2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants.

A. As to the real estate listed in the separate list, the sales contract concluded on February 18, 2010 between Defendant leapA and Non-Party Gangnam-OOOOOOOO (OOOOO) and Defendant leapB and Gangwon-CC concluded on October 29, 2010 respectively is revoked.

B. As to real estate listed in the separate sheet:

1) The registration of the establishment of a neighboring establishment that was completed under receipt No. 6391 of February 18, 2010 by the Seoul Southern District Court (OOO-OOOOOOOOOOOO) with the Gangwon Southern District Court (OO-OOOOOOOOO)

2) Defendant apA’s transfer registration that was completed on November 3, 201 by the receipt No. 45703 of the receipt of November 3, 201 to Defendant apB;

3) Defendant B’s transfer of ownership, which was completed on October 29, 2010 by the receipt No. 42257, with the Seoul Southern District Court Youngpool registry office (Seoul Southern District Court).

Each cancellation registration procedure shall be implemented.

2. Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The plaintiff's claim against the defendants is dismissed in entirety.

The court's reasoning for this case is that the court deleted "the third-party 3 on the judgment of the court of first instance (hereinafter "the contract of this case")", "the presumption of the third-party 4 on the judgment of the court of first instance", "the presumption of the third-party 4 on the judgment of the court of first instance", and "the presumption of the third-party 4 on the judgment of the court of first instance", and except for addition of the following judgments as to the matters alleged by the defendants in the court of first instance, the court of

2. Additional matters to be determined;

A. The defendants' assertion

1) The lack of intent to cause harm to the strongCC

A) The Gangnam did not know at all that the Plaintiff had the instant tax claim at the time of the establishment of the instant right to collateral security or at the time of the registration of transfer of ownership against Defendant YoonB. Therefore, the Gangnam at the time did not have any awareness that the Plaintiff reduced the security for the instant tax claim, and thus, the intent for deliberation cannot be recognized.

In other words, the strongCC, which is a part of the tax affairs, reported and paid the transfer income tax according to its calculation by trusting stuffs from a tax official who was known to the general public, and the circumstances that the additional transfer income tax will be imposed later due to the mistake of ParkD could not be anticipated at all. In collusion with ParkD, there was no reason to block illegal acts such as intentionally underreporting the transfer income tax and hiding the proceeds of real estate sales.

B) At the time of the establishment of the instant right to collateral security, Gangnam owned other active properties, such as approximately KRW OOOO and KRW OOOOO of the deposit of the new bank, and the instant apartment was not the sole property, and thus, it cannot be presumed that the strongCC’s intent to commit the instant act of establishing the instant right to collateral security was unreasonable.

In addition, in the process of purchasing the instant apartment after disposing of the instant transferred real estate, the KangCC paid only the down payment, and paid the intermediate payment to the Defendant leA, a large amount of OOOO and the remainder OOOOOOOOA in the process of purchasing the instant apartment, and Defendant leA was established and made the instant collateral security to secure the loan obligation. If the GangwonCC knew that the Plaintiff’s instant tax claim was due to the occurrence of the Plaintiff’s instant tax claim, it would be difficult to say that the instant apartment was registered for ownership transfer in the future of Defendant leA, which was fully paid for the first time, after acquiring the instant apartment in its own name, and did not take the form of establishing the instant collateral security with Defendant leA.

C) The strongCC did not have the awareness that it would dispose of the instant apartment at the time of selling the instant apartment to Defendant leB, and thus, it is not recognized that it had the intent of deception. In other words, as the Gangnam moved in the instant apartment around November 2010 to another place, Defendant leB, the actual owner of the intermediate payment and the remainder of the instant apartment, sells it to Defendant leB, which is that he was the same, and there was no perception that Gangnam only affixed the seal on the sales contract at the request of Defendant leB. At the time, the market price of the instant apartment was less than the amount of OOOO, which is the maximum debt amount of the instant mortgage, and thus, there was no need to complete the registration of ownership transfer with Defendant leB to prevent the instant tax claim.

2) The Defendants’ good faith

A) Defendant A was aware that the report and payment of capital gains tax managed solely by the Gangnam was terminated without any problem, and it was not always anticipated that the capital gains tax will be additionally imposed, and there was no awareness that it would prejudice the Plaintiff, who is a tax claim, and thus, at the time of the instant mortgage contract.

B) Defendant HaB also purchased the instant apartment from Defendant leB, Nice, that he would purchase because the instant apartment, and did not have any reason to have any interest in the payment of the transfer income tax of the Gangnam. As such, Defendant leB had acted in good faith at the time of the purchase of the instant apartment. Since Defendant leB was a woman of Defendant leB, which was the fluent of the GangwonCC, it cannot be said that there was a friendly personal relationship.

C) After that, Defendant HaB was unable to pay the purchase price and again completed the registration of ownership transfer of the instant apartment in the future of Defendant HaB. At the time, Defendant HaB thought that the instant apartment was in fact owned by itself, and there was no perception that Defendant HaB would prejudice the creditors of the GangwonCC. In addition, even though the Seoul Regional Tax Office had already been requested to vindicate the amount corresponding to Defendant HaB, even though there was no reason to transfer the instant apartment in its name without any reason to transfer the ownership under its own name, Defendant HaB would bring about the instant apartment, and thus, it is merely a receipt of the transfer of ownership.

B. Determination

○ For the following reasons, the Defendants’ above assertion is without merit.

1) In light of all the circumstances revealed in the instant argument, the strongCC’s intent to harm can be recognized.

A) Consumed legal principles

The so-called obligor’s bad faith, i.e., the obligor’s awareness that the obligor, as a subjective element of the obligee’s right of revocation, should not prejudice the obligee, that the obligor would not be able to fully satisfy the obligee’s claims because the obligor’s property is reduced by the obligor’s act of disposal of assets, and thus, the obligor’s joint security of claims is insufficient or joint security already insufficient is more deficient. Such recognition does not require awareness that it would compromise the obligee’s claims in relation to the general obligee (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da57320, May 12, 1998).

The intention of deception is that the debtor should not harm the creditor in doing a legal act. Here, "Dac" is sufficient not to refer to the intention or intent, but to the simple recognition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Da63102, Mar. 26, 2009). In determining the debtor's intention of deception, the circumstances at the time of the fraudulent act should be based on the circumstances at the time of the fraudulent act. However, in determining the existence of the intention of deception, other circumstances may be used as indirect facts in addition to other circumstances in determining the debtor's efforts to repay the debtor after the act alleged as fraudulent act and the attitude of the creditor (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2001Da57884, Dec. 12, 2003).

In addition, barring special circumstances, an obligor’s act of offering real estate owned by him/her to one of the creditors as collateral security constitutes a fraudulent act in relation to other creditors (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 97Da10864, Sept. 9, 197).

B) Determination

Therefore, in light of the aforementioned legal principles, the act of creating the instant right to collateral security against Defendant PapA constitutes a fraudulent act, and then selling the instant apartment to Defendant PapB again constitutes a fraudulent act by making the sale of the instant apartment to fall short of the joint collateral that had already been insufficient.

(5) The Defendants asserted that, in light of the fact that the Plaintiff’s 2nd anniversary of the fact that the Plaintiff’s 7th anniversary of the fact that the Plaintiff’s 7th anniversary of the purchase price of the instant real estate was not aware of the fact that there was no intention to do so at the time of the purchase and sale of the instant real estate, the Plaintiff’s 7th anniversary of the fact that the Plaintiff’s 7th anniversary of the purchase price of the instant real estate was the Plaintiff’s 0th anniversary of the purchase and sale of the instant real estate, and that the Plaintiff’s 2nd of the purchase and sale of the instant real estate was merely the Plaintiff’s 7th anniversary of the fact that the Plaintiff’s 2nd of the purchase and sale of the instant real estate, the Plaintiff’s 2nd of the purchase and sale of the instant real estate was merely the Plaintiff’s 1st of the 7th anniversary of the fact that the 2nd of the purchase and sale of the instant real estate, the Plaintiff’s 2nd of the purchase and sale of the said real estate.

Ultimately, this part of the defendants' assertion is without merit.

2) There is no sufficient evidence to acknowledge that the Defendants were bona fide.

In this case, the defendants' bad faith is presumed to be the beneficiary, and the defendants are responsible for proving the facts that they were bona fide. In light of all the circumstances described in the above Paragraph (1) above, it is still insufficient to acknowledge the facts that the defendants were bona fide, even if the defendants added up the descriptions or videos (including serial numbers) of the evidence Nos. 16-35, which were additionally submitted in the trial, to the court below, and there is sufficient evidence to acknowledge otherwise.

Therefore, this part of the defendants' assertion is without merit.

3. Conclusion

The judgment of the first instance is legitimate, and all appeals by the Defendants are dismissed as they are without merit.