2. All plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

3. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

The decision of dismissal of each of the plaintiffs on February 22, 2011 by the defendant is revoked.

2. Purport of appeal

The same shall apply to the order.

The court's explanation on this part is the same as the reasoning stated in Paragraph 1 of the judgment of the court of first instance. Thus, this part is cited by Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

The reasons why this Court shall explain in this part are as follows, under the third third chapter of the judgment of the court of first instance,

“1-1) Violation of the principle of prohibition of retroactive legislation

The plaintiffs have the right to claim the payment of compensation under Article 4 (1) 2 (hereinafter "former Enforcement Decree of the Compensation Act") of the Compensation Act and the former Enforcement Decree of the Compensation Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22460, Oct. 27, 2010; hereinafter "former Enforcement Decree of the Compensation Act"). Since the defendant is merely an agency to confirm whether the plaintiffs have the right to claim the payment of compensation, the defendant's right to claim the payment of compensation is not created by the defendant's decision. Therefore, by amending the previous provisions of the former Enforcement Decree of the Compensation Act to the provisions of this case, the deprivation of the plaintiffs' right to claim the payment of compensation already occurred constitutes the legislation of a lawsuit against appeal, and the disposition of this case is in violation of the principle of prohibition of retroactive legislation.

1-2) unconstitutionality, illegality, due to failure to comply with transitional provisions

In accordance with the Compensation Act and the previous provision of this case, the plaintiffs had the right to claim compensation under Article 2 (1) 2 of the Compensation Act, and the previous provision of this case under the former Enforcement Decree of the Compensation Act is amended to the provisions of this case in relation to the criteria for determining "persons who received education and training related to special duties" as provided by Article 2 (1) 2 of the Compensation Act. It is against the principle of guaranteeing property rights under the Constitution and Article 2 (1) 2 of the Compensation Act in which those who received education and training related to the actual special duties as stated by the plaintiffs but failed to complete the education and training (hereinafter "persons who completed the education and training") and who did not complete the education and training.

1-3) Violation of the principle of separation of powers under the Constitution

In Article 2(1)2 of the Compensation Act, the National Assembly enacted that “a person who received education and training related to special duties as belonging to a military intelligence unit” as a person who performed a special military mission who is eligible for compensation, and that “the above Nonparty’s related litigation (Seoul Administrative Court No. 2007Guhap32020 and Seoul High Court No. 2008Nu558) instituted by the above Nonparty (Seoul Administrative Court No. 2008Guhap32020) shall be deemed a person eligible for compensation regardless of whether the education and training was completed or not.” However, the Court revised the previous provision of this case under the former Enforcement Decree of the Compensation Act to exclude those who completed the education and training from the eligibility for compensation is in violation of the principle of separation of authority under the Constitution.”

A. In addition, Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act shall be cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Act and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, except that the third side “persons who have not completed education and training” (hereinafter “persons who have not completed education and training”) is “(persons who have not completed education and training)”. Thus, it shall be cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

(b) Related statutes;

The court's explanation on this part is consistent with Article 2-b (b) of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the addition of the Attached Clause of this judgment to this part, and as stated in the Attached Clause of Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

(c) Fact of recognition;

The reasoning for this Court’s explanation is as stated in Section 2(c) of the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance except for the second instance court’s “208Nu588” in Section 6 of the fifth fifth and fifth instance court’s “2008Nu55588,” and therefore, it is acceptable in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

D. Determination

1) As to the assertion that the instant provision is invalid by deviating from the limit of delegated legislation

The court's explanation on this part is identical to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance as stated in Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2) As to the assertion of violation of the principle of retroactive prohibition of legislation

A) Retroactive legislation can be divided into a genuine-level legislation that applies to facts or legal relationships that have already been terminated by new legislation and a quasi-indial-level legislation that applies to existing facts or legal relations. Of these, the genuine-level legislation that intends to deprive an individual of the legal status that has already been formed under the existing law through ex post facto legislation is not in principle permitted according to the principle of the rule of law that covers the protection of individuals' confidence and legal stability. However, in principle, the non-indic-indic-law legislation, in the process of a bridge between the reasons for public interest that require retroactive effect, and the reasons for personal protection that require retroactive effect (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Du5390, Oct. 11, 2007). In addition, even if the grounds for administrative disposition were amended, it is based on the statutes that were enforced at the time of disposition and the standards set therein, and if the amended statutes were to be subject to the existing facts or legal relations and thus, it cannot be said that property rights are not infringed before the completion or enforcement of the Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2000.

Meanwhile, in light of the purport and contents of each provision of the Compensation Act and the Enforcement Decree of the Compensation Act, only the provisions of Article 2 (Definition), Article 2 (Definition), Article 3 (Period of Application), and Article 4 (Determination of Persons who performed Special Military Missions) of the Enforcement Decree of the Compensation Act can not be deemed as having been immediately determined as the person eligible for compensation, etc. under the Compensation Act. Only if the person is recognized as a person who performed a special military mission after deliberation and resolution by the defendant, the person eligible for compensation, etc. can be determined as the person eligible for compensation, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Du6554, Dec.

B) In light of the purport of the entire argument in the instant case, it is reasonable to view that the requirements for recognition of persons who completed education and training were amended in a more unfavorable manner than the previous ones in light of the purport of the judgment of the above non-party (Seoul Administrative Court No. 2007Guhap32020 and Seoul High Court No. 20858). Meanwhile, the plaintiffs did not recognize those who completed education and training as persons who received education and training related to special military missions before the disposition of this case as persons who received education and training, and the revised provision of this case as to the criteria for determination of persons who received education and training related to special military missions under Article 2 (1) 2 of the Compensation Act. However, the amendment of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that "whether they completed education and training according to the following classification" is "whether they completed education and training pursuant to the following classification." However, the plaintiffs' assertion that the revised provision of the Act did not apply to those persons who did not receive education and training after the amendment of the former Enforcement Decree cannot be seen as having been applied to the above persons who did not receive education and training.

3) As to the assertion that failure to provide a transitional provision is unconstitutional and illegal

As seen above, the provision of this case cannot be deemed illegal because it deviates from the limit of delegated legislation of the Compensation Act, and only with each provision of the Compensation Act and the Enforcement Decree of the Compensation Act, it cannot be deemed that the person eligible for compensation under the Compensation Act is determined, and only if it is recognized as a person who performed a special military mission after deliberation and resolution by the defendant, the previous provision of this case under the former Enforcement Decree of the Compensation Act can be determined as the person eligible for compensation. The revision of the previous provision of this case under the former Enforcement Decree of the Compensation Act does not deprive him of the legal status of a person who had already been recognized as a person who performed a special military mission after deliberation and resolution by the defendant. Thus, while revising the previous provision of this case under the former Enforcement Decree of the Compensation Act, it cannot be deemed that the previous provision of this case did not have any transitional provision against the principle of guaranteeing property rights under the Constitution or Article 2 (1) 2 of the Compensation Act. Therefore, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion is without merit.

4) As to the assertion of violation of the principle of equality, and the principle of trust protection under the Constitution

A) The reason why the principle of trust protection should be applied to an amendment of the law is that if a citizen has formed a certain legal status or living relationship with a specific act corresponding to the law in question, based on a reasonable and justifiable trust that the law will continue to exist in the future, and the state does not protect it at all, the citizen’s trust in the legal order will collapse, make it impossible to anticipate the future legal effect on the present act, and seriously undermine legal stability. However, such trust protection is neither absolute nor uniform in a certain life area, but may differ in the degree and method of protection depending on freedom, rights, interests, etc. related to each individual case, and it may be limited in consideration of the higher purpose of public interest to be realized through a new law (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 205Du2050, Nov. 16, 2006; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2005Du520, supra. 50, supra.).

나) 이 사건에 관하여 보건대, 위 인정사실과 위 거시증거 및 을 제2 내지 4호증의 각 기재에 변론 전체의 취지를 종합하여 인정할 수 있는 다음과 같은 사정들, 즉 ① (i) 보상법 제2조 제1항 제2호 소정의 ‘특수임무와 관련한 교육훈련을 받은 자’의 의미는 문리적 해석에 의하더라도 특수임무와 관련한 교육훈련을 다 받았을 것으로 해석될 여지가 있어, 특수임무와 관련한 교육훈련을 일부라도 받기만 하면 족한 것으로 명백하게 해석된다고 단정하기 어렵고(위 소외인이 제기한 관련 소송의 판결에서도 종전 이 사건 조항과 관련하여 ‘보상법 및 보상법 시행령에 교육훈련기간이 명시되지 않았다’는 점을 들어 교육훈련을 받은 자의 의미를 교육훈련을 마친 자로 한정할 근거가 없다고 판단한 것이다), (ii) 보상법 및 보상법 시행령은 특수임무를 한 자뿐만 아니라 ‘특수임무와 관련한 교육훈련을 받은 자’까지 보상대상자로 규정하고 있고 ‘특수임무를 한 자’에 관하여는 특수임무를 실제로 수행한 자들만을 보상대상자로 한정하고 있는 것에 비추어 보더라도, ‘특수임무와 관련한 교육훈련을 받은 자’에 대하여도 특수임무를 한 자에 대한 인정요건에 상응할 정도로 엄격하게 해석할 필요성이 있으며, (iii) 따라서, 원고들의 주장하는 바와 같은 신뢰이익은 보상법 제2조 제1항 제2호 및 종전 이 사건 조항의 존속에 대한 신뢰라기보다는, 위 소외인이 제기한 관련 소송의 판결에서 나타난 법 해석이 변함없이 원고들에게도 계속 적용되어야 한다는 사실상의 기대에 불과한 것으로 보이는 점, ② 위 소외인이 제기한 관련 소송의 판결이 확정된 후, 피고가 기존 입장과 달리 원고들을 포함한 교육훈련 미수료자들에게 향후 보상금을 지급하겠다는 취지로 어떤 공적인 견해를 표시한 적은 없었을 뿐만 아니라, 원고들도 피고에게 보상금 지급신청을 한 것 외에는 피고의 무슨 견해표명을 신뢰하여 적극적으로 어떤 행위를 하는 등으로 일정한 법적 지위나 생활관계를 형성한 적은 없는 점, ③ 원고들은 구 보상법 시행령의 종전 이 사건 조항이 시행되고 있던 시기에 보상금 지급신청을 하였고(원고 1은 2007. 9. 21.에, 원고 3은 2007. 10. 30.에, 원고 2는 2009. 4. 1.에, 원고 4는 2010. 7. 28.에 각 보상금 지급신청을 하였다), 피고는 구 보상법 시행령의 종전 이 사건 조항이 이 사건 조항으로 개정된 후 2011. 2. 22. 원고들의 신청을 기각하는 이 사건 처분을 하였는데, (i) 피고가 보상심의를 하는데 소요된 평균기간은 2007년 신청자의 경우 26.08개월, 2009년 신청자의 경우 12.42개월, 2010년 신청자의 경우 7.3개월이었던 점에 비추어, 원고 4(약 7개월)를 제외한 나머지 원고들의 경우 위와 같은 평균 심의기간보다 심의기간이 더 길었으나, (ii) 피고로서는 위 소외인이 제기한 관련소송( 서울행정법원 2007구합32020호 사건 및 그 항소심인 서울고등법원 2008누558호 사건과 상고심인 대법원 2008두11426호 사건)의 결과를 기다려볼 필요가 있었고, 위 관련소송의 판결 확정 후에는 위 관련 소송의 판결 취지와 관련하여 특수임무와 관련한 교육훈련기간을 구체적으로 명시하는 방향으로 보상법 시행령이 개정되는 것을 기다려 교육훈련 미수료자들에 대한 보상 여부를 심의하기로 의결하였으며, 그 후 이 사건 조항으로 개정이 이루어지자 원고들의 보상금 지급신청에 대해 최종적으로 판단한 것이어서, 피고가 원고들의 보상금 지급신청에 대하여 정당한 이유 없이 그 처리를 지체한 것이라고 단정하기 어려운 점, ④ 또한, 보상금 지급 범위에 대한 결정은 국가의 재정부담능력 등을 고려한 입법자의 광범위한 입법형성의 자유영역에 속하는 것이어서 언제든지 그 기준은 변동될 수 있는 것이고, 교육훈련 미수료자들은 국가를 위하여 특별한 희생을 한 정도의 면에서 특수임무를 실제로 수행한 자들에 상응한다고 보기 어려우므로, 종전 이 사건 조항을 소정의 교육훈련을 마친 자들에게만 보상금을 지급한다는 내용의 이 사건 조항으로 개정한 것이 불합리하다고 볼 수 없는 점, ⑤ 교육훈련 미수료자들에 대해서까지 보상금을 지급하게 될 경우 특수임무를 수행한 자 또는 특수임무와 관련한 소정의 교육훈련을 마친 자들과의 형평성 문제가 발생할 수 있고, 더욱이 원고들과 같이 종전 이 사건 조항에 따라 보상금 지급신청을 한 교육훈련 미수료자들에 대해서만 보상금을 지급할 경우, 이 사건 조항으로 개정된 이후에 비로소 보상금 지급신청을 한다거나 처음부터 보상금 지급신청을 하지 않은 교육훈련 미수료자들(이들에 대해서는 보상금이 지급될 여지가 없다)과의 형평성 문제가 발생할 수 있는 점, ⑥ 피고가 교육훈련 미수료자들 중 1인으로서 이 사건 조항으로 개정되기 전에 보상금 지급신청을 한 소외인에게 보상금을 지급한 것은, 위 관련 소송에서 확정된 판결에 따른 것이지, 종전 이 사건 조항의 해석과 관련한 피고의 입장을 종전과 달리 변경하여 보상금을 지급한 것이 아니므로, 피고가 이 사건 처분 당시에 시행되고 있던 이 사건 조항에 따라 원고들의 보상금 지급신청을 기각하는 이 사건 처분을 한 것이 원고들과 위 소외인을 합리적인 근거 없이 차별한 것이라고 볼 수 없는 점 등을 종합하여 보면, 구 보상법 시행령의 종전 이 사건 조항을 이 사건 조항으로 개정한 것이 헌법상의 삼권분립 원칙에 위반된다거나, 이 사건 처분이 평등원칙이나 신뢰보호의 원칙에 위반된다고 볼 수 없으므로, 원고들의 이 부분 주장은 이유 없다.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim of this case is dismissed due to the lack of reason. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is unfair with different conclusions, the defendant's appeal is accepted and the judgment of the court of first instance is revoked and the plaintiffs' claim is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition

[Supplementary Acts and subordinate statutes to be added omitted]

Judges Cho Jae-ho (Presiding Judge)