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The costs of appeal are assessed against each appellant.

1. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant (Defendant 1) on the existence of the grounds of retrial, the lower court acknowledged facts as indicated in its reasoning after compiling the adopted evidence, and it is reasonable to view that the evidence used as the grounds of rejection of the request by the deceased A in the judgment of retrial was lost due to the pronouncement and confirmation of the judgment of innocence against the parties concerned. Thus, the judgment of retrial in this case determined that there was a ground for retrial of “when a criminal judgment, which served as the basis of the judgment under Article 451 subparag. 8 of the Civil Procedure Act, was changed according to

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal by the defendant (hereinafter "defendant") in the grounds of appeal, there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to grounds for retrial or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion of the judgment

2. As to the ground of appeal on the part of the claim for ownership transfer registration

A. The former Farmland Act (amended by Act No. 4817 of Dec. 22, 1994 and enforced January 1, 1996; hereinafter referred to as the "former Farmland Act") shall abolish the Act on Special Measures for Adjustment of Farmland Reform and Farmland Improvement Projects (hereinafter referred to as the "Special Measures Act") in Article 2 of the Addenda. Article 3 of the Addenda of the Act provides, "The repayment and registration of farmland for which the redemption and registration of farmland are not completed within three years from the enforcement date of this Act, shall be completed pursuant to the previous provisions within 3 years from the enforcement date of this Act. According to this provision, since there is no ground provision for redemption of farmland due to the expiration of 3 years from the enforcement date of the Farmland Act, even if the farmland price is repaid, it is impossible to obtain ownership under the provisions of the Farmland Reform and Special Act, and thus, it is impossible to obtain ownership of farmland within 20 years from the enforcement date of this Act and 20 years from the enforcement date of this Act.

In full view of the adopted evidence, the lower court acknowledged the facts as indicated in its reasoning, and, on the grounds that, until December 31, 1998, the Plaintiff (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) who was the deceased’s heir (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) was unable to complete the repayment and registration of farmland for the distribution farmland of this case, it was impossible to repay the farmland for the distribution farmland of this case, and thereafter, even if Plaintiff B deposited the amount equivalent to the farmland of this case on August 16, 2012 while the retrial litigation was pending, the acquisition of ownership under the provisions of the Farmland Reform Act and the Special Assistance Act was impossible due to the lack of application of the Farmland Reform Act and the Special Assistance Act.

The claim for registration was dismissed.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and contrary to the plaintiffs' grounds of appeal, there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interpretation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Addenda to the Farmland Act, and there is a need to change the above decision, or Articles 2 and 3 of the Addenda to the Farmland Act do not constitute unconstitutionality in violation of Article 13 (2) of the Constitution.

B. The plaintiffs asserted that since they failed to complete the repayment of farmland price within the period stipulated in Article 3 of the Addenda of the former Farmland Act due to the defendant's illegal act, they may be deemed to be qualified under Article 150 of the Civil Act. However, this cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal as a new argument that is imposed upon the court of final appeal. In addition, the repayment of the same zone price constitutes the so-called legal condition that the Farmland Reform Act requires the acquisition of ownership, and therefore, Article 150 of the Civil Act cannot be applied or applied by analogy. Thus, the above plaintiffs' assertion cannot

C. In light of the overall purport of the reasoning of the judgment, even if the specific and direct judgment on the matters alleged by the parties was not indicated in the judgment, it cannot be deemed an omission of judgment if it is possible to find out that the assertion was cited or rejected, and even if it was not actually determined, if it is obvious that such assertion was rejected, it cannot be deemed that there was an omission of judgment due to the lack of influence on the conclusion of the judgment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Da87174, Apr. 26, 2012).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the records, since the plaintiffs cannot acquire ownership of each land listed in the attached Tables 2 and 3 real estate list of the judgment below because they failed to complete the repayment of farmland within the period stipulated in Article 3 of the Addenda of the former Farmland Act, due to the repayment of farmland price, the plaintiffs cannot acquire ownership of each land listed in the attached Tables 2 and 3 real estate list of the judgment below. Accordingly, separate from the defendant's liability for damages, it cannot be deemed that the defendant and the defendant'

Therefore, the lower court’s failure to determine the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Defendant and the Defendant are obliged to implement the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer regarding each of the above lands as unjust enrichment return is obvious, but it cannot be deemed that the lower court’s above error affected the conclusion of the judgment. Ultimately, the Plaintiffs’ ground of appeal cannot be accepted.

3. As to the Plaintiffs and Defendant’s grounds of appeal on the claim for damages

A. As to the occurrence of liability for damages and the extinctive prescription, the lower court acknowledged the facts as indicated in its reasoning after compiling the evidence, and determined that the Defendant was liable to compensate for the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, who were the deceased A or his heir, due to a series of illegal acts from May 1, 1953 to October 11, 1979, even if the deceased A was legally distributed the farmland of this case.

Furthermore, after compiling the adopted evidence, the court below accepted the plaintiffs' re-claim that the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription cannot be allowed as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith and rejected the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription. In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and contrary to the defendant's grounds of appeal, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the public official's intentional or negligent act in relation to State liability, occurrence of damages, causation between illegal act and damages, or by violating the principle of pleading

B. As to the scope of liability for damages, etc., the lower court acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning by comprehensively taking account of the evidence, and determined that the deceased A or the plaintiffs acquired the farmland distributed in this case as a distributor of the distributed farmland in this case without the defendant's series of illegal acts, but it was not acquired due to the defendant's illegal acts, and that the damage therefrom was realized by the impossibility of the plaintiffs' acquisition of ownership after the lapse of December 31, 1998, the payment deadline for farmland under Article 3 of the Addenda of the former Farmland Act. Furthermore, the lower court determined that the damages suffered by the plaintiffs were the amount equivalent to the market price calculated based on the "before the market price, which is the current situation at the time of distribution of each land listed in the attached Table 2, 3, and 4 of the lower judgment at the time of December 31, 198, and the market price appraisal result at the lower court calculated the amount of damages in accordance with its judgment.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal principles as to the scope of damages, etc., contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal by the Plaintiffs and the Defendant, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. In addition, the lower court cannot be deemed as having determined that the amount converted the amount of grain received at the time of December 31, 1998 from the amount of damages, considering

2) Meanwhile, in light of the relevant legal principles and records, we affirm that the lower court did not offset the negligence, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles on offsetting the negligence, contrary to what is alleged in the Defendant’s grounds of appeal.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Yong-deok

Jeju High Court Decision 201Na1548

Justices Park Sang-ok