal except the reasons for dismissal under Article 41 (6) of the collective agreement of the defendant company shall be determined by the disciplinary committee, but the disciplinary committee shall be separately organized. The purport of this case, which stated that "the disciplinary committee shall be separately constituted, is not specifically provided for in a collective agreement and is to leave matters concerning the composition of the disciplinary committee in a separate procedure, and it cannot be interpreted that the composition of the disciplinary committee itself shall be subject to a separate agreement between labor and management, as the grounds for appeal are internal.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is correct and there is no wrong error in the interpretation and application of the collective agreement. The grounds for appeal pointing this out are not acceptable.

3. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the court below is justified in finding that the defendant sent Nonparty Park Jong-hee, a staff member in charge of the case, to the plaintiff's house for the disciplinary action of this case against the plaintiff, after examining the evidence of the witness Park Jong-hee in accordance with the purport of the judgment of remanding the case, and notified the plaintiff of his intention to attend the disciplinary committee on June 24, 198 for the purpose of proving the facts charged, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence or any violation of the law by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations. Further, in the case of the plaintiff, Article 18 of the disciplinary provision of the defendant company's disciplinary action against the principal and the principal of the action of refusing to participate in the collective action of this case, it cannot be deemed that the procedure of the disciplinary committee against the person against whom the disciplinary action was taken can be omitted, and further, the grounds for appeal pointing this out are not acceptable for any reason.

4. Examining the evidence cited by the lower judgment in light of the records, the lower court’s decision that recognized that the Plaintiff led all of the presidents of the Defendant Company’s trade union to engage in illegal industrial actions, such as refusing to operate groups on six occasions as indicated in its holding is justifiable, and it is not possible to find any error in violation of the rules of evidence. The ground of appeal pointing this out is nothing more than criticism for the determination of facts belonging to the exclusive authority of the lower court, and thus

In addition, considering the circumstances leading up to the occurrence of the above industrial action, the importance of the case, and the influence that it would be prejudicial to the defendant company, this does not constitute a cause attributable to the plaintiff to the extent that it cannot continue the labor contract by social norms. Thus, the defendant's dismissal disposition is justifiable as a ground for disciplinary action, and it cannot be said that it deviates from or abused the scope of the right of disciplinary action.

In addition, as duly admitted by the court below, the agreement between the defendant and the plaintiff et al. on June 5, 1987 on the exemption of liability for a dispute between the defendant and the labor union's representative of the labor union is attached to the civil or criminal liability for the illegal collective action of the labor union occurred at that time. However, after the agreement was reached that the labor union including the plaintiff et al. should bear any punishment in the event that the labor union again engages in an illegal collective action in the old age, the plaintiff again took the lead of an illegal collective action in the form of refusal of operation for the purpose of 8 days from September 1, 1987, and 4 days from June 16, 1988, each of the different reasons, if the union members led an illegal collective action in the form of refusal of operation for the reason of the above agreement between the labor and the labor union, it shall be reasonable to deem that the above agreement has been null and void as a matter of course and has reached an agreement on the grounds of this reason.

In addition, even though the Plaintiff led the collective action of union members for 8 days from September 1, 1987, as seen above, even if the Defendant was not at all at issue and later dismissed the Plaintiff by including the above reasons in the disciplinary cause of this case at a time less than 1 year thereafter, such circumstance alone does not lead to an implied agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant to exempt the Plaintiff from liability for the pertinent misconduct, or the Defendant’s dismissal disposition is against the good faith principle.

Therefore, all of the judgment of the court below in the same purport is correct and it cannot be said that there are errors in the misapprehension of legal principles against the law. All of the grounds for appeal pointing out this error cannot be accepted.

5. According to the evidence relationship employed by the court below, the court below's determination that the defendant paid dismissal allowances to the plaintiff instead of the advance notice of dismissal of this case is just, and there is no error in its determination. The grounds of appeal pointing this out are not acceptable.

6. Whether a party's application for the resumption of pleading is accepted or not belongs to the court's discretion. Thus, the court's dismissal of the application for the resumption of pleading in order to provide a new argument after the closure of pleadings after remanding the case without having been sufficiently able to submit a evidence of assertion. It cannot be said that there is an error of incomplete deliberation (see Supreme Court Decisions 91Da27594 delivered on December 10, 191, 92; 92Nu5096 delivered on September 25, 1992, etc.). The court's dismissal of the plaintiff's application for the resumption of pleading appears to be appropriate, and there is no error by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberation. The ground of appeal on this point is not accepted.

7. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff-Appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)