[손해배상][집35(2)민,300;공1987.9.15.(808),1388]
Whether it is contrary to the good faith principle to assert the fact that the company's negligence of supervision is against the good faith principle.
A person who actively crepits the supervisory negligence of a commercial company shall not claim the fact that he/she is negligent in supervising the commercial company as a reason for offsetting the negligence. However, in cases where a livestock cooperative staff member did not actively commit a crepit in the supervisory negligence of the commercial company, but did not perform his/her duty, and where it seems that the company could have avoided the loss caused by such negligence if he/she did not properly point out such negligence, it cannot be said that the above company's negligence in supervising the commercial company is contrary to the good faith principle even if it is asserted as a reason for offsetting the negligence.
Article 763 of the Civil Act, Article 396 of the Civil Act, Article 2 of the Civil Act
Supreme Court Decision 70Da298 delivered on April 28, 1970, 75Da11 delivered on May 11, 1976
Yangju Livestock Cooperatives (Attorney Kim Dong-hwan, Counsel for defendant-appellant)
Attorney Lee Jae-hoon et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant
Seoul High Court Decision 86Na7777 delivered on February 4, 1987
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.
We examine the grounds of appeal.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the non-party 1 was 0,00 won of the above non-party 2's credit for the above non-party 1 and the non-party 2 was 0,000 won of the above non-party 2's credit for 0,000 won of the above non-party 2's credit for 0,000 won of the above non-party 2's credit for 0,000 won of the above non-party 1's credit for 0,000 won of the above non-party 2's credit for 0,000 won of the above non-party 1's credit for 0,000 won of the above non-party 1's credit for 0,000 won of the above non-party 2's credit for 10,000 won of the above non-party 1's credit for 0,000 won of the above non-party 2's credit for the above non-party 2's credit for 9.
The first point which the court below is based on comparative negligence is that the person who crepits the supervisory negligence of his company's company's company's wrong act is not a ground for offsetting the negligence under the good faith principle. Thus, the person who crepits the supervisory negligence of his company can not assert the fact that the supervisor negligence of his company can not be a ground for offsetting the negligence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 70Da298, Apr. 28, 1970; 75Da11, May 11, 1976). However, in this case, it cannot be argued that the defendant's mistake did not commit a crepit actively, but rather did not commit a occupational misconduct, and that the defendant's company did not properly point out it, and that the defendant's company could have avoided damages due to such negligence, which is contrary to the good faith principle.
In addition, if the balance of the feed payment to the plaintiff's association is within the final limit of the credit management of the plaintiff's union, the non-party 1, who is another employee of the plaintiff's union, sold feed in excess of the limit of the credit management of the plaintiff's union, during the transaction period, although the non-party 1, who is the other employee of the plaintiff's union, could not assert the exemption of the amount equivalent to the above temporary excess limit, on the other hand, it is inconsistent with the reasoning of the judgment that the non-party 1's above act is a ground for offsetting negligence that reduces the liability amount of the defendant's punishment. However, the purport of the judgment of the court below is that the above decision of the court below is inconsistent with the reasoning of the judgment, since the above act of the non-party 1, which is a feed price for which the damage caused by the negligence of the defendant 1, could not be recovered due to the cancellation of the right to collateral security, shall be deemed to be damage with the defendant's tort. However, because the balance of the feed payment remains as above, it did not exceed the credit management limit of the non-party 1.
The issue is that the plaintiff's association was supplied with the feed from the non-party 1, on the sole basis that the non-party 1 was supplied with the feed, and the non-party 1 did not immediately bear the obligation for the payment of the feed to the plaintiff's association. Thus, the non-party 1's failure to execute provisional attachment against the land limit owned by the non-party 1 cannot be used as a ground for offsetting negligence. However, if the non-party 1 was supplied with the feed from the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 bears the same obligation as the judgment of the court below, the plaintiff's association could have recovered part of the claim by provisional attachment against the non-party 1's creditor against the non-party 1 as the creditor against the non-party 1, or by provisional attachment against the non-party 1 who was already insolvent, and therefore it is not reasonable to deem the plaintiff's wrong to be a ground for offsetting negligence against the defendant's decoration.
Finally, even if there is negligence on the Plaintiff’s association with regard to the occurrence and expansion of the damages of this case, the ratio of comparative negligence by the lower court is excessively unreasonable. However, in light of the negligence of each Plaintiff’s association as seen above, the lower court’s comparative negligence ratio merely appears to be a minor, but cannot be deemed to be very heavy. Therefore, this part of the argument is without merit.
Therefore, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.
Justices Lee B-soo (Presiding Justice)