[2] In a case where Gap reported the marriage with Eul while meeting the first priority qualification requirements relating to the subscribed house through the collective savings account for subscription opened before marriage, and entered into a contract for supply of apartment housing as a preliminary lottery for apartment, and thereafter, he paid the down payment and intermediate payment from the sales price of apartment to the time the marital relationship is extinguished due to separate reasons, and completed the registration of transfer of ownership under Gap's name, the case holding that the judgment below erred by misapprehending legal principles, even though the object of division of property is not the sales price paid before the failure of marital relationship, but the apartment acquired before the date of the closing of argument at the fact-finding court, in a case where the property

[2] The case holding that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to property division, even if Gap acquired the ownership of the apartment after the bankruptcy of the type of the court below as well as the type of property division, in light of the following: (a) in a case where Gap entered into a contract to supply the apartment after commencement of a marital relationship with Eul and completed the registration of ownership transfer under Gap's name, it was anticipated that Gap would acquire the ownership of the apartment by paying 70% of the remainder of the purchase price of the apartment as the down payment and the intermediate payment before the bankruptcy of the relationship; (b) while Gap entered into a contract to supply the apartment, Eul gave birth to his child and received childcare for the period of payment of the purchase price; and (c) after entering into a contract to supply the apartment, Eul gave birth to his child, and entered into a contract to supply the apartment with Eul; and (d) thereafter, Gap paid the down payment and the intermediate payment of the purchase price of the apartment to the time when the marital relationship was terminated due to the separate payment; and (d) in light of the fact that Gap received assistance from the mother of the apartment as well-being.

1. The lower court: (a) concluded a supply contract with the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff; hereinafter “the Defendant”) on August 8, 2014, on the ground that the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant; hereinafter “Plaintiff”) reported the marriage with the Plaintiff on August 8, 2014; and (b) the Plaintiff won was selected as the preliminary prize of △△△△△△△△△○, ○○○○, △△△△, △△△△ (hereinafter “instant apartment”) on July 3, 2015; (c) based on the fact that the sales price of the instant apartment was 275,060,000 won, including the remainder of the sales price of the instant apartment from around 7, 2017 to October 1, 2017; and (d) based on the fact that the Defendant’s economic distress, including the down payment, intermediate payment, 193,060,000 won and the down payment,168,1008,1937,2008,000.

2. However, we cannot agree with the above determination by the court below for the following reasons.

A. As a matter of principle, the property subject to division and its amount, when a division of property is conducted through a judicial divorce, shall be determined based on the date of the closing of arguments at the fact-finding court in a divorce lawsuit (see, e.g., Supreme Court Order 2000Meu13, May 2, 2000): Provided, That where special circumstances exist, such as where a change in the property relationship arising between the date of closing of arguments at the fact-finding court following the failure of marriage is unrelated to the property relationship formed jointly during the marriage, and there is a special circumstance, such change shall be excluded from the property subject to division of property (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Meu1455, 1462, Nov. 28, 2013). However, even if one spouse acquires property after the failure of marriage, if it is based on the tangible and intangible resources formed through mutual cooperation between the parties prior to the failure of marriage, it shall be subject to division of property (see Supreme Court Decision 96Meu1397, Jun. 11, 199).

B. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted, the Defendant entered into a supply contract on the instant apartment after commencing a marital life with the Plaintiff, and the Defendant paid 70% of the sales price of the said apartment by down payment and intermediate payment before the failure of the marital relationship, and thus, was anticipated to acquire the ownership of the instant apartment through the payment of the outstanding purchase price prior to the failure of the marital relationship. The Defendant entered into the supply contract and paid the sales price as above, and was able to obtain the ownership of the instant apartment prior to the failure of the marital relationship. The Plaintiff was given birth to the principal of the case and took care of household affairs and childcare from March 2016, and was supported by the Plaintiff’s mother with respect to household affairs and childcare.

In light of these circumstances, even if the Defendant acquired the ownership of the instant apartment after the marriage failure, it is based on the tangible and intangible resources formed by mutual cooperation between the original Defendant and the Defendant before the marriage failure. Therefore, the object of division of property is not the sale price paid before the marriage failure but the apartment of this case acquired before the date of closing argument at the fact-finding court.

Nevertheless, on a different premise, the lower court included only the sale price paid prior to the failure of marriage except for the instant apartment as property division subject to property division. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the subject and the base point of time of property division, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation contained in

3. Therefore, the part of the judgment below regarding division of property is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Jung-hwa (Presiding Justice)