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(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2015.09.22 2013가단96262

소유권이전등기

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1. The plaintiffs' claims against the defendants are all dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

Reasons

1. Basic facts

A. The Plaintiffs are owners of housing in Jongno-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government K and L Ground.

B. The Seoul Jongno-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government M. M. 3,44.5 square meters (hereinafter referred to as the “1 land”) is the land for which the ownership transfer registration has been completed in the future of Jongno-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government on September 20, 1988 on the ground of property succession. The land for which the Defendant Jongno-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government completed the registration of ownership preservation on November 29, 1979, and the land for which the Seoul Jongno-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government completed the registration of ownership preservation on November 29, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the “2 land”). The land for which the Defendant Seoul Jongno-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government completed the registration of ownership preservation on March 6, 1992.

[Ground of recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2 and 3

2. Determination

A. The plaintiffs asserted that they occupy the part of the land of this case 1, 2, and 3, which is owned by the defendants, in a peaceful and public manner for 20 years with the intent to own each part of the attached Form 1, 2, and 3, and completed the prescription period for the acquisition of possession at each date listed in the attached Form 1, 2. Thus, the defendants are liable to implement

B. 1) Article 6 of the Public Property and Commodity Management Act provides that administrative property shall not be subject to prescriptive acquisition, notwithstanding Article 245 of the Civil Act. Thus, in order to complete the prescriptive acquisition for public property, the public property is a general property that can continue to be an administrative property, not an administrative property, for the period of prescriptive acquisition, and the burden of proving that the public property is a general property subject to prescriptive acquisition is a general property (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Da42655, Jun. 16, 195). 2) In this regard, it is insufficient to recognize that the above facts of recognition and the entries of Gap evidence No. 1 through No. 15 submitted by the plaintiffs are general property subject to prescriptive acquisition, and it is otherwise recognized.