A. The judgment of the court below which found the Defendant guilty of this part of the charges on the following grounds: (i) mistake of facts and misapprehension of legal principles as to the part of the charge of obstruction of the performance of official duties; and (ii) mistake

① The lower court, on the ground that the witness H of the lower court demanded the testimony without the Defendant, made the Defendant leave the court and proceed with the examination procedure, thereby infringing on the Defendant’s right to cross-examine the witness H of the lower court, and thus, the H’s testimony cannot be used as evidence.

② The Defendant only told Gman with the purport that she was she was she’s she was shed, and that Gman said that she was she was she was shed with the Defendant as a crime of obstruction of performance of official duties when she was she was shed, and she was shed to her with his her her hand, etc., but there was no assault, such as the charge of the charge, that she was sheding off or sheding off the outer sheds of Gman, and that she did not interfere with the legitimate performance of duties of Gman.

③ Since the Defendant had been engaged in a paint work at the time, if the Defendant was to catch, scam, or towed the Gman, he did not scam such scam, but he did not scam the scam on the scam, and scam by attaching a photograph of the Defendant’s hand taken by the police after being investigated by the police, and the police did not attach it to the investigation record even if the Defendant had taken the photograph.

(b) Prosecutors;

1) Mistake of facts (not guilty portion: Contempt of insult)

According to the evidence submitted by the prosecutor, the defendant can sufficiently recognize the fact that the defendant publicly insultingd the victim as shown in this part of the facts charged.

The judgment of the court below which acquitted the defendant on this part of the facts charged is erroneous.

2) Unreasonable sentencing

Punishments (two million won of fine) declared by the court below are too unhued and unfair.

2. Determination

A. As to the defendant's assertion of mistake of facts and misapprehension of legal principles

1) In accordance with Article 297 of the Criminal Procedure Act, when the presiding judge recognizes that a witness is unable to make a sufficient statement in the presence of the defendant, he/she may restrict the direct face-to-face meeting of the defendant by allowing the defendant to leave the court and continuing the examination of the witness, but in such a case, he/she is not allowed to exclude the right to reply against the defendant (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2009Do9344, Jan. 14, 2010; 201Do15608, Feb. 23, 2012).

According to the records, the court below acknowledged that when examining a witness H as a witness, the witness cannot make a sufficient statement before the witness is seen to be the defendant, and ordered him to leave the court and proceed with the examination of the witness. At the time, the defendant was appointed a defense counsel and the defense counsel was involved in the examination of the witness. The presiding judge of the court below provided the defendant with an opportunity to cross-examine, and provided the defendant with an opportunity to cross-examine, but the defendant did not have any matter to be examined. Examining these facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the court below did not err in the trial procedure such as the examination procedure of witness, and therefore, the defendant's assertion on the premise that the procedure of witness examination of H was unlawful is without merit.

2) In determining the credibility of the statements made by the victim, etc. supporting the facts charged, whether the contents of the statements themselves conform to the rationality, logic, appearance, or rule of experience, or conforms to the statements made by a third party, and whether the statements made by the victim, etc., including the appearance and attitude of the witness who is going to the witness statement in the open court after being sworn before a judge, and the statement made by the witness witness statement, such as the pencing of the statement, are evaluated as credibility by considering all the circumstances that make it difficult to record (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2008Do7917, Jan. 30, 2009). Meanwhile, in a case where the statements made by the witness, including the victim, are consistent and consistent with the facts charged, it shall not be rejected without permission, unless there is any other reliable evidence that can objectively be deemed as having no credibility (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Do2631, Jun. 28, 2012).

The court below held that the court below erred in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the defendant's testimony and its credibility or non-performance of evidence by considering the following circumstances: (a) the statement made by a police officer who was in compliance with the facts charged was consistent with the investigation agency from the court below to the court below; (b) the statement made by a police officer who was in compliance with the facts charged was consistent with the statement by the police officer who was in compliance with the investigation agency; (c) there was no motive or reason to make the statement favorable to the police officer who was in compliance with the witness G (hereinafter referred to as the "victim police officer") and witness H; and (d) there was no reason or circumstance to make the defendant's statement unfavorable to the police officer who was in control of him at the time while making it proper; and (6) the defendant also made a statement by the investigative agency that was in compliance with the defendant's attitude and the police officer's request for assistance to other police officers while obstructing the defendant's execution of his duties; and (d) the court below's determination that the defendant's statement and non-performance of evidence were legitimate and non-performance of the charges.

3) In light of the following facts: (a) the Defendant: (b) the witness H’s testimony at the time of the Defendant’s external inquiry of the victimized police officer, and the suspect interrogation protocol prepared by the Defendant under the investigation by the police on the day of the instant case; (c) the contents of the Defendant’s interview on the Defendant’s hand, or the statement on the “catch” did not contain any description on the Defendant’s hand; (d) the Defendant read the protocol over 15 minutes from 21:25 to 21:40; and (e) deleted part of the statement or added the contents of the statement in writing. The police did not attach the Defendant’s hand on the investigation record; or (e) the Defendant’s hand taken the Defendant’s hand at the time of the investigation by the Prosecutor at the time of the instant case, and there was no reasonable doubt as to the credibility of the Defendant’s photograph and the facts charged.

B. In light of the circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and examined by the prosecutor’s assertion of mistake, the lower court acquitted the Defendant of insult among the facts charged on the ground that the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone cannot be deemed as having expressed a desire as to this part of the facts charged or to have proved that there was no reasonable doubt that the Defendant had attempted to insult.

In full view of the circumstances admitted by the evidence duly admitted and examined by the court below, the judgment of the court below is just and there is no error of misconception of facts as alleged by the public prosecutor.

C. Regarding the prosecutor's assertion of unreasonable sentencing

The Defendant has been punished by a fine due to the crime of bodily injury, and again committed the instant crime. The instant crime is a crime that interferes with a police officer’s legitimate performance of duties concerning traffic control and the prevention of traffic hazards by exercising the tangible power, such as cutting off a police officer’s external distress, which was under the control of the Defendant without permission, and sculing and leading up several times.

However, there is no record of punishment exceeding a fine, and the police officer at the time explained the student's economic situation to the police officer that it is too serious to regulate the student without permission, and it seems that the police officer's statement of the obstruction of performance of official duties would lead to an contingent crime by hearing and interesting the police officer, etc., and the degree of violence committed by the defendant was not much serious.

In full view of such circumstances as well as the Defendant’s age, character and conduct, the environment, and the means and consequence of the commission of the crime, all the sentencing conditions as shown in the records and pleadings can not be deemed unfair because the sentence imposed by the lower court is too uneasible.

3. Conclusion

Since the appeal by the prosecutor and the defendant is groundless, all of them are dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Judge Senior Superintendent;

Judges Lee Sung-sung