beta
(영문) 대법원 1996. 6. 14. 선고 95다47282 판결

[소유권이전등기][공1996.8.1.(15),2160]

Main Issues

Whether the possession of a building site shall be recognized even in cases where the owner of the building does not actually occupy the building or its site (affirmative)

Summary of Judgment

Since a building cannot exist regardless of its site under social norms, the land which became the site for the building shall be deemed to be possessed by the owner of the building, and in such cases, even if the owner of the building does not actually occupy the building or the site thereof, it shall be deemed that he/she occupies the site for the purpose of owning the building.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 192 and 245(1) of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 91Da10329 delivered on June 25, 1991 (Gong1991, 2010) Supreme Court Decision 93Da2483 delivered on October 26, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 3163) Supreme Court Decision 95Da23200 delivered on November 14, 1995 (Gong196Sang, 13)

Plaintiff, Appellant

Plaintiff (Attorney Lee Dong-sung et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant, Appellee

Defendant (Attorney Yoon Young-young, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Daegu High Court Decision 94Na1099 delivered on September 21, 1995

Text

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court.

Reasons

The Plaintiff’s attorney’s ground of appeal is examined.

1. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court: (a) purchased 129m2 from the Defendant on March 20, 195 the land located in Seogu, 129m2, which was the land of this case; (b) used the building on June 16, 196 as the site; and (c) purchased the instant site and its ground building from Nonparty 2, who was the wife of the said deceased on December 20, 197, and occupied the instant site and its ground building on September 7, 197, 197, on the ground that it was evident that Nonparty 1 had occupied the instant site by Nonparty 4, who was the deceased on March 9, 197, and had occupied the instant site by Nonparty 1, who was the deceased on June 9, 197, and had no other residential address for 197, which was the deceased on June 19, 207, the lower court found that the Plaintiff acquired the instant site by prescription for 1, etc., on September 2, 197, 197.

2. However, since it cannot exist in light of social norms, the land which became the site for the building shall be deemed to have been possessed by the owner of the building. In this case, even if the owner of the building does not actually occupy the building or its site, it shall be deemed to have occupied the site for the ownership of the building (see Supreme Court Decision 95Da23200, Nov. 14, 1995). According to the records, the above evidence was first acknowledged as evidence No. 6 (Acquisition Tax Receipt), since the above deceased non-party 1 constructed the building on the site of this case and paid the acquisition tax on June 16, 196, since it is not clear whether the above building was newly constructed on the site of this case, and it is difficult to conclude that the plaintiffs occupied the building of this case or the above site of this case since the above non-party 1 resided on the 6th anniversary of the date on which the deceased or his successor actually resided on the site of this case, it shall be deemed to have occupied the building of this case since 17 years thereafter.

Nevertheless, as the court below held above, it is difficult to avoid criticism that the above deceased non-party 1 did not possess the site of this case and that the plaintiff occupied the site of this case until April 20, 1984, as soon as possible. Thus, the period of possession falls short of 20 years, and thus rejection of the plaintiff's claim for prescriptive acquisition is not sufficient to exhaust all necessary deliberations or by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence or by misunderstanding the legal principles on possession, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The arguments pointing this out are with merit.

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Ahn Yong-sik (Presiding Justice)