[2] The case holding that the judgment below erred by misapprehending legal principles, in a case where the previous land was divided and the previous land whose ownership was transferred was divided in the old forestry register, and part of the previous land whose ownership was transferred was registered and its land cadastre was completed, and the State completed the registration of preservation of ownership of part of the land whose registration was registered, and where the previous land was written in the old land cadastre which was made in the card form that Gap acquired ownership at the same time as the previous land cadastre was recorded as the owner, and the previous land was changed to the parcel number of the remaining land without registration conversion, and the previous land was left in the old forestry register as the previous land lot for the lot number of the remaining land, and the previous land was still registered in the Japanese forestry register for the previous land, and the previous land was recorded as the transfer of ownership in the above forestry register for the previous land at the time of registration of ownership transfer and written in the notification of the registration public official, and since some land was divided from the previous land and the entry in the owner column of the above forestry register was transferred to the old land as it was, the owner column for some land, thereby maintaining the right presumption of ownership column

[2] In a case where: (a) the previous land in which Party A entered as the transfer of ownership was divided into the previous land and its land cadastre was completed; (b) the State completed the registration of initial registration; and (c) the former land cadastre was written as the owner; and (d) Party A acquired ownership at the same time as the previous land cadastre was written in the former land cadastre prepared in the card form; (b) the previous land was divided into the previous land; (c) the previous land was changed into the parcel number of the remaining land without registration conversion; and (d) the previous land was left with the previous land parcel as the previous land lot number; and (e) the previous land was used as the new land lot and Japanese language was printed in the same text, the above land cadastre could be deemed as having been registered in the Japanese occupation book and prepared; and (e) Party A had already entered the ownership transfer registration in the future at the time of transfer of the previous land; and (e) Party A had no legal basis for the presumption that the previous land was divided from the previous land owner’s previous land registry, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the previous land owner’s legal reasoning for the previous land ownership change was maintained.

1. Basic factual basis

The reasoning of the lower judgment and the record reveal the following facts.

A. The forests and fields (number 1 omitted) in ○○○○○-gun, Seoyang-gun, Gyeonggi-do (hereinafter “instant mother land”). The administrative district of △△△-do was changed to the △△-dong, Seoyang-gu, Seoyang-do; hereinafter in this context, land was divided into (number 2 omitted), (number 3 omitted), (number 4 omitted), and (number 4 omitted), and (number 3 omitted, and (number 4 omitted) land registration conversion was completed at 30 square meters prior to (number 6 omitted).

The defendant completed the registration of ownership preservation on the land (number 5 omitted), (number 6 omitted), July 21, 1994 (number 5 omitted), and (number 6 omitted) (after this, the land (number 5 omitted), was divided into (number 5 omitted), (number 7 omitted); hereinafter (number 5 omitted), (number 6 omitted), and (number 7 omitted) land.

B. In the old land registry for the mother of this case, the △△△△△△△ (Korean Chinese name omitted) with the address in ○○○○ (number 8 omitted)’s land registry entered that the ownership was transferred on August 21, 1940. The old land cadastre for the land of this case is written by the △△△△△△△ in the old land registry with the address in ○○○○ Ri as the owner, and the old land registry prepared in the old land registry in around 1976 with the address in the ○○○ Ri was written as the ownership acquired on August 21, 1940.

2. The judgment of the court below

The lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that the instant land owner was the same as Nonparty 1, the Plaintiff’s fleet, who was the Plaintiff’s fleet. The reasons are as follows.

Even if the name of the owner was entered in the forest land register voluntarily restored for the convenience of taxation without any legal basis before the enforcement of the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2801, Dec. 31, 1975), the presumption of right is not recognized. The mother land of this case was restored around 1959, and the competent authority arbitrarily restored the forest land register without any legal basis. The old land cadastre regarding the mother land of this case divided from the mother land of this case was transferred as it is to the owner column of the forest land register for the mother land of this case. The old forest land register for the mother land of this case and the previous land cadastre for the owner column for the land of this case were written by △△△△△△△△, merely because the former land register for the mother land of this case and the former land cadastre for the land of this case were written by the owner column

3. Supreme Court Decision

A. Article 2 of the former Regulations on the Forestry Ledger (Ordinance of the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs No. 113 of Aug. 23, 1920), which was applied mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 2 of the former Regulations on the Forestry Book (Ordinance No. 113 of the Ministry of Shipbuilding), provides that the transfer of ownership shall not be registered in the forest register unless a public official’s notification is given to the transfer of ownership. If ownership is registered in the current forest register, the transfer of ownership has already been completed in its name regarding forest land under the name, and it shall be deemed that the registration was recorded in the forest register by the public official’s notification (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 76Da2042, Apr. 12, 197; 2003Da3157, Sept. 3, 2004).

B. In light of the above legal principles, there is room to view the circumstances revealed in the facts and the records of this case as follows.

(1) As the mother land of this case was partitioned in around 1959, the lot number was changed to (number 1 omitted) (number 2 omitted) and the Gu forest register for the mother land of this case remains to the (number 2 omitted; hereinafter “instant forest register”). In the instant forest register, the mother land of this case was changed to the Do governor for six years (1917), 15 (1940), after Non-party 2 was under the circumstances of the Do governor for six years (1917) and Do governor for ○○ (1940), the land was transferred to the owner of the land of this case through Non-party 3 (number 8 omitted). As such, in light of the fact that the previous forest register was used for the Japanese Do governor and the Japanese Do governor for the land of this case, which was used for the Japanese Do governor for the land of this case, and was printed in the previous Do governor for the land of this case, it is deemed that the previous Do governor had been registered in the forest register for Do governor.

(2) Nevertheless, the lower court determined that there was no presumption of change in the owner’s name on the ground that the land pointed out as to the mother’s land of this case was arbitrarily restored by the competent authority. Such determination exceeds the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence inconsistent with logical and empirical rules, or erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the presumption of rights recorded in the previous forest register and failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The Plaintiff’

4. Conclusion

The Plaintiff’s appeal is with merit and is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Dong-won (Presiding Justice)