XX Stock Company

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by each party.

Each disposition of imposition of corporate tax of 200 won for the business year of 2002, corporate tax of 2003, corporate tax of 000 won for the business year of 2004, corporate tax of 2004, corporate tax of 000 won for the business year of 2005, and corporate tax of 000 won for the business year of 2005, which the Defendant made against the Plaintiff on January 1, 208 (According to the application for modification of the purport of the claim made by the Plaintiff on May 16, 201, it appears that each tax

2. Purport of appeal

A. The part against the plaintiff in the judgment of the court of first instance is revoked. The defendant's disposition of imposing corporate tax of 000 won for the business year of 2002 against the plaintiff on January 1, 2008 shall be revoked.

B. Defendant: The part against the Defendant in the judgment of the first instance is revoked. The Plaintiff’s claim corresponding to the above revocation is dismissed.

The reasoning of this court's reasoning is as follows: ① according to the facts found in the judgment of the court of first instance from 14th to 10th, the plaintiff renounced its recovery by treating the bad debt amount (00 won) of the claim for indemnity of this case as bad debt (the defendant is also deemed to have waived its recovery by treating the bad debt amount of this case). Thus, the part of "the defendant shall be deemed to have waived its recovery by treating the bad debt amount of this case from among the claim for indemnity of this case (the defendant shall also be deemed to have waived its recovery by treating the bad debt amount of this case)", and the part of "the judgment of the court of first instance from 17th to 18th 4th Da" shall be written as stated in 2.b., and the part of "the second 6th 17th th th th 6 to 18th 4th ," and "the third th 3." is the same as the written reasons of the judgment of the court

2. Parts to be dried;

(3) On or after the 20th anniversary of the fact that the Plaintiff had been unable to recover 10 O's debt with 00 U.S. dollars on or after the 20th anniversary of the fact that it had been found that it had been 10 U.S. dollars on or after the 20th anniversary of the fact that it was difficult for the Plaintiff to recover 10 U.S. dollars's debt amount on or after the 2nd of the 2nd of the 1st of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 1st of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 1st of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 200th of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 3rd of the 2nd of the 20000.

Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the Defendant’s provisional payment without any duty to the claim of this case is illegal to impose corporate tax for the business year from 2003 to 2005 of this case on the ground that the Defendant deemed the provisional payment without any duty to the claim of this case as the taxable income of 2003-20

B. “C. Determination”

(1) The term "tax investigation" means an act of asking questions to taxpayers, etc. or ordering them to investigate or submit relevant documents, account books, and other things as necessary for their duties by exercising the right of questioning and questioning and questioning and questioning as stipulated in each tax law (see, e.g., Article 122 of the Corporate Tax Act and Article 170 of the Income Tax Act). Article 81-3(2) of the former Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Act No. 8830, Dec. 31, 2007; hereinafter the "Act") provides that a re-revision or re-audit cannot be made for the same items and taxable periods unless there are special circumstances. This is intended to prevent a taxpayer from infringing upon his rights and interests, such as the taxpayer's freedom of business through repeated tax investigation and a arbitrary abuse of authority by the tax authorities. Therefore, a tax disposition based on a double tax investigation prohibited under the above provision is in principle unlawful (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Du12070, Jun. 2).

(2) The following circumstances revealed by the aforementioned private opinion and evidence, i.e., the first tax investigation conducted by the Seoul regional tax office for the pertinent business year: ① was conducted for the integrated investigation of corporate tax for the first 200 to 201 business year; however, at the time of the investigation, the Plaintiff’s payment of the loan to △△△△△△△ (△△-Amba; hereinafter referred to as “△△△△”) on behalf of the Plaintiff during the pertinent business year for the pertinent 20 years; the Plaintiff’s payment of the loan to 20 years for the pertinent business year; and the Plaintiff’s payment of the loan to 20 years for the pertinent business year for the pertinent 20 years after the date of the investigation on the settlement of the loan to 20 years for the pertinent business year; the Plaintiff’s payment of the loan to 20 years for the pertinent overseas local tax office’s payment of the loan to 20 years prior to the date of the investigation on the settlement of the loan to 20 years prior to the date of the investigation.

(3) If the facts are as above, the motive for the Seoul Regional Tax Office to extend the period of investigation to the business year of 2002 at the time of the first tax investigation is not deemed to have occurred only in the business year of 2000 - 2001, and the necessity to verify the time of closure of the non-party company's claims for indemnity against the non-party company. In addition, in light of the situation where the main subject and scope of the investigation related to the business year of 2002, which was conducted at the time of the first tax investigation, are clearly different from those of the second tax investigation, even though the second tax investigation conducted at the time of the second tax investigation, it is difficult to view that the investigation related to the business year of 202, among the second tax investigation conducted after the second tax investigation, falls under a double tax investigation prohibited in principle under Article 81-3 (2) of the Act (see Supreme Court Decisions 2004Du1040939, Jan. 14, 2005; 2004Du93094).

(4) Furthermore, even if the part of the second tax investigation for the business year 2002, among the second tax investigation, can be deemed to constitute a case where the first tax investigation was conducted in duplicate with the second tax investigation, the plaintiff's act of delaying the recovery of the amount of indemnity, etc. against the non-party company does not appear to be related only to the first tax investigation for the business year 200 - 2001, which is the period subject to the first tax investigation, and also for the previous and subsequent business years connected to the above business year. Thus, it is reasonable to view that such a problem falls under the case where there was an error related to the second or more business years, which are stipulated as an exception to the second tax investigation under Article 81-3 (2) of the Act, as long as the investigation for the business year 202 constitutes a duplicate tax investigation, such investigation shall not be deemed to be unlawful.

(5) As to this, the Plaintiff argues that the Plaintiff’s error related to the second or more business years as stipulated in Article 81-3(2) of the Act is exceptionally permitted only to “where it is inevitably necessary to correct the amount of income for a certain business year, such as the time when the amount of income accrue, if the error is corrected,” and that such exception is not to mean where the issue at the time of the first tax investigation is extended to another period exceeding the one subject to investigation in relation to two or more business years, but the period subject to investigation at the time of the second tax investigation is not, in principle, allowed at the time of the second tax investigation, but it is merely a cause that can be expanded to the period subject to the first tax investigation.

However, there is no explicit legal basis to interpret the meaning of "in cases where there are errors in relation to two or more business years, which are the exceptional grounds for the prohibition of duplicate investigation under Article 81-3 (2) of the Act, only as alleged above by the plaintiff, and there is no explicit basis for interpreting the meaning of "in cases where there are errors in relation to the two or more business years, which are the grounds for exception to the prohibition of duplicate investigation under Article 81-3 (2) of the Act, and it can be deemed that the failure of recovery, such as indemnity, etc

(6) Ultimately, since the investigation of the second tax investigation during the 2002 business year constitutes a duplicate tax investigation and cannot be deemed unlawful, the plaintiff's assertion on this part is without merit.

3. Additional determination

A. The plaintiff's assertion

Article 34(2) of the Corporate Tax Act and Article 62(1)8 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21302, Feb. 4, 2009; hereinafter “Enforcement Decree”) "bonds which cannot be recovered due to the discontinuation of business, which is a bad debt cause," shall be determined depending on whether the debtor actually discontinued the business that he originally intended, regardless of whether the report on discontinuance of business has been filed. Since the O discontinues the business of the OO around June 2002, it actually discontinued the business of the OO, the bad debt of this case shall be included in the loss for the business year of 2002, which includes the date on which the collection of the bad debt of this case became impossible.

B. Determination

However, in light of the legislative intent of the Corporate Tax Act, the scope of and requirements for claims to be redeemed with bad debts for the purpose of ensuring equity in taxation and preventing profit manipulation, etc. In light of the legislative intent of the same, the provision on claims included in bad debts under the Enforcement Decree should be interpreted to the effect that the provision on claims included in bad debts should be limited rather than explicitly stipulating them (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Du3980, Nov. 24, 2000), etc., if the debtor discontinues his/her business, which is the grounds for permission of bad debts under the Enforcement Decree, as alleged by the plaintiff, if the debtor discontinues his/her business, as alleged by the plaintiff, he/she cannot be construed as falling under "the discontinuation of the business," even if the debtor does not discontinue his/her business, even if it does not discontinue his/her business, and there

In addition, the issue of "the discontinuation of the debtor's business", one of the grounds for permission for bad debts stipulated by the Enforcement Decree, should be objectively proven that the debtor's business was discontinued without the debtor's report regardless of the debtor's report, such as the registration of dissolution, etc. of the debtor, and that the above JungB, an employee of the plaintiff in charge of management of OB, recognizes that O is continuously generating rental income without O's report (record 654 pages), ② AO's report on O prepared by an employee in charge of the plaintiff, also includes the fact that OO's normal business or OO's assets in 204 (record 528 pages pages, 529 pages), etc. in consideration of all the evidence submitted by the plaintiff and the argument that the debt in this case is inside the court, as alleged by the plaintiff, cannot be determined objectively as a result of the discontinuance of business of OO as of December 31, 202.

Therefore, the Plaintiff’s above assertion is without merit (the Plaintiff’s assertion that, even if the Plaintiff acquired the amount equivalent to the subrogated amount to theO as a claim for reimbursement, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff’s assets increase and the gain accrued therefrom, and accordingly, presented the Supreme Court Decision 2009Du1157 Decided September 29, 201. However, the above case is different from the case in this case as a matter of a corporation for the purpose of a guaranteed insurance business, etc., and in general, inasmuch as the guarantor who performed the guaranteed obligation acquires the claim for reimbursement equivalent to the amount of reimbursement against the principal obligor or other joint guarantor, the Plaintiff did not acquire the assets equivalent to the amount of subrogated amount solely on the grounds asserted by the Plaintiff in this court).

4. Conclusion

If so, the judgment of the court of first instance is legitimate, and all appeals by the plaintiff and defendant are dismissed.