2014Na19907 (Consolidated) Confirmation of the existence of obligations due to copyright

2014Na19914 (Consolidated) Confirmation of the existence of obligations due to copyright

2014Na19921 (Counterclaim)

(1) It is confirmed that there is no liability for damages arising from the infringement of the copyright of the computer program in attached Form 3 by the remaining plaintiffs (Counterclaim defendants) against the defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff).

(2) All of the counterclaim claims filed by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) against the remainder of the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) are dismissed.

2. All appeals filed by the Defendant (Counterclaim Defendant) against the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) are dismissed.

3. The total cost of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) through the principal lawsuit and the counterclaim.

[Lawsuit] The judgment confirming that there is no liability for damages related to the infringement of the computer program copyright of the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant, hereinafter "the plaintiff") against the defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff, hereinafter "the plaintiff") (the plaintiff is seeking confirmation that there is no liability for damages due to the infringement of the computer program copyright of the attached Table 3 (the plaintiff is seeking confirmation that there is no liability for damages due to the infringement of the computer program copyright of the plaintiff (the plaintiff is not the direct infringement of the computer program copyright of the plaintiff), but the defendant changed his claim to seek employer liability due to the infringement of the computer program copyright of his employee, not the infringement of the plaintiff's computer program copyright in the process of the lawsuit, and the plaintiffs also proceed with the lawsuit on this premise. Accordingly, the damages claim for confirmation of the absence of the plaintiffs is not the direct damage liability of the plaintiff

[Counterclaim] The plaintiffs shall pay 20% interest per annum to the defendant at the rate of 20% per annum from the day after a copy of the counterclaim of this case was served on the corresponding amount as stated in the attached claim No. 2 and the day of complete payment.

Purport of appeal

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[2] The judgment of the court of first instance is modified as follows. The plaintiffs' liability for damages with respect to the plaintiffs' infringement of computer program copyright against the defendant is confirmed to be in excess of 5% per annum from September 26, 2013 to September 26, 2013 to the judgment of the court of first instance, and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment. The plaintiffs shall pay to the defendant the amount corresponding to the amount of appeal in attached Form 2 to the amount of the defendant and the amount equivalent to 5% per annum from September 26, 2013 to the judgment of the court of first instance from the next day to the date of full payment, and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

A. Case summary

In this case, the plaintiffs and employees, including the plaintiff and the plaintiff, who are employees, including the plaintiff and the plaintiff et al., seek confirmation that there was no liability for damages based on employer's liability against the defendant, by asserting that there was no infringement of the defendant's right of reproduction of the defendant's computer program. As a counterclaim, the defendant asserts that employees infringed the right of reproduction by installing and using the defendant's computer program with respect to the management of affairs without permission, and sought compensation and payment of damages based on employer's liability pursuant to Article 756 of the Civil Act. The judgment of the court of first instance accepted all of the main claims of the plaintiff No. 55, Korea No. Ss. S. Co., Ltd. and the plaintiff's remainder of the main claims and the defendant's remainder of the main claims against the plaintiff, and the remainder of the defendant's remainder of the main claims against the plaintiff, the defendant's remainder of the counterclaim, the defendant's remainder of the counterclaim, the defendant's remainder of the counterclaim, and the defendant's remainder of the appeal against the defendant et al.

B. Facts that are commonly premised on the principal lawsuit and counterclaim

(Evidence-1, 2, 4, and 18-1, 18-1, 1-2, 2, 3, 4-2-2, 3, 5, 21, 33, 35-1 through 92, 36-1, 94 (the plaintiff's evidence concerning the plaintiffs' IP address and MAC address (21, 36-1, 36-1, 94) are not admissible since the defendant used and collected personal information in violation of the Act on the Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc., providing that the period of possession and use of personal information should be notified and obtained from the plaintiffs or individual users, and it constitutes unlawful collection evidence collected without consent of 1, 2, 3, 4-2-2, 3-2, 3, 3, 35-2, 35-1, 36-1, 36, 94, 94, 94, 97, 961, , 94, 2, etc.).

(1) The Defendant is a company for software development, etc., and the Plaintiffs are the users of individual employees using computer program works in attached Form 3, which the Defendant has copyright.

(2) Since around 2003, the Defendant’s computer program work (open) developed “E”, which is a computer program that provides a computer screen to a computer user, and offered copyright to the user free of charge before E6.7 B transferred the author’s property right related to E to C, and C transferred the author’s property right to the Defendant on April 1, 2012. The Defendant registered the program with the Defendant as the author. CE was operated from 6.7 on February 5, 2012 to 7.0 on but was operated free of charge from 7.0 on but only for non-commercial and personal use, and in other cases, it was changed to a fee for use.

(D) E was started on August 23, 2012, 7.5, 7.0, 8.0, 15, 2013, 8.1, 8.1, 2013, 8.5, 8.5, 13, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as “E-charge” from 7.0 to 8.5, 2013).

(3) As a result of collecting information on IP addresses and MAC address information of a computer using a paid server, if a program user takes a creative verification server asking whether the user consents to the license agreement terms and conditions, including the collection of data such as network information, etc., and if the user installs and implements a paid server, the user’s IP address (IPSs and identification addresses assigned to communicate with each other on computer network) and the MAC address (MAC address (MACres and network equipment installed on computer network). The network equipment installed in the network equipment, such as a computer, has a unique address, and each computer has a MA address, so that each computer can be identified through the MAC address, and the number of MA devices assigned by the Defendant from the MA212 to the Plaintiff is assigned from the MA412.21.

(4) Division of the Plaintiff Han Han-sung Bank Co., Ltd.

On July 2, 2014, the plaintiff Han-il divided the company by the human division method pursuant to the provisions of Article 530-2 to Article 530-11 of the Commercial Act, and established a new company, and changed the name of the existing company to the plan for the resolution of the resolution of the merger, and the plan for the resolution of the resolution of the resolution of the merger of Han-il, a new company, succeeded to the rights and obligations concerning the lawsuit

2. Issues of the instant case

A. Whether the Defendant’s employees installed and implemented the Defendant’s E-Commission War

B. Whether an employee of the Plaintiffs infringed the right of reproduction in the course of installing the E-Commission digital disc on the computer’s hard disc

C. Whether the Plaintiffs’ employees infringed the right of reproduction by means of temporary storage in the course of executing the E-VV

(1) Whether reproduction is made by temporary storage in the course of the implementation of the E-Commission transfer

(2) Whether it constitutes temporary reproduction in the course of using a copyrighted work (whether it is exempted under the Copyright Act)

D. Whether the Plaintiffs’ liability for damages is established based on the Plaintiffs’ employer’s liability (whether the individual program user’s liability is established due to the infringement of copyright)

E. Whether liability for damages based on tort caused by deception by the plaintiffs was established

A. Whether the Defendant’s employee established and implemented the Defendant’s E-Commission war [Defendant’s assertion]

The defendant asserts that the plaintiffs' employees reproduced E-pays on company computers and used them for business purposes.

【Counterclaim of Plaintiffs】

The plaintiffs asserted that even if the plaintiffs' employees used the E-Commission transfer to the company computer, it cannot be readily concluded that they used it for business purposes.

[Judgment]

(1) In full view of the overall purport of the arguments in evidence (Evidence B 28, B 29-1 to 8, B 30-1 to 6, B 31-1 and B-2), E-paid program can be acknowledged as a computer program used to capture necessary parts, such as reports, proposals, press data, planning data, pictures, pictures, videos, video images, etc., to be used in preparation of promotional materials, or to edit closed images, etc. in the company’s business.

(2) According to the above facts and the above facts of recognition, according to the Defendant’s performance of the E-Commission transfer.

A certified IP address collected automatically and assigned to the rest of the plaintiffs can be used for personal purposes. In addition, E-V may be used for personal purposes. However, it is widely used in the process of preparing reports, proposals, press data, planning documents, promotional materials, etc. in the company, and the use of E-V transfer by individual employees is close to the rest of the plaintiffs' businesses in time and location, and is in close relation to the whole or part of the employees' affairs.

In light of these circumstances, barring special circumstances, it can be ratified that the employees of the remaining plaintiffs have installed E-Commission diskss on the hard disks of the company’s office-based computer and used them for business purposes.

On the other hand, the defendant asserts that the employees of the plaintiff Nomlue and Han Lins also installed the E-mail on the hard disks of the company's computer, and used it.

However, according to evidence (B 35-16, B 36-16, B 41-1), a certified IP address (211.45.67) claimed by the defendant to be assigned to the plaintiff Nomlue is allocated to the plaintiff Nomlue, and a certified IP address (211.40.67) is divided into the plaintiff Nomlue Holdings and the plaintiff Nomlue Plue, around 2006.

However, this fact alone is insufficient to readily conclude that an authorized IP address collected by the defendant was allocated to the Plaintiff Nohym, not the Plaintiff Nohym (a trade name after the change of Nohym Holdings). There is no other evidence to acknowledge it. There is no evidence to acknowledge that the Defendant’s authorized IP address (2.2. 2. 2, 2105) claimed to have been allocated to Plaintiff Han Pym. The Defendant’s above assertion is reasonable within the scope of recognition (not, but, as seen earlier, it cannot be deemed as infringing the Defendant’s right of reproduction even if the employee’s above act infringed the Defendant’s right of reproduction, even if the employee’s fee-charging was installed in the Plaintiff Nohym, Han Pym, and Han Pym Co., Ltd, and used the fee-charging on the Plaintiff’s Hym drive in the course of installing it on the computer’s Hym drive (the Defendant’s assertion).

The defendant asserts that the reproduction in a normative sense protected under the Copyright Act should be distinguished from the act of storage in a simple computer disc in a technical sense, so only when it arrives at the time when the E-paid computer can be actually used, the reproduction under the Copyright Act is completed. Even if individual employees agreed to use the E-paid computer only for non-business or individual use before the completion of the E-paid computer reproduction, the act of reproduction in the E-paid computer constitutes an act of infringing the defendant's right of reproduction.

【Counterclaim of Plaintiffs】

The plaintiffs, regardless of the will of individual employees, are reproduced by the computer of individual employees according to the orders of the defendant, regardless of the intention of individual employees, and only after the e-fee was reproduced on the computer of individual employees, ask whether they agree to the license terms and conditions for use. Therefore, the plaintiffs' employees did not reproduce the e-mails without the defendant's permission, but rather obtain the defendant's permission, which is the copyright holder, and thus the reproduction was made. Thus, the defendant's right of reproduction is not infringed.

[Judgment]

(1) In full view of the overall purport of the arguments in evidence (A6-1, 2, 3, 4, 11-1, 2, 3, 27-1-2, 70, 28-1-24, 7, 14, 22-1-1, 17, 32-1, 32-5) and the whole purport of the arguments, the following facts can be acknowledged.

(A) In the status of E 6.7 Bber installed, it appears that E 6.7 Bber starts with a new Bber, and regardless of the leakage of the confirmer, E-user’s temporary route of the user’s computer, regardless of the leakage of the checker, E-user’s user’s hard disc automatically downloads, and then, the program is installed on the Hone disc, and then the program is installed on the Hone disc, and then the program is connected with the L/C terms and conditions of the L/C including the license agreement (attached Form 5), and the user finally completes the checker installation, and the user can use the E-V in the computer.

B) The original text to ask whether or not you agree to the License Terms and Conditions for E-Vs shall be used only for the terms and conditions, non-business use, and personal use in the case of 7.00 but also for the case of E-Vs. In the case of E-Vs, I will use the license terms and conditions only for the non-business use, non-business use, and personal use in the 7.5 Band 8.0 Band to use the license terms and conditions. However, I will use the license terms and conditions for business in 8.1 Band 8.5 Band to use them at non-business places and for non-business use, non-business use, and non-commercial and private use. However, the license buyers were not related to this content.

(2) Article 16 of the Copyright Act provides that "the author shall have the right to reproduce his/her work." Article 2 subparagraph 22 of the Copyright Act provides that "the reproduction" means the temporary or permanent fixing or remaking of a tangible object by means of printing, photographing, copying, sound or visual recording, or other means, and in the case of a building, the reproduction of a work refers to the act of constructing it in accordance with the models or design plans for the construction of the building. As such, under the current Act, the term "the reproduction of a work" refers to the act of fixing or remaking a work on a tangible object temporarily or permanently to the extent sufficient to recognize the content and form of the work, or sufficient to recognize it, and the act of storing a file of a computer program in a storage device, such as a hard disc, constitutes reproduction as provided under the Copyright Act.

According to the above premise facts and the above facts, if an individual user of a computer executes E 6.7 BV installed at the E 6.7 BV, it appears that “I start to start to start to start to e.I.C.,” and regardless of the completion of the verification pressing, EF will automatically download on the HV disc, a tangible object, as temporary route of the user’s computer, regardless of the user’s user’s computer, and then, if the confirmation server is short, the EV is installed on the HV disc, and the EV will proceed with the work. Upon completion of the work, the door asking whether the user consents to the LV terms and conditions, and the installation of the EF disc is completed by completing the EF’s use of the EM. Therefore, the installation of the EF disc disc is completed.

However, in the course of the business of a fee-charging, the installation of an individual user’s fee-charging shall be deemed to have been made according to a software use agreement including the Defendant’s license for the reproduction of the E-user’s computer through a window asking whether the Defendant consents to the license terms and conditions of the E-user’s license. Furthermore, if the reproduction of the E-user is completed by being self-fixed on the H-user’s computer storage device through the installation of a fee-charging, it cannot be deemed that the infringement of the right of reproduction of the act of installing the E-user’s fee-charging on the H-user’s hard disc after the completion of reproduction beyond the scope of the license for use stipulated in the license agreement including the license for use between the Defendant and the Defendant. Therefore, even if an individual user used the E-user’s license beyond the scope of the license agreement at the time of installation of the E-V disc, it cannot be deemed that the user’s act constitutes an infringement of the user’s right of reproduction on the individual user’s own license agreement even if it did not constitute an infringement of the user’s obligation.

After all, the defendant's fee E-V is based on the permission agreement entered into with the individual employer.

It is merely a reproduction on the hard disc, which is a storage device of an individual user’s computer, and it cannot be deemed that the individual user infringed the right of reproduction prior to payment. The defendant’s above assertion is without merit.

C. Whether the Defendant’s employee infringed the Defendant’s right of reproduction by means of temporary storage in the course of executing the E-VV

(1) Whether reproduction is made by temporary storage in the course of the implementation of the E-Commission transfer

【Defendant’s Claim】

The defendant asserts that when the program is carried out on a computer, part of the program was temporarily stored in luminouss (RAM, Random Acs) within the individual user's computer, and that the plaintiffs' employees were temporarily reproduced by fixing part of the E-pays to tangible objects in implementing the program for the purpose of business use.

[Dissenting of the plaintiffs] The plaintiffs are entitled to make a reply as follows. In the case of a computer program already installed in a hard disc, it is implemented by converting the computer program into the order language necessary for the implementation of the program, which is temporarily stored in the central processing unit (CPU), and each order language is temporarily removed after implementation, which is temporarily stored in the lamps. It is extremely limited to a part of the program, and a reproduction is made only when the program is artificially reproduced because the program implementation order language is very short, and the program is temporarily stored in the lamps, which is a computer storage device, and it cannot be deemed as a reproduction of the work with a part of the program that is temporarily stored in the computer, which is considerably small temporary work space compared with the hard disc. And if the program is stored in the auxiliary memory, it is not sufficient for the defendant to view that the part of the program does not constitute a "explosive or only a part of the program which is temporarily stored in the open light" because it does not constitute a "explosive or a part of the program.

[Judgment]

(A) In full view of the overall purport of the arguments in evidence (A27-1 to 70, 40-1 to 5) and evidence (A27-1 to 40-1 to 40), the fact that, if an employer executes a fee computer on a computer, E-V will be recognized as being carried out through the process of temporarily storing the 'Winow' work manager of the user computer in a certain space of the screen, which is a storage device of the user computer, like other computer programs, such as a window screen (mpa.ex), window screen (exe), window screen searcher (exe), window screen, and window cover (exe).

B) “A reproduction” under the Copyright Act refers to fixing or re-making on a tangible object temporarily or permanently to the extent sufficient to recognize or recognize its content and form by virtue of an existing work, so it constitutes a temporary reproduction inasmuch as the program is temporarily stored in the lamps inside the computer in the implementation of the program, and if the program is cut off when it is cut off on a screen in the computer, such form of storage does not mean physically fixing or re-making the program, which is a work, and therefore, it constitutes a temporary reproduction.

According to the above facts, if a user executes a program on a computer in which the Defendant’s fee server is installed, part of the E-user’s pay server temporarily stored in the lamps during the implementation process, and the computer program temporarily stored in the lamps, which is a storage device, in the computer, is a type of temporary fixing or re-making. Thus, E-user’s temporary reproduction takes place by fixing it in the lamps, which is a type of material, in the process of using the program. In addition, E-user temporarily takes place in the process of storing it in lamps for the implementation, and the fee server’s reproduction is recognized as creative for the operation of the E-user’s work.

Therefore, it is reasonable to view that individual users temporarily reproduced all or part of the fee-charging in computer lamps by using it in the computer. The above argument by the defendant is reasonable.

(2) Whether it constitutes temporary reproduction in the course of using a copyrighted work (whether it is exempted under the Copyright Act)

【Plaintiff’s argument】

The plaintiffs asserts that even if the employees of the plaintiffs take temporary reproduction on the luminous, which is a storage device in a computer, in the course of implementing the E-Commission program on the computer, it constitutes temporary reproduction conducted for smooth and efficient information processing when using copyrighted works in a computer, and that such temporary reproduction is exempted pursuant to the main sentence of Article 35-2 of the Copyright Act allowing temporary reproduction in the course of using copyrighted works.

[Dissenting of the Defendant]

The defendant, in violation of the terms and conditions and scope of the permission of use by the defendant, who is the copyright holder, used the E-V transfer for business purposes, which constitutes "where the use of the copyrighted work is infringed on copyright" under the proviso of Article 35-2 of the Copyright Act, and thus, the plaintiffs' employees did not claim the exemption since temporary storage in lamps made in the process of executing the E-V transfer on computers constitutes infringement on copyright.

[Judgment]

(A) The Copyright Act provides that if a copyright holder uses copyrighted works on a computer, such as an act of using copyrighted works, it shall be deemed that the copyright holder can temporarily reproduce such copyrighted works within the scope of his/her license that is deemed necessary for smooth and efficient information processing. On the other hand, if a program is carried out on a computer, such as 200 square meters or equipment installed on a e-mail screen is temporarily stored within the computer, and the program is carried out through the process of storing e-mail or screen creation without i.e., temporary reproduction within the scope of its license to use the copyrighted works. It is deemed that the temporary reproduction of copyrighted works is not permissible within the scope of e-mail to increase the speed of processing by temporarily fixing copyrighted works from the storage device to e-mail and thus, such temporary reproduction is also deemed necessary for smooth and efficient processing of copyrighted works in the process of using the copyrighted works on a computer.

Ultimately, since a computer program copyright holder has no exclusive right to implement the program, the implementation of the program does not fall under the "use of copyrighted works as provided by Article 46 (1) and (2) of the Copyright Act", and the permission related thereto does not fall under the "use of copyrighted works as provided by Article 46 (1) and (2) of the Copyright Act". Therefore, in case where a license agreement has been entered into between a copyright holder of a computer program and his/her user with respect to the use of a computer program, the user is only liable for the implementation of the program in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated by the license agreement, and even if the user has carried out the program in violation of the terms and conditions stipulated by the license agreement unrelated to the "use" as provided by Article 46 (1) and (2) of the Copyright Act, the violation of the license agreement

Meanwhile, “where the use of a work is in violation of copyright” as referred to in the proviso of Article 35-2 of the Copyright Act refers to where the main use of the work, which is conducted by the owner of temporary reproduction, constitutes an act that requires permission from the copyright holder, or is not included in an act that is permitted by the Copyright Act (an act that falls under various restrictions such as reproduction under the Copyright Act) and thus constitutes an act that infringes on the copyright holder’s right of reproduction, etc. under the Copyright Act or an act that constitutes an act that is deemed an infringement in case the use of a program satisfies certain requirements (Article 124(1)3 of the Copyright Act). Therefore, temporary reproduction accompanied thereby is excluded from the free use of the main sentence of Article 35-

In this case, in the course of individual users’ work in E-Commission, they installed E-Commission disks in a computer’s hard disc, and, on the screen, have an indication of consent to use only for personal use or for non-business use presented by the Defendant, the copyright holder, by charactering it (not run in the following screen). However, even though the license contract was concluded in the so-called type, individual users violated the license agreement with the Defendant by using it for business use from the company of the Plaintiffs to the company of the Plaintiffs.

However, even if an individual user used a paid server on a computer in violation of a license agreement with the defendant for use, it does not constitute an infringement of the right to share of author’s property right such as reproduction right under the Copyright Act, and thus, the proviso of Article 35-2 of the Copyright Act does not apply to the case where the individual user violated a license agreement with the defendant for use and carried out temporary reproduction in addition thereto, and thus, the individual user is liable for nonperformance due to the breach of a license agreement with the defendant, even if the individual user separately bears the responsibility for temporary reproduction in a light in the course of carrying out such computer program, it shall be deemed that the temporary reproduction in a light in the course of carrying out

Furthermore, since the development of E program around 2003, the program could be used free of charge for about nine (9) years from the date of the program to February 5, 2012, and the Defendant did not take any technical access control measures in the process of the program being used free of charge until the program is operated as EB, and when individual users implement E6.7 BB, it would automatically be downloaded onto the HV drive, a tangible object, the temporary route of the user’s computer, and if the user confirms the consent of the LV terms and conditions, it would be possible for the user to use the EV if the user does not have the right to use the copyrighted work, such as reproduction, performance, public transmission, display, etc. However, the Copyright Act grants the user the right to use the copyrighted work within the scope of control of the program, but it is reasonable to recognize the user’s right to use the copyrighted work to use the copyrighted work, as alleged in the proviso of the Copyright Act, by infringing the user’s right to use the copyrighted work, and thus, allows the user to use the copyrighted work (31).

D. Whether the Plaintiffs’ liability for damages is established based on the Plaintiffs’ employer’s liability (whether the individual program user’s liability is established due to the infringement of copyright)

【Defendant’s Claim】

The defendant is the employer who actually directs and supervises the employees, and thus, the defendant is liable for damages arising from the employer's liability under Article 756 of the Civil Act with respect to illegal acts of copyright infringement committed against the employees in relation to the performance of their duties.

[Judgment] An employer's liability is not an employer's own negligence liability but an employer's liability for an employee's act on behalf of the actor. Thus, if an employer's liability is subrogated, it is the premise that an employer's tort is established against an employee as a result of such subrogation.

However, as seen earlier, it is separate from the fact that individual users, who are employees of the plaintiffs, have temporarily stored in the luminous in the computer in the course of installing and implementing the e-mail, and thus, the nonperformance due to the violation of the contract for permission for use by individual users against the defendant, and cannot be deemed to constitute tort infringing the defendant's right of reproduction of the computer program works. Therefore, the defendant's assertion on the employer's liability against the plaintiffs, which is premised on the establishment of tort due to infringement of the defendant's right of reproduction of computer program works, is without merit

E. Whether liability for damages based on tort caused by deception by the plaintiffs was established [Defendant's assertion]

The defendant asserts that since the plaintiffs, as they are actively used for non-business or private use, they belong to the defendant and obtained permission for use of E-pays, they caused property damage to the defendant, general tort is established against individual employers.

[Judgment]

However, evidence (A6-1 to 5, A11-1, 2, 3, 7, 14) alone is insufficient to recognize the defendant's assertion that the representative of the plaintiffs belonged to the defendant, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

Even if the defendant's above assertion is based on the premise that the defendant's employee's tort was established when he belongs to the defendant in connection with the performance of his business affairs, it is insufficient to recognize the defendant's assertion that the defendant's employee was permitted to use the ESB prior to the ESB, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. The defendant's assertion is without merit, without any need to look at the above assertion.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, there is no liability for damages based on the infringement of the right of reproduction (right of reproduction) against the defendant, and as the defendant contests the existence of the liability for damages, there is a legal interest to seek confirmation that there is no liability for damages, and the defendant's claim for damages against the plaintiffs is without merit.

Therefore, all of the plaintiffs' claims are reasonable, and all of the defendant's counterclaims are without merit. Among the judgment of the first instance that different conclusions, the part concerning the plaintiff's main lawsuit against the defendant, other than No.S. P. S.P., and the part concerning the defendant's counterclaim against the remaining plaintiffs, such as the defendant, is unfair, and thus, the relevant part is modified as indicated in the disposition, based on the remaining plaintiffs' appeals. The defendant's appeal against the plaintiffs is without merit, and all of the appeals are dismissed. The total costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the defendant who lost through the main lawsuit and counterclaim.

Judges Park Jae-woo

Judges Park Jong-tae