The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2-1 to 5:

As determined by the court below, if the plaintiff company established an independent company of the non-party Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (currently changed to Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.) with the reasons indicated in the judgment below, and comprehensively transfers all shipbuilding-related facilities and business rights, including subject matter of acquisition tax, owned by the plaintiff company, to the above Hyundai Shipbuilding on January 1, 1974 on the premise that the establishment is established, and the transfer of all of the assets is completed on the same day in reality regardless of the completion of payment, regardless of whether the transfer price is paid, and if the Hyundai Shipbuilding succeeds to the status of the plaintiff company related to shipbuilding-related business from that time to the actual owner of the facilities and acquires business profits therefrom while operating it as the owner of the facilities, it shall be deemed that the time of acquisition of subject matter of taxation of this case was the time of acquisition of subject matter of taxation of this case in light of the substance over taxation under the tax law, and the purport of Article 105 (2) of the Local Tax Act, which is the acquisition of subject matter of acquisition tax.

In Article 73 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act where the place of issue is pointed out, the "in the case of oil acquisition, the taxable goods shall be deemed to have been acquired on the payment date of the balance under the contract.

However, the provision that "if it is actually paid before the due date of payment under a contract, it shall be deemed to have been acquired on the date of actual payment." This is merely an item of the acquisition time when the actual acquisition is unclear or when the actual acquisition is advanced with the payment of the balance under the contract, and it cannot be deemed that the acquisition time of the object of this case is excluded from the original case. Therefore, the court below is justified that the acquisition time of the object of this case is deemed to be January 1, 1974, and therefore, it does not err in the misapprehension of the legal principles of the Local Tax Act, such

In this case, based on Article 73 (1) of the Local Tax Act, the date following June 10, 1974, which was approved by the Director of the Economic Planning Board for the above acceptance limit contract with the Plaintiff Company, or the date on which payment under the contract was actually approved shall be deemed the time when the Hyundai Shipbuilding acquired the object of taxation of this case, and shall not be employed.

With respect to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2-6

In Article 105 (6) of the Local Tax Act which is enforced at the time of the instant case, the “acquisition of stocks” that provides that the “acquisition of stocks becomes an oligopolistic stockholder” refers to the acquisition from other stockholders. As to the Plaintiff’s assertion that the acquisition of new stocks by capital increase of the said modern shipbuilding company does not constitute the case of acquisition of new stocks due to the capital increase of the said modern shipbuilding company, there is no room to regard the case of acquisition of new stocks under the text of Article 105 (6) of the said Local Tax Act as excluding the case of acquisition of new stocks under the text of Article 105 (6) of the said Act, the “acquisition of stocks” under the provisions of the said Act should be deemed to include both the case of acquisition by succession of the already issued stocks

The issue is that the above judgment of the court below was erroneous on the premise that Article 78 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10567 of May 5, 1973) of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 6667 of the same Act), which was enforced at the time of the case, provided that there was a provision that "the acquisition of shares" means the acquisition of shares from shareholders. However, Article 78 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10567 of the same Act) does not constitute the same provision as alleged by the plaintiff, and is merely a shareholder who becomes an oligopolistic shareholder under Article 105 (6) of the Act (amended by the Act No. 1056 of Dec. 31, 1974, which was inserted by the amendment of the above Act). Thus, the judgment of the court below is justified in its judgment that there was a provision that was enforced at the time of the case.

As to ground of appeal No. 3

The issue is on the premise that Article 22 of the Local Tax Act provides that oligopolistic shareholders shall assume the secondary tax liability with respect to the delinquent amount of local taxes to be borne by the corporation at the time of the enforcement of the instant case. Under Article 105(6) of the same Act, oligopolistic shareholders are liable to pay the primary acquisition tax pursuant to Article 105(6) of the same Act. However, there is no logical ground that Article 22 of the same Act requires oligopolistic shareholders to assume the secondary tax liability, which is contrary to the basic principles of the Constitution and tax laws. The lower court did not make any judgment on this, and thus, the lower court erred in its judgment and the grounds for

However, in the Local Tax Act (Act No. 2593, Mar. 12, 1973) at that time, it is apparent that Article 22 of the Local Tax Act, which stipulated the same purport as the plaintiff's assertion, has been deleted, so the judgment of the court below cannot be attacked on the premise that there was such a legal provision. Therefore, even if there was a defect in the judgment of the court below which omitted the judgment of the plaintiff's assertion, the conclusion of the judgment of the court below

Therefore, all of the grounds of appeal by the plaintiff is without merit, and they are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff who has lost. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Dra-ro (Presiding Justice)