The contents of the judgment are the same as the attachment.

1. Article 162 (1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22034, Feb. 18, 2010; hereinafter the same) which provides for the time of transfer or acquisition of assets pursuant to delegation of Article 98 of the former Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 9897, Dec. 31, 2009; hereinafter the same) provides that the time of transfer of assets is, in principle, the date of settlement of the price of the assets concerned, and Article 162 (3) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act provides that in cases of a long-term installment period prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance under subparagraph 3, the date of receipt of ownership transfer registration, delivery, or use and profit-making, whichever comes earlier (hereinafter referred to as the "instant provision"), and Article 78 (3) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Income Tax Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Mar. 28, 2011>

The "use profit date" stipulated in the provisions of this case includes not only the date the transferee starts to use and profit from the assets which are the objects of sale, but also the date on which the transferee can use and profit from the assets which are the objects of sale. However, even if the transferee obtained the consent from the transferor to use and manage the assets which are the objects of sale, if it is merely a temporary preservation, maintenance, or management of the assets or a temporary use for the limited purpose, the transferee does not allow the transferee to use and profit from the assets independently, and such approval date does not constitute the "use profit date" stipulated in the provisions of this case.

2. Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record reveals the following facts.

A. On October 1, 2004, the Plaintiff concluded a sales contract to sell the instant land used as orchard in excess of KRW 000,000,000,000 as the Plaintiffs owned 1/3 shares of each of the Plaintiff to the school juristic person Dental Institute. On November 1, 2004, the Plaintiff determined to pay KRW 00,000,000 for the first intermediate payment as of November 1, 2004, KRW 00,000 for the second intermediate payment as of March 2, 2005, KRW 00,000 for the remainder payment as of December 15, 2009, respectively.

B. At the time of the instant purchase and sale contract, the Plaintiffs and Dental established a special agreement on the following: (i) the Plaintiffs issued a written consent to the application for land transfer at the time of the secondary intermediate payment to enable the instant land to be used as the site of the EE University; and (ii) the various administrative documents for authorization and license until the time of transfer of ownership are provided, and (iii) the documents necessary for the transfer of ownership are provided when the transfer of ownership can be possible in the name of DPE under the related Acts and subordinate statutes, including the Farmland Act.

C. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs received the second intermediate payment on March 3, 2005, and delivered the written consent to the application for incorporation of the instant land to the Korea Development Institute. However, on December 15, 2009, the Plaintiffs continued to use the instant land as an orchard until the remainder is paid from the Korea Development Institute. The taxes on the instant land up to that time were also borne by the Plaintiffs pursuant to a special agreement.

D. The instant land was incorporated into a school site development project around August 2010, and the ownership transfer registration was completed on September 1, 2010.

3. Examining these facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, even if the Plaintiffs delivered the written consent to the application to convert the land of this case to Dental Institute on March 3, 2005, it is merely limited to the Plaintiff’s provision of convenience to obtain various kinds of authorizations, such as the determination of school facilities, etc. on the land of this case under the condition that the Plaintiff continued to use and profit from the land of this case, and thus, the delivery date of the written consent to convert the land of this case stipulated in the said special agreement cannot be deemed as the “use profit date” stipulated in the said special agreement. The Plaintiff did not change on March 4, 2005 on the land of this case on the sole basis that the Plaintiff set up a collateral security right of maximum debt amount of KRW 0 billion in the name of Dental Institute, or that the sales amount received from Dental Institute up to that time reaches about 95% of the total amount.

Nevertheless, solely on the grounds stated in its reasoning, the lower court held that the instant disposition was unlawful, on March 3, 2005, on the premise that the instant sales contract constituted a long-term installment transaction, and that the time of transfer of the instant land was also March 3, 2005, by deeming the “the date of use profit” as the date of the second intermediate payment payment, and that the instant disposition that deemed the time of transfer of the instant land as the date of December 15, 2009, which was the remainder payment date, was unlawful. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of the “date of use profit” as stipulated in the instant provision, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation in the grounds of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

4. Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remainder of the grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent