2. B stock companies;

3. C Stock Companies.

2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

The following facts are not disputed between the parties, or there is no counter-proof as to Gap evidence 1-1-4, Eul evidence 1-1-1, and Eul evidence 3-1, and there is no counter-proof.

A. The plaintiffs are companies that conduct installment financing business under Article 3 of the Specialized Credit Financial Business Act, and are business operators under Article 2 subparagraph 1 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act").

B. On January 20, 199, Plaintiff A Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Plaintiff A”), B Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Plaintiff B”), and Plaintiff C Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Plaintiff C”) reduced the fixed-use vehicle payment rate from 26% to 25% on January 22, 199 to 20%.

C. The defendant deemed that the plaintiffs' above act constitutes an unfair collaborative act under Article 19 (5) and (1) 1 of the Act. On August 16, 2000, the defendant ordered the plaintiffs to take corrective measures and pay penalty surcharges as stated in the attached Form E in accordance with Articles 21 and 22 of the Act (hereinafter the disposition of this case).

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The parties' assertion

The defendant asserts that the disposition of this case is lawful because it constitutes an unfair collaborative act presumed pursuant to Article 19 (5) and (1) 1 of the Act on the Grounds of the above disposition and related Acts and subordinate statutes. The plaintiffs asserted that the act of reducing the interest rate of the plaintiffs' above installment does not constitute an unfair collaborative act as prescribed by the Act, and even if it falls under domestic affairs, the order of the payment of the penalty surcharge is unlawful because

B. Relevant statutes

Article 19 (Prohibition of Unfair Collaborative Acts) (1) No enterpriser shall agree with other enterprisers to jointly engage in any of the following acts that unfairly restrict competition (hereinafter referred to as "unfair collaborative acts") by contract, agreement, resolution, or any other means:

1. Fixing, maintaining or changing the price;

(5) Where two or more enterprisers are committing any act falling under any subparagraph of paragraph (1) which practically restricts competition in a particular business area, they shall be presumed to have committed an unfair collaborative act despite the absence of an express agreement to engage in such act.

When any unfair collaborative act violating the provisions of Article 19 has occurred, the Fair Trade Commission may order the enterpriser concerned to discontinue such act, to publish violations of the Act, or to take other corrective measures.

The Fair Trade Commission may impose a penalty surcharge on any enterpriser who has conducted unfair collaborative acts in violation of Article 19 within the limits not exceeding the amount equivalent to five percent of the turnover determined by Presidential Decree.

(1) Reference in Article 22 of the Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act to “the turnover determined by the Presidential Decree” in the main sentence of Article 22 of the Act shall be construed to include the average turnover for the immediately preceding three business years of the enterpriser concerned (hereinafter referred to as “standard turnover for imposing penalty surcharges”).

(2) Other matters necessary for calculating the standard turnover for imposition of penalty surcharges shall be determined by the Fair Trade Commission.

(c) Estimation of unfair collaborative acts;

(1) Article 19(1) of the Act provides for the presumption of an unfair collaborative act as a requirement for the establishment of such an unfair collaborative act: ① It is a case where two or more enterprisers jointly intend to engage in any of the acts listed in the subparagraphs of Article 19(1) of the Act; ② it is agreed that a collaborative act be conducted between the enterprisers, by contract, agreement, resolution, or any other method; ③ it is substantially limited competition in a certain business area; ③ it is possible to provide for the presumption of an unfair collaborative act as provided in Article 19(5) of the Act. The purpose of the provision is to establish an unfair collaborative act as provided in Article 19(1) of the Act. It is to prove that the act is conducted under the explicit and implied agreement of the enterprisers; thus, it is not easy to prove such agreement in light of the nature of the unfair collaborative act; thus, it is not sufficient to prove that the two or more enterprisers are not subject to the said "unfair collaborative act" or "unfairly restricted act" (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Du1600.

(2) Whether the act corresponds to the appearance of the act

First of all, as to whether there exists a type of act among the plaintiffs' consent falling under any of the subparagraphs of Article 19 (1) of the Act, in full view of the whole purport of the pleading as to whether there is a type of act between the plaintiffs, Eul evidence 1-1, Eul evidence 1-9 through Eul evidence 13, Eul evidence 3-1, the whole purport of the pleading is as follows: plaintiff A shall be 26% to 28% of Jan. 20, 199, plaintiff B shall be 28% of Jan. 20, 199, plaintiff B shall be 25% of the previous 28% of Jan. 20, 199, and plaintiff C shall be 27% to 28% of Jan. 22, 199 to 25% of the previous 27% of Jan. 22, 199, and there is no counter-proof evidence. This shall be a case where two or more enterprisers in a certain business area where the above presumption clause is defined as "the price determined under Article 19 (1) 1.

(3) Whether additional circumstances are necessary for the above presumption

The plaintiffs were subject to the presumption clause of unfair collaborative act under Article 19 (5) of the Act by putting them on the ground that the acts of the plaintiffs are identical to the external appearance of the acts of the plaintiffs and applied the provision of this case to the presumption clause of unfair collaborative act under Article 19 (5) of the Act. However, in the used cars melting market, the information about the interest rate and installment conditions to be done through multiple agencies (affiliated points) are completely opened. When information on the change of installments is obtained, other companies also have reduced the same time in the process of determining the change of the interest rate to be equally, and if it comes to the external check, the other companies have reduced the same installment at the same time. As a result, the phenomenon of the act is the same. In this case, it cannot be presumed to be an unfair collaborative act merely with the external appearance of the acts caused by such food concurrent act, and there is no reason to see that there is no additional presumption of facts that the above presumption of facts is contrary to the theory of interpretation under Article 19 (5) of the law of the United States.

(4) Restriction on competition

(A) Next, in full view of the following facts: (a) whether the Plaintiffs’ installment reduction constitutes the act of practically restricting competition in the domestic used cars market; (b) Gap evidence 1-2, Eul evidence 1-4, Eul evidence 1-1-3-1, and Eul evidence 3-1; and (c) the fact finding as to the president of the F association of this court, the domestic used cars market at the time participated only in six companies including the Plaintiffs; (c) the Plaintiff’s share in the used cars market was approximately 30.9%, Plaintiff B, about 43.1%, and Plaintiff C was about 10.8%, and the market share of the Plaintiff three companies was about 84.8% (based on the performance standard in 199); and (d) the used cars products were subject to some absolute conditions, such as having differences in loans or financial service transactions for each company; and (e) the fact that the price increase in used cars market at the time was not affected by the above determined competition.

(B) The plaintiffs alleged that the used cars and credit card companies, such as the plaintiffs, are alternative competition with each other, and therefore, they should define the used cars market including credit card companies. Therefore, it is reasonable to view that only the installment financing companies except credit card companies, have no reason to act jointly. In general, credit card companies are issued only to wage and salary income earners or property payers with a certain level of economic credit rating, and even in light of the case of a non-interest rate, Plaintiff B’s installment interest rate is 18.4% from January 1, 1999 to May 199, while the average used cars of installment companies were 25% of the total amount of installment financing companies (No. 1-4 of the evidence No. 1) during the same period of time. However, since the used cars generally lack the ability to procure funds through other financial institutions, it cannot be viewed that the plaintiffs' share in the above used cars is more than the market share in the above used cars in light of the fact that the plaintiffs' share in the used cars and the above used cars is not reasonable.

(C) The plaintiffs asserted that the collaborative act of this case was not an act of raising the interest rate of 1. B, but an act of reducing the interest rate of 1. B. It does not practically affect competition. Thus, considering the previous purport of the argument as to Gap evidence 1-1, Eul evidence 1-2-1, and Eul evidence 3-1, and the fact that used cars, including the plaintiffs, are subject to strict restrictions on the receipt by the Specialized Credit Financial Business Act, the interest rate of 9% for each of the above 19-year installments was set in consideration of general management expenses, profits, bad debts, etc., and the difference between the above interest rate of 1.2-year installments and 9-year installments was 9% higher than that of the plaintiff 197 to 197, the plaintiffs' interest rate of 2-year installments was 9% higher than that of the plaintiff 197 to 197 to 199% higher than that of the plaintiff 2-year installment financing company.

(5) Sub-decisions

If so, the plaintiffs' act of reducing the installment payment of this case is presumed to be an "unfair collaborative act" under Article 19 (1) 1 of the Act in accordance with Article 19 (5) of the Act.

(d) Whether the presumption of an unfair collaborative act has been destroyed;

Meanwhile, the plaintiffs reviewed the reduction of the interest rate for installment payments from the mid-198 mid-term 1998 after the IMF relief financing period to maintain the low-speed stabilization rate, and reduced the interest rate to 26% or 28% in accordance with the terms of the previous installment payment rate of 1998, 10.1.0, and again decided to reduce the interest rate for January 13, 1999 to 25%, and later delayed the enforcement period for the reasons of education, public relations, etc., but "from January 20, 1999 to 25%" was included in the 199th anniversary of the opinion of the Gangnam Branch of January 19, 199 to the 19th 19th 19th 2nd 19th 19th 19th 19th 19th 19th 19th 19th 19th 19th 19th 19th 19th 19th 19.

Therefore, according to the evidence of Nos. 3-14 and 5, it was difficult to find that the plaintiffs' plans to reduce the rate of installments from the second half of 1998 following the lapse of the IMF relief financing period to 26% or 28% according to the terms of consumer's installment payment at around October 1, 1998. Accordingly, it was difficult to find that the plaintiffs' plans to reduce the rate of installments within 1999 to 26% or 28% under the conditions of consumer's installment payment. The plaintiff Eul also did not have any other evidence of No. 3, No. 13, No. 4, No. 2, No. 13, No. 2, No. 3, No. 4, No. 1998.

E. Whether the penalty surcharge payment order is unlawful

(1) The plaintiffs' assertion

In light of the purport of imposing the penalty surcharge under the Act as the purpose of restitution of unjust enrichment, the Plaintiffs asserted that the amount of sales, which serves as the basis of calculating the penalty surcharge in this case, should be the total amount of interest income realized or expected to be realized by entering into a new contract with 25% installment during the period of collaborative act. However, the sales, which forms the basis of calculating the penalty surcharge in this case, include not only the interest income accrued from entering into a new contract during the period of collaborative act, but also the interest income accrued during the period of collaborative act after entering into a contract

(2) Determination

As a matter of course, penalty surcharges are money imposed and collected by administrative agencies in order to deprive of illegal gains from violations of the administrative law, or to enforce the implementation of certain administrative orders under the relevant laws and regulations, and it differs from criminal punishment or administrative punishment. However, it has the characteristic of sanctions as sanctions in order to impose monetary payment obligations against the violator. In particular, penalty surcharges for the violation of this case basically have the nature of recovering unjust gains, i.e., deprivation of illegal economic benefits acquired by the violation of the law. However, the revised provisions under Act No. 5235 of Dec. 30, 1996, which made it possible to impose penalty surcharges on the violation that is not related to the occurrence of unjust gains prior to the amendment of the Act No. 5235 of Dec. 30, 196. The imposition of penalty surcharges was abolished based on the sales unit of the violation, and the nature of sanctions has been strengthened by considering the content and degree of the violation, the period and recovery of the violation, etc. Therefore, since the purpose of the imposition of penalty surcharges under the Act is solely for restitution of unjust gains, it should not be justified.

In addition, according to the defendant's guidelines for calculation of penalty surcharges established on April 29, 197 pursuant to delegation of Article 9 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act, the standard for imposition of penalty surcharges x (Sales of related goods and services during the same period) x 5/100 with respect to unfair collaborative acts x within the period of violation x (Sales of related goods and services during the same period x 4, 14, 5 and 6 with respect to evidence 1-4, 14, 6 with respect to each of the above evidence , the defendant cannot claim the amount of penalty surcharges 3, 55-3 (1) of the Act with regard to the purpose to achieve the imposition of penalty surcharges within the maximum amount of penalty surcharges under Article 2 of the Act and Article 9 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act, considering the contents and degree of the violation, period of the violation, and frequency of the violation, and the size of profits acquired from the violation, etc. of the defendant's order for calculation of penalty surcharges 9% of the amount of installment charges 9.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim of this case is dismissed in entirety as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

June 27, 2002

Judges Kim Gin-tae

Judges Lee Chang-chul