2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

This Court’s reasoning is as follows: (a) the reasoning for this Court’s explanation is the same as that for the first instance court’s decision, except for any addition under the following: (b) Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act; and (c) Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Judgment on the plaintiff's assertion

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) The assertion that it violates the principle of prohibition of comprehensive delegation of legislation and the principle of prohibition of excessive delegation.

Article 162 (1) 7 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act violates the limit of delegated legislation, and not only unfairly infringes on property rights, the right to trial, and the freedom of conscience against the excessive prohibition principle, but also the order that is null and void in violation of the principle of tax equality. Thus, the disposition of this case is unlawful.

2) The plaintiff's assertion that there are justifiable grounds for neglecting the plaintiff's duty

The lawsuit filed by the association members against the head of Seodaemun-gu and the lawsuit filed against the association of this case seeking confirmation of invalidity of the establishment of the association, and the lawsuit seeking revocation of the management and disposal plan against the association of this case is pending until the above judgment becomes final and conclusive. As such, there was no possibility for the Plaintiff to report and pay capital gains on the commencement date of expropriation, and there was no possibility for expectation for the Plaintiff to report and pay capital gains tax. Accordingly, there is justifiable reason that the Plaintiff may not be any violation of its duty to report and pay capital gains tax against the Plaintiff.

B. Determination

1) Determination as to the assertion that the principle of prohibition of comprehensive delegation of legislation and the principle of prohibition of excessive delegation is violated

A) Article 75 of the Constitution provides that "The President may issue Presidential Decrees with regard to the matters delegated to him/her with the specific scope of the Act," which provides the constitutional basis for delegated legislation, and at the same time provides for the specific scope of the delegation, the limitation of the delegation is to be predictability. In this case, "The possibility of prediction" means that anyone who is already provided for in the Act shall be able to predict the course of the contents to be provided for in the Presidential Decree, etc. from the relevant Act, etc., because the basic matters of the contents and scope that are already provided for in the Act are specifically provided for in the Presidential Decree, and the existence of such predictability shall not be determined with only the relevant specific provision, but shall be determined with an organic and systematic comprehensive determination of the whole relevant legal provisions. If it can be reasonably predicted when examining the specific and individual nature of each applicable Act and considering the legislative intent of the Act, it shall not deviate from the limit of delegation (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du9884, Oct. 26, 2007).

B) As to this case, Article 98 of the Income Tax Act, which is a delegation provision of the Enforcement Decree, stipulates that the time of acquisition and transfer of assets shall be the date of liquidation except for cases prescribed by Presidential Decree, such as where the date of liquidation is unclear, etc., and where the date of liquidation is unclear in its language, it may not be the base date of transfer margin. (2) The provisions of Article 98 of the Income Tax Act and Article 162 (1) 7 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act stipulate that the date of liquidation of the price may not become the base date of transfer margin in cases prescribed by Presidential Decree, such as where the date of liquidation is unclear, and that it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s provision of Article 162 (1) 7 of the Income Tax Act provides that the date of acquisition and transfer of assets, which are various standards within the system of the income tax law to exclude the taxpayer from arbitrary and uniformly understand taxable income and to interpret and apply the principle of fair taxation without inconsistency, it is difficult to see that the Plaintiff’s comprehensive provision of acquisition or transfer restriction of property rights, etc.

2) Determination as to the assertion that there are justifiable grounds for the Plaintiff’s neglect of duty

A) Under the tax law, where a taxpayer violates various obligations, such as a tax return and tax payment, without justifiable grounds, in order to facilitate the exercise of the right to impose taxes and the realization of a tax claim, a taxpayer’s intention and negligence is not considered, but does not constitute justifiable grounds that do not constitute a breach of duty (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2001Du4689, Nov. 13, 2002).

B) The following circumstances cited in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, which are acknowledged in full view of the overall purport of the arguments, are as follows: ① The association of this case deposited all the compensation determined by the decision of expropriation on March 17, 201, which was before March 18, 201, which was the first day of expropriation; the Plaintiff appears to have been aware of the circumstances regarding the decision of expropriation, such as filing a lawsuit seeking an increase in the compensation determined by the decision of expropriation; ② In the case of land expropriation for public services, the transfer of assets is confirmed due to the commencement of expropriation, and the right to claim compensation for landowners is finally established; ③ the Plaintiff’s report and payment of capital gains tax based on the compensation determined by the decision of expropriation commencement date, and ③ the Plaintiff’s request for correction can not be made to the chief of the competent tax office under the relevant provisions of the Framework Act on National Taxes, ④ the Plaintiff’s report and payment of capital gains tax cannot be viewed as a justifiable ground for the first day of expropriation or payment of land solely on the ground that the lawsuit seeking nullification or cancellation of the association establishment or management plan.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just in conclusion, and it is so decided as per Disposition.