2. B

3. C.

4. D;

5. E.

6. F;

7. G.

8. H;

9. I

10. J

11. K;

12. L.

13. M;

2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

The reasoning of this Court's reasoning is as follows, and the reasoning of this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance. Thus, the reasoning of this Court is cited by the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Parts of scraping;

○ From 10th to 21th day of the first instance judgment, the part concerning the determination as to the expiration of extinctive prescription is modified as follows.

A. Relevant legal principles

The exercise of the right of defense on the ground of extinctive prescription is governed by the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principle of the Civil Act. Thus, in a case where there are special circumstances where it is impossible to expect the exercise of the right on the grounds of de facto disability that could not be objectively exercised prior to the completion of prescription, the obligor’s assertion of the completion of extinctive prescription is not permissible as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Da27604, Dec. 9, 1994). However, if

The statute of limitations defense of an obligor can be prevented only when the rights are exercised within a reasonable period. Whether such rights are deemed to be exercised within a reasonable period should be determined by comprehensively taking into account various circumstances, including the relationship between the obligee and the obligor, the cause of the claim for damages, the cause of the obligee’s exercise of rights, the grounds for delaying the obligee’s exercise of rights

However, since the system of extinctive prescription is based on the ideology of legal stability islands such as the escape of the difficulty in proving, it is very exceptional to deny the validity of extinctive prescription on the basis of the principle of good faith even though the requirements for its application are met. Therefore, the "reasonable period of time" of the above exercise of the right should be limited in a short period equivalent to the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act, barring special circumstances. In particular, in cases where it is inevitable to extend the period for a claim for damages due to a very special circumstance, it shall not exceed three years, which is the short-term extinctive prescription period under Article 766(1) of the Civil Act (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da202819, May 16, 2013).

In a case where a public prosecution was instituted on the basis of evidence collected by a State agency in the course of investigation, but a final judgment of conviction was finalized during the retrial procedure, and a State agency’s claim damages against the State due to an illegal act of the State agency, it is reasonable to deem that the obligee was de facto disability that the obligee could not expect the claim for damages until the judgment of innocence becomes final and conclusive in the retrial procedure. Thus, the obligee’s defense of the completion of extinctive prescription cannot be allowed as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith. However, barring any special circumstance, the obligee shall exercise the right within six months from the date when the judgment of innocence was revoked, and whether the right was exercised within that period shall be determined based on whether the obligee filed a lawsuit seeking damages in principle (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da201844, Dec. 12,

B. Determination

1) The fact that the instant lawsuit was filed on August 5, 2013, after five years from February 16, 1975 and February 17, 1975, the release date of the Defendants, which could be seen as the termination of the Defendant’s tort, is obvious in the record.

2) Meanwhile, comprehensively taking account of the aforementioned facts and the evidence as seen earlier, the Plaintiffs appears to have trusted that the Defendant would not claim for the extinguishment of rights at least when they exercise their rights within a reasonable period based on the truth-finding findings made by the Committee on the Settlement of History based on the truth-finding findings. ② In light of the fact that it is difficult to expect that the Defendant, among the Defendants of this case, seeks damages against the perpetrator, while the judgment has been in force yet to be revoked by retrial due to the final and conclusive judgment on conviction of the facts charged against N,0 and P, it is also difficult to expect that the Defendant would not exercise their rights because of a de facto disability that could not exercise rights objectively before the completion of prescription.

3) However, in special circumstances where the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription cannot be expected to be exercised against the plaintiffs, even if the defendant's exercise of rights constitutes an abuse of rights, the plaintiffs' exercise of rights should be done within a reasonable period. The following circumstances acknowledged by comprehensively taking account of the above facts and the evidence as well as the purport of the pleading body. ① The retrial judgment of this case against N,O, and P among the defendants of this case became final and conclusive on October 8, 201 and September 3, 2011, respectively, the lawsuit of this case was filed on August 5, 2013, which was about 2 to 10 years, and 6 months, the statutory period under the Civil Act, and the heir's claim for consolation money, which was 6 months after the expiration of the statute of limitations in Q and R, and it cannot be deemed that there was an objective cause for the plaintiff's claim for consolation money within 30 months before the final and conclusive judgment became final and conclusive, and the plaintiff's claim for damages in this case's lawsuit of this case was filed within 981 or 25 months of this case.

4) Therefore, the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription does not constitute an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith, and therefore, the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription is justified.

3. If so, the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed in its entirety as it is without merit. The judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiffs' appeal is dismissed in its entirety as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Date of inquiry of judge;

Judge Guo- Provision