The plaintiff's appeal and the defendant's remaining appeal are dismissed.

1. As to the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal as to Article 1 of the collective agreement

Examining the reasoning and records of the lower judgment, Article 1 of the instant collective agreement is the only labor organization that only the Plaintiff, who directly concluded a collective agreement with an employer as an industrial unit trade union, is able to conduct collective bargaining, and it is evident that any other labor organization is not recognized. Therefore, this is in violation of Articles 5 and 29(1) of the Trade Union Act by infringing the workers’ right to organize and join a trade union and the right to collective bargaining, and the purport of the said provision is merely the Plaintiff’s organization that represents the Plaintiff’s members.

In the same purport, the court below rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion on the interpretation of Article 1 of the collective agreement of this case, and held that the Defendant’s corrective order was lawful on the ground that the above provision violated Articles 5 and 29(1) of the Trade Union Act. In so doing, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the interpretation of the collective agreement provisions or the validity of the agreement provisions of the

2. As to the grounds of appeal by the plaintiff and the defendant as to Article 13(3), the former part of the proviso to Article 14, Article 16(1), and Article 81(2) of the collective agreement of the court below

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s corrective order was unlawful on the ground that Article 13(3) of the instant collective agreement providing for the payment of wages to full-time officers violates Article 24(2), (4), and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union Act, and thus, the Defendant’s corrective order is legitimate, but the proviso to Article 14 of the instant collective agreement providing for the treatment of the full-time officer when a member takes full-time office of the public office of an organization recognized as a labor-management agreement, etc.

Furthermore, on the grounds stated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s corrective order was lawful on the ground that Article 16(1) of the instant collective agreement and Article 81(2) of the instant collective agreement, which provided a trade union with a place, facility, or transportation means for a union member in operating a consumption cooperative (store) in which the employer provided a business-use vehicle for union activities and the vehicle maintenance and management expenses, include an act of assisting operating expenses corresponding to unfair labor practices as provided by the main sentence of Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union Act. Examining the records in light of the relevant legal principles, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to the act of providing wages or operating expenses for union workers who are prohibited

3. As to the grounds of appeal by the plaintiff and the defendant as to Articles 9 and 10 of the collective agreement of the court below and the latter part of the proviso of Article 14

A. Article 9 of the collective agreement of the court below

The lower court determined that the Defendant’s corrective order is lawful on the ground that Article 24(4) of the Trade Union Act and Article 81 subparag. 4 proviso of the former part of the Trade Union Act provide that each of the provisions of the former part of Article 24(4) and the former part of Article 81 subparag. 4 shall not be an employee, but an employee, including the full-time officer, is entitled to the exemption of working hours. However, Article 9 of the instant collective agreement does not limit the hours during which a union member or negotiating member is allowed to engage in a paid trade union activity within the limits of the exemption of working hours as prescribed by Article 24(4) of the Trade Union Act and it violates Article 24(

Examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, the above determination by the court below is just, and contrary to the Plaintiff’s grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal principles on the system of duty hours exemption under Article 24(4) of the Trade Union

B. Article 10 of the collective agreement of the court below

The lower court, pursuant to Article 24(4) of the Trade Union Act, where a trade union activity of a non-exclusive union-affiliated union constitutes affairs prescribed by the Trade Union Act or other Acts, such as consultation with an employer, negotiation, settlement of grievances, and industrial safety activities, and affairs related to the maintenance and management of a trade union for the sound development

Although it is permitted within the limit of working hours and such case does not constitute unfair labor practices, the Defendant’s act of labor union activities between non-permanent union and non-permanent union pursuant to Article 10 of the collective agreement of this case is deemed to have worked hours of labor union activities between non-permanent union and non-permanent union pursuant to Article 10 of the collective agreement of this case, and the Defendant’s order of correction as to the above provision is unlawful, under the premise that it does not constitute unfair labor

However, according to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, Article 10 of the collective agreement of this case permits time during which non-exclusive union members can work as a paid trade union within the limit of the exemption of working hours under Article 24(4) of the Trade Union Act, and such time exceeds the limit of the exemption of working hours under Article 24(4) and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union Act. Thus, the defendant is in violation of Article 24(4) of the Trade Union Act, and the court below added the violation of the provision on the exemption of working hours under Article 24(4) of the Trade Union Act as the ground for corrective order

Nevertheless, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s corrective order against Article 10 of the collective agreement of this case was unlawful solely for the reasons indicated in its holding. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on Article 24(4) and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union Act without exhaust all necessary deliberations, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The Defendant’s ground of

C. The latter part of the proviso to Article 14 of the collective agreement

According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, the latter part of the proviso of Article 14 of the instant collective agreement recognizing the appointment of a superior organization, etc. of a non-exclusive executive officer does not limit the hours during which a non-exclusive executive officer may act as a paid senior organization, etc. within the limit of the exemption of working hours under Article 24(4) of the Trade Union Act and permits it to exceed this limit. Thus, the said provision should be deemed to be in violation of Article 24(4) and Article 8

Therefore, although the reasoning of the court below is inappropriate, the decision of the court below that the latter part of the proviso to Article 14 of the collective agreement of this case violates Article 24(4) and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union Act and thus the defendant's corrective order is legitimate is just. Contrary to the plaintiff's ground of appeal, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the working hours exemption system of Article 24(4)

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment below regarding Article 10 of the collective agreement of this case is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The plaintiff's appeal and the defendant's remaining appeal are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Byung-hee

Justices Kim In-bok

Justices Kwon Soon-il