(b) The nature of Article 12 of the Regulations on the Establishment and Supervision of Non-profit Corporations under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture which provides for the appointment authorization of officers of non-profit corporations and cancellation thereof

C. Nature of the act of approving taking office of the non-profit corporation of the competent authority

B. Article 12 of the former Regulation on the Establishment and Supervision of Non-profit Corporations under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture and Sports (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Ordinance of the Ministry of Culture and Sports No. 8 of December 30, 1993) which provides for the appointment and dismissal of officers of a non-profit corporation shall also be deemed to be a regulation that embodys the general supervisory authority

C. Even if the appointment of an officer of a religious corporation is based on the articles of incorporation of the religious corporation, as long as the act of authorization or refusal is related to the supervisory authority of the competent authority over the corporation, the act of authorization or refusal is an administrative disposition under public law, and the issue of whether or not to authorize or refuse the taking office belongs to the authority of the competent authority. Thus, the competent authority should not necessarily approve the application for approval of taking office of the religious corporation, which is bound by the pertinent authority.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

On the third ground for appeal

Examining the evidence established by the court below in accordance with the records, the fact-finding and judgment of the court below on the point of the lawsuit is just and acceptable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the religious trial and the division of order, or there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the party's pleading.

The Supreme Court Decision 81Da276 Decided September 22, 1981 cited as the main issue is that the case is different from the case of this case and thus cannot be invoked.

There is no reason to discuss.

On the first ground for appeal

1. The phrase "the plaintiff corporation does not constitute a public-service corporation under Article 2 of the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Public-Service Corporations as a religious corporation" is the same as the theory of lawsuit (see Supreme Court Decision 77Do4002 delivered on June 13, 1978) and the court below also ruled to the same purport. Therefore, it is not a legitimate ground for appeal that there is an error of misapprehension of legal principles as to Articles 2 and 5 of the Act on the Establishment and Operation

2. Article 32 of the Civil Act provides that permission from the competent authority shall be obtained in the establishment of an association or foundation which is a non-profit corporation. Articles 45(3) and 42(2) provide that any amendment of the articles of incorporation of an incorporated foundation shall be null and void without permission from the competent authority. Articles 43 and 40 subparag. 5 provide that the necessary matters to be stated in the articles of incorporation of the incorporated foundation shall be entered in the articles of incorporation of the incorporated foundation. Article 37 provides that the competent authority shall inspect and supervise the affairs of the incorporated foundation. In light of the above provisions, it is reasonable to find a law that makes it possible for the competent authority to determine whether to permit the appointment and dismissal of directors of the incorporated foundation or modification of the articles of incorporation by examining the provisions concerning the appointment and dismissal of directors of the incorporated foundation, and therefore, if there is a provision that the appointment and dismissal of directors of the incorporated foundation or auditor requires authorization from the competent authority. Thus, it is reasonable to consider that the competent authority extended specific authority to supervise directors and auditors by the articles of incorporation of the incorporated foundation.

In this case, Article 6 of the articles of incorporation of the plaintiff corporation provides that the officer of the plaintiff corporation shall be elected by the board of directors with the consent of the head of the culture division, although the officer of the plaintiff corporation is fluent, the representative of the board of directors shall be elected at the plenary meeting of the National Assembly (hereinafter referred to as the "fluent"), and the above officer shall take office with the approval of the head of the culture division. Even if the appointment of the officer of the plaintiff corporation is based on the articles of incorporation of the plaintiff corporation, as long as the defendant's act of approval (authorization) is based on the right of supervision of the competent authority over the corporation, the act of approval or refusal is an administrative disposition under the public law, and the issue of whether to authorize or refuse the taking office belongs to the defendant

Although there is no somewhat inappropriate expression at the time of the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below's rejection of the plaintiff corporation's assertion that approval and cancellation right of taking office of the defendant is merely a courtesy, the defendant is bound by the request of the plaintiff corporation for taking office of the plaintiff corporation and must be approved as a matter of course. The judgment below is just and acceptable as it is in accordance with the above legal principles. It did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to Article 37 of the Civil Act and Article 12 of the Rules on the Establishment and Supervision of Non-profit Corporations

There is no reason for the issue.

On the third ground for appeal

The court below is justified in holding that the disposition of this case, which rejected the application for taking office of the plaintiff corporation, on the grounds as stated in the reasoning of its explanation, is justified, on the grounds that the merger of the "Gisung" group, and the merger of the "Gisung" group, and the merger of the "Gisung" group and the combined opposition after the division of the "Gisung" group, have a unity between them, and there was a criminal complaint against the former officers of the plaintiff corporation, who are the opposing parties to the integration in the integrated support group, and that the withdrawal of the executive of this case was based on holding a general meeting through the integration of the existing Nisung group, and there was a defect in the procedure or method of the dispatch of the executive officers, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the deviation or abuse of

There is no reason to discuss.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)