Ullsan

2. Maximum source:

Seoul

[Judgment of the court below]

The Minister of Justice, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Justice

A litigation performer;

A. As to KRW 21,00,000 and the above money of KRW 18,90,000 among the 21,00,000 and the above money, 6% per annum from December 21, 2018 to September 9, 2019; 12% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment; 2,100,000 out of the above money, 6% per annum from December 21, 2018 to April 9, 2020; and 12% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

B. With respect to KRW 30,00,000 and the above money, KRW 27,00,000 per annum from September 9, 2019 to the date of full payment, KRW 3,00,000 among the above money shall be paid to the Plaintiff, 6% per annum from September 9, 2019 to April 9, 2020, and 12% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

2. The plaintiffs' remaining claims are all dismissed.

3. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

A. On April 29, 2017, Plaintiff Lee Won-il entered into an insurance contract of Korea Family Cancer Insurance (Class 2, married couple type) (hereinafter “instant insurance contract”) with Korea Post, the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, and the beneficiary and main insured, who are affiliated with the Defendant, as the date of the Plaintiff Lee Il-won, and the insured by setting the insurance period as the date of the contract as 10 years from the date of the contract, and the said insurance contract is less than two years from the date of the insurance contract (hereinafter “general cancer diagnosis”) and includes the payment of insurance proceeds of KRW 21 million at the time of the conclusion of the cancer diagnosis (hereinafter “general cancer diagnosis”).

B. As the maximum source of Plaintiff 1, the said Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, and the beneficiary and the insured, respectively, set the insurance period from January 16, 2017 to January 16, 2027 as the maximum source of Plaintiff 1, and the term of the insurance period from January 16, 2017 to January 16, 2027, and Korea entered into an insurance contract (hereinafter “instant 2 insurance contract”). The said insurance contract includes the contents that KRW 30 million should be paid at the time of the determination of general cancer diagnosis in the event of the lapse of two years from the date of the insurance contract.

C. Among the instant 1 and 2 insurance contracts (hereinafter “each of the instant insurance contracts”), the main contents of the terms and conditions relating to the instant insurance contracts are as shown in the attached sheet. In particular, each of the instant insurance contracts is described below (hereinafter “original cancer standard terms and conditions”) at the bottom of Article 5 of the said terms and conditions:

In the case of C77-C80 (in the case of a c77-C80 (a diversity and an unidentified life in detail) in accordance with the Korean Standard Disease and Death Classification Guidelines, it shall be classified as the basis for the original diversity (the first diversity) if the primary marity is confirmed.

D. On November 29, 2018, Kim○, the paper insured of the instant insurance contract, was diagnosed as the main disease from the Korea Institute of Radiological and Medical Sciences (C73), the head, face, and item with an injury and disease, and with an unidentified personality (C77). On December 17, 2018, the Defendant filed a claim for insurance proceeds under the instant one insurance contract with the Defendant on the ground that the main disease was caused by the transfer of the c73 crypam (C7) and the insurance proceeds should be paid based on the c73 crypam (C73). Accordingly, the Defendant paid the KRW 200,000 on the date of diagnosis to the Plaintiff, on the ground that the insurance proceeds should be paid based on the c73 c73 crypamam (C7).

E. On February 14, 2019, the Plaintiff, the insured of the instant two insurance contract, was diagnosed by Samsungnam Hospital located in Gangnam-gu Seoul, Seoul, and claimed insurance proceeds under the instant two insurance contract for the Defendant. For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant paid only KRW 3,000,000 of the insurance proceeds pursuant to the determination of the Plaintiff’s upper cancer diagnosis.

[Grounds for recognition] 1 to 4, 12, 13, 14 (including paper numbers), 1-1, 2-2, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The parties' assertion

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

The plaintiffs received the diagnosis of the dual nature of malicious life and the cirrology (C77), which constitutes "general cancer" as stipulated in the terms and conditions of each of the insurance contracts of this case. However, although the terms and conditions of each of the insurance contracts of this case include the original cancer classification clauses at the time of the conclusion of each of the insurance contracts of this case, since the defendant did not properly explain the terms and conditions of the original cancer classification to the plaintiffs at the time of the conclusion of each of the insurance contracts of this case, they cannot be asserted as the contents of each of the insurance contracts of this case. Accordingly, the defendant should pay the plaintiff Lee Won-il general cancer diagnosis costs of KRW 21 million and damages for delay.

B. Defendant’s assertion

(1) Since the Plaintiff’s malicious life transfer (C77) of the malicious life that was diagnosed by the Plaintiff was the malicious life that occurred in the upper vessel, the insurance money should be paid based on the upper vessel cancer according to the original cancer classification clause.

(2) It is difficult to view that the original cancer classification clause is a general and common content in trade, and thus, could have sufficiently predicted without a separate explanation, or merely a mere fact that the content stipulated in the law is repeated or added. Furthermore, the original cancer classification clause does not constitute an important content that is subject to the duty to explain, even if the Plaintiffs knew of such circumstances, since it does not lead to the failure to enter into an insurance contract or the maintenance thereof even if they knew of such circumstances.

(3) Even if the Defendant has an obligation to explain the original cancer classification clause to the Defendant, the Defendant fulfilled all the obligation to deliver and explain the terms and conditions at the time of entering into each of the instant insurance contracts with the Plaintiffs.

(4) Even if the Defendant’s obligation to pay the insurance money for general cancer diagnosis costs is recognized, the insurance money for the Aprypam diagnosis costs, which the Defendant had already paid, should be deducted.

3. Determination

(a) Relevant legal principles;

The grounds for paying insurance accidents or insurance proceeds, which are major parts of insurance contracts, are determined by the contents of the insurance policy or terms and conditions, generally. The insurance terms and conditions shall be fairly and reasonably interpreted in light of the purpose and purpose of the relevant terms and conditions in accordance with the principle of trust and good faith, and shall be objectively and uniformly interpreted in consideration of the interests of all insurance organizations based on the average customer’s interests, not on the intended purpose or intent. Even after such interpretation, in cases where the terms and conditions can be interpreted in a multilateral manner and their respective interpretations are unreasonable, and where the meaning of the relevant terms and conditions is unclear, it shall be interpreted favorably to customers (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Da70794, Jul. 2

In the conclusion of an insurance contract, an insurer shall specify and explain in detail the important contents of the insurance terms and conditions, such as the content of the insurance contract and the premium rate system, if the policyholder knows, or is common and common in the transaction, even if there is no separate explanation, or if it does not include any matter that has already been determined by the Acts and subordinate statutes, the insurer may not assert the content of the terms and conditions as the content of the insurance contract when the insurer concludes an insurance contract in violation of the duty to explain (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da59842, May 11, 199). If there is a special circumstance to deem that such circumstance does not affect the conclusion of the insurance contract even if the parties to a certain insurance contract fulfilled the duty to explain and explain properly, it cannot be viewed as an important content of the insurance contract subject to such duty to explain and explain (see Supreme Court Decision 205Da2808, Oct. 7, 2005).

B. Whether the ground for payment of general cancer insurance money occurs

In light of the following circumstances acknowledged based on the above facts and the aforementioned evidence, i.e., (i) the difference between the Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio 380, (ii) there is no content that the terms and conditions of each insurance contract of this case excludes Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio Madio.

(2) In addition, in the case of a protegrity and an unidentified in detail, if the protegrity of a protegrity is confirmed, it shall not be deemed that there is a matter that could sufficiently be anticipated even if there is no separate explanation, because it is classified as the basis for the protegrative part, or that it would be general and common to the transaction, or that it would be merely a matter that could be covered by the law, or that it would be limited to the extent that it would be delayed, or that there is a need to specifically explain the content in order to avoid unexpected disadvantages when concluding an insurance contract without knowing it. According to the original cancer classification clause, even if the duty to explain and explain is properly performed, it would result in a decrease in the scope of coverage, and even if such circumstance did not affect the conclusion of each insurance contract of this case.

(3) In this case, the following circumstances are considered comprehensively considering Gap evidence No. 1 and Eul evidence Nos. 2-1 and 2-1 and the overall purport of arguments, i.e., the product specifications, etc. at the time of each insurance contract, and it is difficult to view that an insurance solicitor explained the contents not indicated in the product specifications to the plaintiffs. ② The defendant argued that the plaintiff Lee Won-il explained the product classification clauses on the basis of the insurance solicitor's insurance solicitation statement (Evidence No. 4). However, it is difficult to believe that the insurance solicitor's unilateral reply was prepared at the near 3 years after the conclusion of the insurance contract in this case and its contents are difficult to conflict with the plaintiff. ③ The defendant stated that the insurance solicitor's explanation of the material contents of the insurance contract in this case, such as non-Guarantee of No. 2-1 and No. 2, was presented to the insurance solicitor's explanation of the material contents of the insurance contract in this case, and the defendant did not clearly explain the contents of each of the insurance contract in this case.

D. As seen earlier, as to whether the insurance contract of this case should deduct KRW 3,00,000 of the pre-paid similar cancer diagnosis insurance money, each of the insurance contracts of this case includes a separate matter between the pre-paid cancer diagnosis determination and the pre-determined cancer diagnosis determination, and there is no ground to view that the insurance contract of this case should include or deduct the pre-paid cancer (C73) and the pre-paid cancer diagnosis under each of the insurance contracts of this case. Thus, insofar as the Plaintiffs were diagnosed as they received the pre-paid cancer (C77) and the pre-paid malicious life (C77)

It is reasonable to view that the causes for the payment of the general cancer diagnosis expenses and the 'Apam cancer diagnosis expenses' have occurred, respectively. On a different premise, the Defendant’s assertion on this part is not acceptable.

E. Sub-decision

Therefore, the defendant (1) with respect to 21 million won of insurance proceeds under general cancer diagnosis and 18.9 million won of a complaint among them, the defendant shall pay 20 million won per annum from December 17, 2018 to December 9, 2019, which is the date of the claim for insurance proceeds, 6% per annum under the Commercial Act, which is the date of delivery of the complaint of this case, from September 9, 2019, and 12% per annum as stipulated under the Act on Special Cases concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the next day to the date of full payment; 2.1 million won shall be the remainder 9% per annum from December 21, 2018 to the date of the above claim; 2.0% per annum from the day following the day of service of the claim to the day of above 2.1 million won to the day of above change; 3.2% per annum from the day after the next day to the day of full payment to the day of the claim to the plaintiff 2.3 million won per annum.

4. Conclusion

The plaintiffs' claims are accepted within the scope of each of the above recognized claims, and the remaining claims are dismissed as they are without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.