beta
(영문) 서울고등법원 2013. 08. 22. 선고 2012나52702 판결

피고는 전득자에 불과하여 채무자의 증여행위가 사해행위에 해당함을 알지 못하고 채무의 변제를 받은 것으로 보임[국패]

Case Number of the immediately preceding lawsuit

Suwon District Court support 2012 Gohap20000 ( October 20, 2012)

Title

The defendant is merely a subsequent purchaser and is deemed to have received the repayment of the debt without knowing that the debtor's act of donation constitutes a fraudulent act.

Summary

In full view of the fact that the Defendant was merely a subsequent purchaser, and there is no circumstance to deem that the Defendant either knew of the act of donation between the beneficiary and the debtor, or knew of the debtor’s credit standing, etc., the Defendant appears to have received the repayment of the obligation with no knowledge of the debtor’s existence of fraudulent act.

Cases

2012Na52702 Revocation of Fraudulent Act

Plaintiff, Appellant

Korea

Defendant, appellant and appellant

Park AA

Judgment of the first instance court

Suwon District Court Decision 2012Gahap20000 decided June 20, 2012

Conclusion of Pleadings

July 11, 2013

Imposition of Judgment

August 22, 2013

Text

1. Revocation of a judgment of the first instance;

2. The plaintiff's primary claim is dismissed.

3. The plaintiff's conjunctive claim added in the trial is dismissed.

4. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

1. Purport of claim

A. The primary purport of the claim

1) The contract between the Defendant and BB is revoked on September 26, 201, concluded on September 26, 201.

2) The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 00% interest per annum with 5% interest per annum from the day following the day this judgment became final and conclusive to the day of complete payment.

B. Preliminary purport of the claim (the plaintiff added to the preliminary purport of the claim at the trial)

1) The contract of donation between the MediationCC and the BBB, which was concluded on March 7, 2011, is revoked.

2) The defendant shall pay the plaintiff 0% interest per annum to the plaintiff at the rate of 5% from the day following the day this judgment became final and conclusive to the day of complete payment.

2. Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

Reasons

1. Basic facts

A. Tax claims against the Plaintiff Company BB

“The Plaintiff, on March 8, 2011, notified the BB (hereinafter referred to as “BB”) to pay the OO members (the due date of December 31, 2010, and the due date of payment April 15, 2011) under the resolution to correct the value-added tax for the second period of February 2010, but BB did not pay the value-added tax by the time of the closing of argument in the trial. The value-added tax and additional dues are total OO members (the base date of January 4, 2012, hereinafter referred to as “value-added tax”). BB’s payment of the amount of money to BB’s ChoCC.

1) BB was deposited in one bank account (Account Number: O-OO-OO-OOOOOOOOOOO) in its name upon the request for correction of value-added tax on the first half of January 2008 from February 18, 201 to 2010 (revision due to a decrease in sales due to termination of a contract during the taxable period from January 2008 to January 1, 201).

2) On March 7, 2011, BB withdrawn OOOO from the account of the above Han Bank from 11 cashier’s checks (for example, five OOOOs and six OOss) to BB’s joint representative director.

(c) Payment of money to the Defendant by the Mediation Committee;

On September 26, 201, 201, ChoCC paid 6 copies of the cashier's checks of OOOOOO (one set of OOO-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O

(d) A new apartment construction project, etc. in BB;

"1) BB entered into a contract for construction works (hereinafter referred to as the “instant contract”) with the FF Motor Sales Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the “FF Motor Sales Co., Ltd.) around December 2007, while promoting the instant project as OOOE apartment construction project (hereinafter referred to as the “instant project”) of OOOE apartment 391-12 OO2, OO2, OO2, OO2, and BB entered into a contract for construction works of the instant project with the FF Motor Sales Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the “FF Motor Sales Co., Ltd.”), and after BB was unable to pay the construction costs under the instant contract due to the above apartment unsold housing unsold, etc., on March 19, 2010, while BB was unable to pay the construction costs under the instant contract due to the above apartment unsold housing unsold, etc.

BB shall faithfully implement the following matters as a contractor and owner of the project after the conclusion of this Agreement:

1) Issuance of tax invoices in the name of BB following the sale and cancellation re-sale of apartment and commercial buildings;

(ii) applications for extension of the period of time to the National Bank PF lines (ABCP) and part payments and cooperation therein;

(iii) consent to re-sale on the terms and conditions presented by FF Motor Vehicle Sales at the time of unsold parcels and cancellation households;

(iv) application for approval of use and implementation of and cooperation in the work relating thereto;

(v) the implementation of the BB’s business relating to the preservation registration;

(vi) conclusion of contracts (other than cost-bearing) and issuance of tax invoices with the exercise of sale units;

8) Conclusion of a security trust upon completion of the preservation registration.

9) Following the conclusion of this Agreement, the FF Motor Vehicle Sales's consent to provide BB's employee identification cards (including 10 copies of a certificate of seal imprint, additional provision, and if necessary later) for the business progress until the immediately affixed seal and the final settlement of the business account at the time of request for the BB's official seal imprint for the business progress.

10) Performance of the operations of BB under other construction contracts and loan agreements;

(xi)proactive cooperate in notarial procedures upon the conclusion of this Agreement;

Article 2(Liability for FF Motor Vehicle Sales)

The FF Motor Vehicle Sales shall faithfully implement the following matters as the contractor of the Project after the conclusion of this Agreement:

(i)the cost-bearing for the shortage of project costs;

(ii)the selection and placement of sales agents, such as the sale of buildings in units, the management of contractors, and the occupancy management;

(iii)the implementation of, and the cooperation in, the new project approval and any related work;

(iv)the performance of the FF Motor Vehicle Sales operations under other construction contracts and loan agreements;

(v)proactive cooperate in notarial procedures upon the conclusion of this Agreement;

Article 3 (Management of Value-Added Tax)

1) BB shall deposit an OOO (OOO) out of value-added taxes refunded by the time of the preparation of this Agreement into the Project Operation Account (National Bank) at the same time as this Agreement is concluded, and the amount shall be used as expenses (the purchase balance of state-owned land, the amount borne by sewage burden, etc.) incurred in the Project.

(ii)The report of value-added tax arising in connection with the project after the conclusion of this Agreement with respect to the obligation to report and pay value-added tax held by BB on the project shall be made BB, and the payment to BB shall be made by FF car sales when BB requests the FF car sales to pay the value-added tax together with the documentary evidence of value-added tax.

3) BB shall take measures to report immediately after the conclusion of this Agreement to the tax office having jurisdiction over the seat of BB so that all of the value-added taxes refunded after the conclusion of this Agreement can be deposited into the business operation account.

Article 4 (Agreement)

1) BB and FF Motor Vehicle Sales shall be conducted in good faith upon the conclusion of this Agreement, and FF Motor Vehicle Sales shall recognize the amount of value-added tax (OOO) already refunded by BB except the OOO referred to in paragraph 1 of Article III as the proceeds of the business of BB, with the original CLR that B shall implement the contents of this Agreement on a good faith basis.

2) BB is unable to claim any proceeds from the project other than those in paragraph 1, and FF Motor Vehicle Sales will take charge of substantial progress of the project, such as execution and sale of funds, for the completion of the project.

[Ground for recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 1, 2, Gap evidence 4-2, Gap evidence 5-1, 2, Gap evidence 6, 7, 8, 9, Gap evidence 17-1 through 5, Eul evidence 6, 7, Eul evidence 8-1, Eul evidence 28, Eul evidence 28, Eul evidence 28, the purport of the whole pleadings and arguments.

2. Judgment as to the main claim

The plaintiff sought the cancellation of the above donation contract and the recovery therefrom on the premise that BB donated OOD to the defendant. However, BB withdrawn OO and paid it to the Mediation Committee. Since the fact that CCC paid OOOD to the defendant through its wife KimD is recognized in the above basic facts, the plaintiff's primary claim based on a different relation is without merit.

3. Judgment on the conjunctive claim

(a)the existence of preserved claims;

1) Determination

According to the facts acknowledged earlier, this case’s value-added tax claim is a preserved claim that can exercise creditor’s right to revoke with respect to the payment of money to BB CC on December 31, 2010.

2) The defendant's assertion and judgment

A) Defendant’s assertion

(1) BB transferred all the rights under the instant project to FF car sales through the instant settlement agreement, and recognized OOO as proceeds from the instant settlement agreement. The value-added tax imposed in relation to the instant project after the instant settlement agreement was determined to be paid by FF car sales. According to the aforementioned agreement, around October 2010, BB transferred the apartment housing unsold households in the instant project to GGG, etc., and received the payment of the FF car sales in full, including value-added tax, by transferring the apartment housing unsold households in the instant project to FF car sales. Accordingly, the instant liability to pay value-added tax is against FF

(2) Article 41 of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that if the business is transferred or acquired and the business is insufficient to cover the national taxes, additional dues and expenses for disposition on default on the business for which the transferor's tax liability becomes final and conclusive prior to the date of transfer as the property of the transferor, the transferee of the business prescribed by Presidential Decree shall be liable to pay the second tax within the limit of the value of the property acquired by the transferor. However, if BB transfers all of the business rights of this case to the FF car sales because it constitutes "where the business under Article 41 of the Framework Act on National Taxes is transferred or acquired", the obligation to pay

(1) Around December 2007, BB, implementing the instant business, entered into the instant contract with FF Motor Vehicle Sales, BB and FF Motor Vehicle Sales, through the instant settlement agreement, and thereafter, FF Motor Vehicle Sales is in charge of funding, sales, approval of business, etc., and BB determined that BB will take charge of the issuance of tax invoices as the owner of the instant business, consent and cooperation with the FF Motor Vehicle Sales, application for approval of use, preservation registration, etc. In addition, if BB makes a request for payment along with evidentiary documents, the fact that BB determined that the FF Motor Vehicle Sales will pay the purchase price under the name of FFO 9, and that it will include HO 20,000, 200, 100, 100, 100, 100, 201, 10, 201, 200, 200, 200, 201, 200, 10, 201.

However, in light of the following circumstances revealed by the facts acknowledged earlier, i.e., BB appears to have maintained its position as the contractor and owner after the instant settlement agreement, and the agreement on value-added tax among the settlement agreement in the instant settlement agreement appears to have been merely the purport of performing the payment in the event BB makes a payment request between BB and FF car sales, it is difficult for the legal obligor to be deemed to be BB, and thus, it is difficult for the said recognition alone to view that the instant tax liability for value-added tax exists in the FF car sales.

(2) Furthermore, this paper examines whether FFF Motor Vehicle Sales is subject to secondary tax liability.

Article 22 of the Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that the transferee of the business as prescribed by the Framework Act on National Taxes shall be a person who comprehensively succeeds to all the rights (excluding rights related to amounts receivable) and all all the obligations (excluding obligations related to unpaid amounts) with respect to the business of this case by workplace. Thus, as to whether BB and FF Motor Sales succeed to all the rights and obligations relating to the business of this case, health care shall be provided. Although BB and FF Motor Sales were to perform major duties related to the business of this case in FF Motor Sales under the settlement agreement of this case, but BB agreed to perform the principal duties related to the business of this case, but upon the agreement of this case, upon the agreement of this case, it is recognized as above, that BB concurrently assumes the duty of the owner as an executor and owner with respect to the business of this case.

As claimed by the Defendant, even if FF Motor Vehicle Sales bears the secondary tax liability as claimed by the Defendant, the FFF Motor Vehicle Sales does not extinguish the BB tax liability, which is the original taxpayer. Therefore, the Defendant’s assertion is without merit.

(b) The intention to commit fraudulent acts and to injure himself;

1) Relevant legal principles

A) In order for a debtor's act of disposing of property to become a fraudulent act, the act must cause a decrease in the debtor's whole property and thus, the debtor's small property should be more than the active property. In other words, the debtor's active property should be more than the active property. Even if the debtor's total property exceeds the creditor's claim amount due to real estate claims among his/her active property at the time of disposing of the property, the calculation of the active property should be excluded from the active property that has no real property value and cannot serve as a joint security for the claim, unless there are any other special circumstances. If the property is a claim, it shall be included in the active property only where it is confirmed reasonably by determining whether it is certain to receive repayment easily (see Supreme Court Decision 201Da32533, Oct. 12, 2001).

B) Meanwhile, if a debtor donated his/her own property to another person under excess of his/her obligation, such act would constitute a fraudulent act unless there are special circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da57320, May 12, 1998). The debtor’s intent to commit suicide is presumed (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Da41875, Apr. 24, 2001).

2) Determination as to whether the debt exceeds the debt

In light of the above legal principles, it is examined as to whether BB was in excess of its obligation at the time of payment to the MediationCC on March 7, 2011.

In addition to the above evidence evidence BB’s statement and the whole purport of the pleading, it can be acknowledged that there were real estate (OO also 389-12 parcels of land 389-5, 2000) equivalent to the market value of OB as active property of BB around March 7, 201, and that there was OB in the notice amount of value-added tax as small property. Meanwhile, according to the settlement agreement of this case, it is acknowledged that BB agreed to pay the value-added tax on the business of this case as FF car sales in accordance with the above facts, it is difficult to view that BB had a claim equivalent to the value-added tax and the equivalent amount of 200 BB’s debt sales in the FF car sales. However, it is difficult to view that BB had been 10% of the total amount of value-added tax to be paid by the FF 210,000,0000 won which was not paid by the FF 210,201.

(3) The nature of money paid by BB to CC

A)Judgment

In other words, the following circumstances revealed by the facts recognized earlier, the instant business is the only business of BB, and BB determined that all of the value-added tax refunded after the conclusion of the instant settlement agreement can be deposited into the operating account of the instant business, and that it cannot be asserted that the value-added tax already refunded cannot be claimed other than OOB from among the value-added tax already refunded, so it could not be anticipated that there was any revenue in BB after the said agreement, and BB could not have been actually performed on or around March 7, 201, and CB could not have been engaged in the business, and CB could not have been deemed to have been involved in the business of BB, other than the donation, and it is reasonable to deem BB to have paid OO to CCC on March 7, 2011.

B) The defendant's assertion and judgment as to it

(1) The defendant's assertion

(A) The above money was paid by BB to CC, and its details are as follows.

(B) A retirement allowance that a conciliationCC has to receive from BB is an OO employee. Around July 1, 2010, it reported that it received OOO employee while conducting interim settlement of the retirement allowance. However, the retirement allowance actually received at the time of OOO employee’s time was paid as an officetel No. 3 B B, 2010, and on November 4, 2010, the total amount of OO employee paid approximately 40 square meters for OO employee’s land. A short-term rental OO employee of Article 6-7 set-off against some of the retirement allowances was not loans, but paid for the instant business (i.e., partial payment) as retirement allowance paid to O employee as set-off by accounting practices around March 17, 2010 (i.e., partial payment of retirement allowances).

(2) Determination

In addition to the above evidence evidence Gap evidence No. 11, Gap evidence No. 12-1, and the whole purport of the arguments and arguments, it can be acknowledged that the retirement benefit of the MediationCC is a retirement benefit that is to be paid to the Mediation Committee except for the source-specific tax amount, and the retirement benefit that is to be paid to the Mediation Committee is set off against the short-term loans provided to the Mediation Committee. BB sets off a part of the above retirement benefit against the Mediation Committee, and paid all the amount of the retirement benefit to the Mediation Committee on September 17, 2010 and the amount of the OOO on November 4, 2010.

The defendant asserts that the monthly salary of the MediationCC is 4 years, since the monthly salary of the Mediation Committee is 00,000 won and the continuous service year is 4 years, based on the evidence No. 12-2 (BB's retirement allowance payment provision for officers, and the retirement allowance for officers is determined by multiplying the amount of wages for the 4 months immediately preceding the retirement by the number of years of continuous service and weight, and the representative director is 5.0).

In light of the fact that the first instance court witness evidence 12-2 is insufficient to view that the first instance court witness witness's testimony alone constitutes the Plaintiff's retirement allowance claim against the first instance court's director or retirement allowance claim against the first instance court's employee, and that the second instance court's claim against the first instance court's employee is insufficient to view that the second instance court's claim against the first instance court's employee's retirement allowance claim against the second instance court's employee is insufficient to view that the second instance court's claim against the first instance court's employee's retirement allowance against the second instance court's employee's employee's retirement allowance claim against the second instance court's employee's employee's employee's retirement allowance claim against the second instance court's employee's employee's employee's retirement claim against the second instance court's employee's employee's employee's retirement claim against the second instance court's employee's employee's employee's employee's retirement claim against the second instance court's employee's employee's employee's retirement claim against the second instance's employee's employee's retirement claim.

4) Sub-determination

Therefore, it is reasonable to see BB’s donation of OOO to ChoCC in excess of its obligation as fraudulent act, and it is presumed that BB’s intent is presumed, and the Defendant’s bad faith is presumed to be the subsequent purchaser. Therefore, the gift contract between BB and ChoCC concluded on March 7, 2011 should be revoked, barring any special circumstance, and since the check donated to ChoCC was deposited into the Defendant’s account, the Defendant, the subsequent purchaser, who is the subsequent purchaser, shall return the amount equivalent to the value thereof, and the Plaintiff may seek direct payment to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Defendant is obligated to pay the Plaintiff the OOO and its delay damages.

4. Judgment on the defendant's defense

In this regard, the defendant alleged that BB's act was not known as a fraudulent act, and thus, examined.

Considering the aforementioned evidence, Eul evidence, Eul evidence Nos. 3, Eul evidence Nos. 4-1, and Eul evidence Nos. 4-2, and some testimony of ChoCC by witnesses of the trial party, the ChoCC purchased the above Nos. 102, and 301 in the name of OO-si on October 2009, and requested the defendant to lend the balance to the defendant on or around Feb. 9, 2010, which is the remaining payment date. The defendant was merely aware of the fact that the defendant knew or could not have known that the defendant had received the above Nos. 200, 2010, 2010, 2000, 2000, 2000, 2000, 2000, 2000, 200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,00,000).

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's main claim and the conjunctive claim added in the trial of the case are all dismissed as it is without merit. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is unfair as it is concluded differently, the plaintiff's main claim is dismissed. The plaintiff's conjunctive claim added in the trial of the court of first instance is also dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.