2. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.

A. The Plaintiff entrusted the Plaintiff’s employees (chief of personnel management department) C with the training program for HREXERT conducted by the Plaintiff (hereinafter “instant training program”) from May 31, 2008 to July 26, 2008 in accordance with the consignment agreement with B. B obtained recognition of vocational skills development training courses for the instant training course from the Defendant.

B. On July 26, 2008, C dealt with the attendance of the training course of this case between 9 days (the remaining training days excluding May 31, 2008; June 7, 2008; June 14, 2008; June 28, 2008; July 5, 2008; July 12, 2008; July 19, 2008; July 26, 2008; and issued a certificate of completion to C. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 20720, Jul. 26, 2008>

C. Accordingly, on October 21, 2008, the Plaintiff applied for reimbursement of training costs of the instant training course conducted for C to the Defendant and received reimbursement of KRW 231,558 from the Defendant.

D. After that, while investigating whether the instant training courses were illegally withdrawn, the Defendant discovered that C was absent on June 4, 2008 from the Plaintiff’s occupational instruction on June 12, 2008, and that C was absent on the training day conducted on June 7, 2008, and that C did not meet the training completion standards by attending the training day out of 70 days of the total number of training days nine days, and thus, Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act (amended by Act No. 9315, Dec. 31, 2008; hereinafter “Employment Insurance Act”) and Article 56(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21015, Sep. 18, 2008; hereinafter “Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act”) and applied the same provision to the Plaintiff during the period from October 10 to 17, 2018.

E. Meanwhile, on November 23, 201, the Plaintiff filed an application with the Defendant for reimbursement of expenses for training conducted by 189 employees belonging to the Plaintiff during the period from January 1, 2009 to March 31, 2009, but the Defendant refused payment on the ground that the expenses claimed to the Plaintiff were expenses for training conducted during the period of restriction on payment of the instant disposition No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as “instant disposition”). Furthermore, on December 20, 201, the Plaintiff filed an application with the Defendant for reimbursement of expenses for training conducted by 387 employees belonging to the Plaintiff during the period from April 1, 2009 to October 31, 209, the Defendant rejected payment to the Plaintiff on the ground that the expenses claimed to the Plaintiff were expenses for training conducted during the period of restriction on payment of the instant disposition No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as “each of the instant dispositions”). However, the Defendant rejected payment to the Plaintiff on the aforementioned ground (hereinafter referred to as “each of the instant dispositions”).

[Ground of recognition] without any dispute, Gap's evidence 1 through 3, Gap's evidence 5, 7, Gap's evidence 8-1 through 4, Gap's evidence 9-1 through 3, Gap's evidence 10, Eul's evidence 1, 3, and 7, and the purport of whole pleadings

2. Whether each of the dispositions of this case is legitimate

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) In light of the fact that the Plaintiff entrusted all matters related to the instant training course to B, and the Plaintiff applied for subsidies to the Defendant by trusting the certificate of completion to C issued in B, etc., the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have received subsidies for vocational skills development training for C by fraud or other improper means. Accordingly, each of the instant dispositions made on a different premise is unlawful.

2) Article 56(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (hereinafter “Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act”) provides that a person shall order the return of all training expenses paid for one year from the date of illegal receipt to the whole amount of training expenses paid for the year from the date of illegal receipt is null and void in violation of the purpose of delegation under Article 35(1) of the Employment Insurance Act, which is a mother-based legal entity. Therefore, each of the dispositions of this case

B. Relevant statutes

The entries in the attached Table-related statutes are as follows.

C. Determination

1) Determination on the first argument

Sanction against violation of administrative laws is a sanction against the objective fact of violation of administrative laws and regulations in order to achieve administrative purposes. Thus, a sanction may be imposed even if the violator has no intention or negligence, barring any special circumstance, such as where the violation does not cause any negligence due to his/her failure to perform his/her duties. "False or other unlawful means" means any unlawful act conducted in order to conceal the eligibility for, or the absence of, eligibility for, the payment of training costs for vocational skills development by, the business owner who is not eligible for the payment of training costs (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Du4272, Jun. 11, 2009).

However, in full view of the following circumstances revealed by the facts acknowledged earlier and the purport of the entire pleadings, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff was paid training expenses for vocational skills development by fraud or other improper means. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

A) Although the Plaintiff was obligated to finally verify whether C, an employee of the Plaintiff, was actually present at the instant training course, the Plaintiff neglected such duty and applied for payment of training expenses to C without undergoing verification procedures as to whether C was actually present at the instant training course. Furthermore, in light of the fact that C was unable to attend the instant training course due to an overseas business trip directed by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff appears to have known or could have known that C was unable to complete the instant training course by being absent on the training day, and it is difficult to deem that there was a justifiable reason for failure to verify C’s attendance.

B) Although C was unable to attend the training days for two days among the instant training courses and failed to meet the training completion standards, the Plaintiff applied for subsidies to C and received them from the Defendant as if it met the normal completion standards. If the Defendant had known such fact in advance, the Plaintiff would not be entitled to subsidies to C. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s act was a fraudulent act committed by a business owner who is not entitled to subsidies to C and thus, affected the Defendant’s decision-making on the payment of subsidies.

2) Judgment on the second argument by the Plaintiff

A) According to Article 35(1) of the Employment Insurance Act, Article 35(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that a person who has received, or intended to receive, vocational skills development training costs, etc. by fraud or other improper means (hereinafter referred to as “unsettled recipients”) shall be obligated to pay training costs, etc. for one year, and shall be refunded in full with respect to training costs, etc. paid during the period of restriction on payment. The disposition ordering the establishment of the restriction period and the return of principal paid during the restriction period is a binding act.

B) First, we examine whether the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case satisfies the legitimacy of the legislative purpose and the requirements for the appropriateness of the means. The purpose of the provision of this case is to prevent misconduct in relation to the payment of training expenses, etc. and ultimately to promote the development and improvement of workers’ vocational ability through the restriction on payment of training expenses, etc. for one year for illegal recipients and the order to refund subsidies paid within the restriction period. In addition, considering that workplace skill development training is conducted with limited public resources, such as the Employment Insurance Fund under the Employment Insurance Act, the purpose of the provision of this case is justifiable. Furthermore, it appears that misconduct in relation to the payment of training expenses, etc. is reduced through punitive sanctions stipulated in the Enforcement Decree of this case, and accordingly, it is possible to further increase public resources such as

C) Next, we examine whether the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case satisfies the minimum requirements for damage. It is reasonable to view that the administrative agency has broad discretion in the choice of the means to impose sanctions against the violation of statutes. If the method of choice is not clearly erroneous in prediction or evaluation, it cannot be deemed that the provision of this case does not impose additional obligations on the illegal recipient, but rather recover training expenses paid to the illegal recipient, etc., and thus, it is difficult to view that the choice of the means of sanctions is clearly erroneous.

라) 마지막으로, 이 사건 시행령 조항이 법익의 균형성 요건을 갖추었는지 여부에 관하여 살펴본다. 관계 법령의 문언 내용과 앞서 인정된 사실 및 변론 전체의 취지에 의하여 알 수 있는 다음과 같은 사정들, 즉 ① 고용보험법 제35조 제2항은 징벌적인 의미로서 거짓이나 그 밖의 부정한 방법으로 지급받은 금액에 상당하는 액수 이하의 금액을 징수할 수 있도록 규정하고 있고, 이에 따라 구 근로자직업능력 개발법(2008. 12. 31. 법률 제9316호로 개정되기 전의 것) 제25조 제4항 제1호, 구 근로자직업능력 개발법 시행령(2009. 3. 31. 대통령령 제21398호로 개정되기 전의 것) 제22조의2, 구 근로자직업 능력 개발법 시행규칙(2009. 4. 1. 노동부령 제320호로 개정되기 전의 것) 제9조 제1항은 과거 5년 동안 거짓 그 밖의 부정한 방법으로 비용을 신청한 횟수 등을 기준으로 추가로 징수할 금액을 세분하여 정하고 있는 점, ② 이 사건 시행령 조항은 위 추가징수처분과는 별도로 부정수급자에 대하여 의무적으로 1년간 지원을 제한하도록 규정하는 동시에 위 지급제한기간 내에 지급된 지원금에 대하여 반환하도록 규정하고 있어 위 추가징수처분과 마찬가지로 징벌적 제재의 성격을 가지고 있는 한편, 위 추가징수처분과는 달리 위반행위의 내용이나 정도에 따른 가중, 감경 등의 세부적인 기준을 정함이 없이 일률적으로 1년간의 지급제한 및 그 지급제한기간에 지급된 지원금 전액의 반환만을 규정하고 있는 점, ③ 그로 인해 통상 반환명령의 대상이 되는 지원금은 부정수급액에 비하여 매우 큰 금액이 될 수 있고 이 경우 부정수급자가 예상할 수 있는 범위를 현저히 초과함으로써 그 위반행위의 내용, 정도 등에 비추어 지나치게 가혹한 결과를 초래할 수 있는 점(실제로 원고의 경우 부정수급액은 231,558원에 불과함에도 지급제한기간 중 지급받은 지원금은 17,702,710원에 달한다), ④ 또한, 이 사건 시행령 조항은 지급제한의 기산일을 제재처분일이 아닌 '훈련비용을 받거나 지급 신청을 한 날'로 명시하고 있어 부정수급자로서,는 제재처분을 받기 이전에 이미 지급 받았던 지원금을 소급하여 반환하게 되는 경우가 많은데, 부정수급자가 1년간 훈련비용 등에 대한 지급이 제한될 것이라는 사정을 미리 알았더라면 그 기간 중 훈련과정을 탄력적으로 실시하여 반환대상이 되는 금액을 줄일 수도 있었을 것으로 보이는 점, ⑤ 나아가 이 사건 시행령 조항은 '훈련비용을 받거나 지급 신청을 한 날로부터 1년간의 지급제한 및 지급제한기간에 이미 지급된 지원금에 대한 의무적인 반환 명령을 규정하면서도 위 제재처분을 할 수 있는 기간에 특별히 제한을 두고 있지 않아 부정수급자의 지위가 장기간 불안정해지는 문제가 발생하는 점, ⑥ 한편, 고용보험법에 따라 사업자에게 지원되는 직업능력개발 훈련비용은 직접적으로 근로자의 직업능력의 개발과 향상 등을 위해 사용되고 그 결과 사업자가 간접적으로 숙련된 근로의 제공이라는 혜택을 누리게 되므로 그 전액의 환수가 의심의 여지 없이 정당화된다고 보기는 어려운 점 등에 비추어 보면, 부정수급자에 대하여 추가징수처분 외에 징벌적 제재를 중복하여 규정함으로써 그 입법목적을 보다 효율적으로 달성할 수 있다고 하더라도 이 사건 시행령 조항은 그로써 달성하고자 하는 공익과 그로 인하여 원고가 입게 되는 사익 사이에 현저하게 균형을 잃어 무효라고 봄이 상당하다(2010. 2. 8. 대통령령 제22026호로 개정된 고용보험법 시행령 제56조 제2항은 부정수급자에 대한 1년간의 지급 제한을 규정하면서도 '다만, 지원금이나 장려금을 받은 날부터 3년이 지난 경우와 거짓이나 그 밖의 부정한 방법으로 지급받거나 받으려고 하는 금액이 300만 원 미만으로서 최초로 부정행위가 적발된 경우에는 1년 동안의 지급제한을 적용하지 아니한다'라는 제한을 두었고, 2010, 12. 31. 대통령령 제22603호로 개정되어 현재 시행 중인 고용보험법 시행령 제56조 제2항은 '제35조 제1항에 따라 거짓이나 그 밖의 부정한 방법으로 제1항에 따른 각 지원금 중 어느 하나의 지원금을 받거나 받으려 한 자에 대하여 고용노동부장관은 제1항에 따른 반환명령 또는 지급제한을 한 날부터 1년의 범위에서 새로 지원하게 되는 제1항에 따른 각 지원금 중 어느 하나에 해당하는 지원금에 대해서는 별표 1에 따른 기간 동안 지급을 제한한다. 다만 그 부정한 방법의 정도, 동기 및 결과 등을 고려하여 그 지급제한기간의 3분의 1까지 감경할 수 있다'고 규정하고 있는바, 이는 이 사건 시행령 조항의 문제점에 대한 반성적 고려의 결과로 보인다).

E) Therefore, the Defendant’s Disposition No. 1 of this case based on the invalid provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case is unlawful, and each Disposition No. 2 and 3 of this case based on Disposition No. 1 of this case is also unlawful.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is reasonable, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Hanwon-won

Judges Kim Tae-hee

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.