[2] The validity of a contract, such as sale, exchange, donation, etc. of a corporation that violates the criteria for permission for the acquisition of a housing site or did not obtain permission from the competent

[3] Whether a juristic act which is null and void due to a violation of compulsory law at the time of the act becomes effective upon the amendment of the statute thereafter

[4] The meaning of "the de facto owner" under Article 21 (2) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site

[2] In full view of the legislative intent and the relevant provisions of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, in principle, the ownership of the housing site is prohibited in case of a corporation. However, even in this case, if the competent authority directly intervene in the transaction of the housing site and after reviewing whether the transaction details conflict with the legislative intent and permission standards of the Act, the purpose of the legislation is to prohibit the entry into force of the contract binding upon the party without such permission. Therefore, the contract shall be null and void as long as the contract, such as the sale, exchange, gift, etc. of the housing site concluded between the parties, is proved to have failed to meet the permission standards, and even if the permission is not obtained from the competent authority.

[3] Where a violation of a mandatory law is null and void at the time of the act, it shall not be effective even if the provision of the law is amended later.

[4] The term "actual owner" in Article 21 (2) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites refers to a person who is not registered as an owner on the public register but can exclusively use, benefit from, and dispose of the pertinent housing site in an objective manner and can be registered as an owner on the public register at any time.

1. On the first ground for appeal

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, it is justified that the court below recognized that the plaintiff, by compiling the evidence presented in its judgment, contributed the land of this case to the above school juristic person as the chief director of ○○ Private Teaching Institute established by the non-party who is the husband of the non-party (hereinafter referred to as "school juristic person"), and there is no error of misconception of facts due to a violation of the rules of evidence as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

2. On the third ground for appeal

Article 21 (2) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") provides that a person liable for the payment of a charge in excess of the ownership of a housing site under the Act shall be the owner on the public register: Provided, That if a de facto owner is different, the actual owner shall be the owner. Article 27 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14447 of Dec. 23, 1994) provides that if a de facto owner is different under the above proviso, the owner on the public register of the relevant housing site shall submit a report to the Minister of Construction and Transportation along with relevant documentary evidence 30 days prior to the base date for the imposition of the charge as provided in Article 25 of the Act. The above provision provides that the owner on the public register shall report the same fact in advance and shall be construed as an administrative convenience provision to prevent any unlawful imposition on the owner on the public register who is not liable for the payment of the charge in fact from omitting the imposition of the charge on the de facto owner.

3. On the second ground for appeal

원심판결 이유에 의하면 원심은, 그 판결에서 들고 있는 증거들을 종합하여, 피고가 서울 (주소 생략) 대 4,255㎡(이하 '이 사건 토지'라 한다)를 포함한 판시 토지들이 원고 소유의 택지임을 전제로 원고에 대한 1992. 6. 2.(원심판결의 7. 17.은 6. 2.의 오기임이 명백하다. 이하 같다.)부터 1993. 6. 1.까지의 택지초과소유부담금을 판시 방식으로 산정하여 1993. 8. 31. 원고에게 금 407,940,010원을 부과고지(이하 '이 사건 처분'이라 한다)한 사실, 원고는 위 학교법인이 1991. 3.경 새로이 전북 김제군 공덕면 공덕리에 ○○○○전문대학을 설치하려고 하자 그 수익용 재산으로 위 공덕리에 있는 다수의 토지와 함께 이 사건 토지를 출연하기로 하고 그에 관한 재산출연증서를 작성하여 위 학교법인에 제출하였고, 그 당시 원고 명의의 인감증명서를 비롯한 등기신청서류를 위 학교법인에게 교부하였으며, 이 사건 토지가 나대지였으므로 종전의 관리상황에 특별한 변동은 없었으나 그 점유도 아울러 위 학교법인에게 이전되었는데, 그 이전부터 위 학교법인의 정관에는 학교의 운영을 위한 수익사업의 일종으로 부동산임대업, 조림사업 및 금전신탁업이 규정되어 있었던 사실, 그러나 당시 법 제12조 제1항 제4호 , 개정 전의 같은법시행령(1993. 5. 10. 대통령령 제13882호로 개정되기 전의 것) 제12조 제2호 의 각 규정에 의하여 학교법인의 경우 고유업무에 직접 사용하기 위하여서만 택지의 취득이 가능하다는 이유로 법 제10조 소정의 허가증을 교부받을 수 없어 위 증여에 따른 소유권이전등기를 경료하지 못한 반면 설립재산대장에는 이 사건 토지를 출연재산으로 등재하여 그 사무소에 비치한 사실, 한편 위 학교법인은 1991. 3.경 교육부장관에게 이 사건 토지를 수익용 기본재산으로 포함시켜 위 ○○○○전문대학의 설립계획승인신청을 한 결과 1991. 10. 19. 그 설립인가를 받았고, 그 후 1993. 3. 1. 개교를 목표로 위 전문대학의 설치작업을 추진하였으나 당초 교사의 신축 및 각종 시설확보를 위한 재원으로 출연하였던 이 사건 토지에 관하여 소유권이전등기가 경료되지 못하는 바람에 계획대로 위 전문학교를 개교하지 못하고 그 설치를 연기한 사실, 그러다가 위 시행령이 1993. 5. 10. 개정됨에 따라 학교법인이 수익용 재산으로 택지를 취득할 수 있음이 명문화되자 위 학교법인은 1993. 7. 29. 이 사건 토지에 관하여 같은 달 28.자 증여를 원인으로 한 위 학교법인 명의의 소유권이전등기를 경료하였다가 1993. 11. 11. 이를 소외 주식회사 삼익주택에게 매도한 후 1994. 5. 24. 위 매매를 원인으로 하여 위 회사 앞으로 소유권이전등기를 경료하여 준 사실을 인정한 다음, 위 인정사실에 의하면 원고는 1991. 3.경 이 사건 토지를 위 학교법인에 출연하기로 하여 그 점유를 이전하여 줌은 물론 소유권이전에 필요한 제반 서류를 교부하였고, 위 학교법인은 이 사건 토지를 주된 수익용 기본재산으로 하여 위 전문대학의 설립을 인가받았으므로 적어도 이 사건 부담금의 부과기간이 시작되는 1992. 6. 2.에는 이미 이 사건 토지의 실질적인 소유권은 학교법인에 이전된 후이나 다만 법 제10조 소정의 허가증을 받지 못하여 그 소유권이전등기만을 마치지 못하였을 뿐이고, 등기를 경료하지 못한 사유를 보면 개정 전의 시행령 제12조 제2호 에 의하더라도 위 학교법인이 이 사건 토지를 취득하는 것을 법이 금지하였다고 볼 수 없음에도 원고가 이 사건 토지를 출연할 당시 행정실무에서 '법인의 고유업무'를 엄격하게 해석하는 바람에 학교법인이 수익용 재산으로 택지를 취득할 경우 그 택지취득이 허가되지 아니함으로써 부동산등기법 제40조 제1항 제4호 에 의하여 그 소유권이전등기가 사실상 불가능하였을 따름이고, 설사 원고가 이 사건 토지를 출연할 당시 법의 제 규정에 의하여 위 학교법인이 이 사건 토지를 취득하는 것이 금지되어 있었다 하더라도 피고가 이 사건 부과처분을 할 당시에는 이미 개정된 시행령 제12조 제2호 에 의하여 학교법인이 택지를 수익용 재산으로 취득할 수 있도록 규정된 후이므로 위 학교법인이 이 사건 토지를 취득하는 것을 두고 위법한 행위라고 할 수 없게 되었고, 이와 같이 볼 때 특단의 사정이 없는 한 이 사건 부담금의 부과기간 동안 원고는 이 사건 토지의 공부상의 소유자에 지나지 않고 그 사실상의 소유자는 위 학교법인이라고 봄이 상당하다고 하여 이 사건 부과처분 중 이 사건 토지에 관한 부분인 금 305,580,710원에 해당하는 부분은 위법하다고 하여 이를 취소하였다.

However, in light of the legislative intent of this Act and the relevant provisions, in principle, ownership of a housing site is prohibited in case of a juristic person, but even in this case, it is interpreted that the purpose of legislation is to prevent the effect of a contract binding upon the party without such permission by allowing the competent authority to directly intervene in the transaction of the housing site and after reviewing whether the transaction details conflict with the legislative intent and the standards for permission under the Act. Therefore, the contract cannot be objectively permitted due to the violation of the standards for permission, such as sale, exchange, donation, etc. of the housing site concluded between the parties, as well as the case where it is proved that the contract, such as sale, exchange, donation, etc., of the housing site,

As determined by the court below, even if the plaintiff contributed the land of this case to the above school juristic person by disposing of the land of this case and using it as expenses for the establishment of a junior college, this does not constitute a case where the above school juristic person can acquire the land of this case after obtaining permission under the provisions of Article 12 (1) 4 of the Act, which was in force at the time of the act of contribution of this case, and Article 12 (2) 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act prior to the amendment, and the above school juristic person could not acquire the land of this case. In addition, there is no record that the above school juristic person obtained permission for the acquisition of the land of this case on the record. Therefore, the donation contract with the purport that the plaintiff contributed the land of this case to the above school juristic person cannot be deemed as conclusive because

In addition, if a provision of the law is null and void at the time of the act, it shall not be effective even if the provision of the law is amended (see Supreme Court Order 66Ma1250, Jan. 25, 1967). In this case, Article 12 subparag. 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act was amended by Presidential Decree No. 13882, May 10, 193, and a school juristic person (referring to a juristic person under Article 2(2) and (3) of the Private School Act) receives a donation of a housing site for profit-making business or disposal in accordance with the method prescribed by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation for the purpose of raising expenses, such as scholarships necessary to carry out its unique duties, if it is stipulated as one of the reasons for permission for the acquisition of the housing site to the juristic person, even if the donation contract null and void by the provision of the law at

Meanwhile, Article 21(2) of the Act provides that the person liable for payment of excess ownership charges shall be the owner on the public register, and where there is another de facto owner, the person liable for payment shall be the de facto owner. Here, "the de facto owner" refers to a person who is not registered as the owner on the public register, but can exclusively use, benefit from, and dispose of the relevant housing site, and may be registered as the owner on the public register at any time (see Supreme Court Decision 95Nu5080 delivered on September 15, 1995). In light of the facts established by the court below, the fact that the above school juristic person entered into a donation contract with the Plaintiff cannot be said to be a person in a situation where the pertinent school juristic person can exclusively use, benefit from, or dispose of the instant land and can be registered as the owner on the public register at any time.

Nevertheless, the court below held that the disposition of this case against the plaintiff was unlawful since the plaintiff is a school juristic person which is a person liable for the payment of charges for the land of this case on the basis of the above school juristic person, on the premise that the contract for the donation of land of this case with the plaintiff to the school juristic person is valid. Thus, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the validity of the contract for donation to the juristic person which cannot acquire a housing site under the law or the legal principles on the de facto owner as stipulated in Article 21 (2) of the Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

4. Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)