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(영문) 대법원 1964. 5. 26. 선고 63다974 판결

[건물철거및대지인도][집12(1)민,127]

Main Issues

(a) The defective litigation procedures taken over by an inheritor within one month from the time when the inheritor becomes aware of the commencement of the inheritance, and the recovery of such defects;

(b) The precedent judged on the facts constituting the basis of prescriptive acquisition in violation of the principle of pleadings; and

Summary of Judgment

Even if there is a defect in the process of a lawsuit by taking over the lawsuit within one month after the commencement of the inheritance, the defect in the litigation before the commencement of the lawsuit is treated when three months have elapsed from the date of becoming aware of the commencement of the inheritance without giving up the succession in the process of the lawsuit.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 211(2) of the Civil Procedure Act, Article 1019 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff-Appellant

Man Kim Yong-ho Litigation, Kim Hong-moo et al. (Attorney Don-ju, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant-Appellee

Shin Pung et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee)

original decision

Daegu District Court Decision 62Na244 delivered on December 31, 1962

Text

The original judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the Daegu District Court Panel Division.

Reasons

As to the ground of appeal No. 1 by the plaintiffs,

In the previous case, where his heir of the deceased Kim Yong-ho's estate due to the death of the plaintiff was limited to his lawsuit taking place, and there was no lawsuit taking place against the plaintiff Kim Hong-ho, and if there were other co-inheritors, their co-inheritors. Therefore, the lawsuit on their part is still pending in the court below, but the lawsuit on these part is merely seeking the exclusion of the infringement on the land of this case owned by the above co-inheritors, and the claim for the return of the infringed property, which is the joint ownership of the above co-inheritors, can be viewed as having been done independently by each co-inheritors. Thus, it cannot be said that there was an error of law in the original judgment on the sole ground that

The issue is groundless.

As to the second ground for appeal:

Under Article 211 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act, an inheritor is unable to take over the proceedings until he is able to waive inheritance within three months from the date when he became aware of the commencement of inheritance pursuant to Article 1019 of the Civil Code, and the inheritor is able to waive inheritance. However, there is an error of law in the judgment of the original court in violation of the procedure of the original instance, which was taken place within one month from the date when the commencement of inheritance was commenced or within one month after the commencement of inheritance. However, since the legal proceedings of the plaintiffs are defective in the proceedings in violation of the above provisions of the Civil Procedure Act, even if there is a defect in the proceedings being taken over, it is reasonable to see that the defect in the proceedings before the commencement of inheritance is cured if three months have passed from the date when she became aware of the commencement of inheritance without the waiver of inheritance during the proceedings, and it is obvious that three months have passed after the commencement of inheritance by the plaintiffs, it cannot be viewed that there was an error in the judgment of the original court on the sole ground of a violation of the provisions of the

The issue is groundless.

As to ground of appeal No. 3

In its explanation of its reasoning, the original judgment was passed from March 1946 to March 31, 1956, which was the first day of possession, in which there is no argument and evidence as to the grounds for undermining the completion of the prescription in this case, and the defendants acquired the ownership of each of the land in this case by prescription. However, according to the records of this case (Chapter 201 Chapter 181), the defendants asserted the above-mentioned succession of possession from 5,6 years before 1946 to 5,6 years before and after the initial date of the acquisition of prescription, and it is obvious that the initial judgment is the starting day of the acquisition of prescription, even though it is obvious that the facts constituting the basis for the acquisition of prescription must be proved by the parties' assertion, and therefore, the original judgment is reversed without the need for other arguments, and it is reasonable to have the court below deliberate on the facts in this case and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices under Article 406 of the Civil Procedure Act.

The judges of the Supreme Court, the two judges of the two judges of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge)